Milly's Institutions

concerning the Holy

Trinity

1703



INSTITUTIONS,

Concerning the

HOLY TRINITY,

And the Manner of our

Saviour's Divinity;

BEING,

- I. An Explication or Declaration of the (General and Current) Doctrine of the Catholic Church, concerning those Articles; and a Desence of the same, against the Socinians and Tritheists. And an Abstract or Summary of the XV Books of St. Austin, concerning the Article of the Trinity, and the depending Articles and Questions; with the Clauses of the Confession of Faith, of the Oriental or Greek Church, that explain also the same.
- II. A Scholastic Dissertation, that represents the Doctrine of the other Latin and Greek Fathers, of the Schoolmen, and of the Divines of the Reformation. This last from the Latin; but with a Conclusion, and Notes added to it.

The Whole an Abridgment of the Learning on these Articles.

By STEPHEN NTE, Rector of Hormead.

LONDON, Printed, and fold by J. Nutt near Stationers Hall. 1703.

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STEPHANUS NYE.

I how much the more Wit or good Sense any Man has, by so much (always) he is more Curious and Inquisitive; and content (or rather pleased) with the Pains, and Attention, that are necessary to a full and sure Information: more especially concerning important Subjects, and that are much litigated. Nor will such mistake Depth, for Obscurity; or Accuracy, for Niceness or Precisity. It is such a Reader that this Book requires; and it will profit no others: more especially the Second Part of it, or the Dissertation. But I will give a particular Account of the Whole; that every Reader may judg for himself, whether he ought to meddle with it, yea or no?

The First Part has two (Principal) Sections. The first Section is only some Part of the Ist and 4th Letters, published about two Years ago, under the Title of The Doctrin of the Holy

Holy Trinity, and the manner of our Saviour's Divinity, as they are held in the Catholic Church and the Church of England; in four Letters, to a Peer. But bere I have explained some things more clearly, and fully, than in those Letters: and I have expressed some others more in the Forms and to the Mind of the Metaphysicians, and Scholastics; to take away Occasion from those Pedlars in Learning, who being but Cavillers, would yet set up for Critics. The other Section of this Part, is an Abridgment of the 15 Books of St. Austin, concerning the Holy Trinity; because the Authority of this Father has always been reverenced as decisive, (especially in these Questions) by the Catholic Church. This Part will be obvious and easy enough, to what soever Reader; and contains nothing but what is necessary to be known by all, for the avoiding of Herely, or Tritheism.

The second Part, being a Scholastic Dissertation, will require more Attention in the Reader, and that he be content to go over it more than once: if he would fully understand all of it. But for the sake of those, who are indeed the most, that love not to take too much

Pains ;

Pains; I have added a Conclusion, which is a Summary and an Elucidation of the Dissertation: all the Opinions are there clearly represented, and a Judgment made of them. The Sections of the Dissertation, are these;

I. May the Doctrine of the Trinity, be-

ing a Mystery, be explained?

II. How much of the Doctrine of the Trinity, is necessary to be believed by all Christians, as a Condition of their Salvation?

III. What Traces and Likenesses of the Divine Trinity may we find in the External

Creation?

IV. What in the Human Soul, or Soul

of Man?

V. Is there a Trinity of PRINCIPLES (or Essential Attributes) in God, as well as in the Soul?

VI. In what doth the Trinity of PRIN.
CIPLES in the Soul, agree with the Divine

Trinity of Principles or Persons?

VII. Is the Trinity of Principles and of Persons in God, the same? This Section hath many lesser ones, viz.

we render WORD) signify in the context of

St. John, Chap. 1. Vers. 1, 2, &c.

2. What is a Person?

3. What is a Relation, in God?

4. What are the Foundations of the Relations in God?

5. Wherein do the Divine Principles (or Powers) in God, differ from one another?

6. What have the Fathers said of this Mat-

ter!

7. VV hat is the Doctrine of the Scholas-

tics, or Divines of the middle Ages?

8. VVhat have the Divines of the Reformation (those that began and perfected the Reformation) said?

VIII. The Determination and Judgment of the Author, concerning the Divine PRIN-

CIPLES and PERSONS.

IX. His Propositions concerning the Tri-

nity; Name and Thing.

X. The Conclusion, by the Translator; being a Sum, and Elucidation, of the whole.

When the School-Doctors speak here, it will seem sometimes obscure, sometimes Aat; to those that understand not the Metaphysical Terms and Notions; but Learned

Men

Men know that, those accurate Distinctions and Divisions are useful, and are almost necesfary, to an exact Knowledg of Things. But Divines, or any that study Theology, must by no means be wholly unacquainted with them; because without em, they cannot read the ablest Authors, especially in the Trinitarian and Quinquarticular Controversies. This Dissertation, read sometimes, will acquaint a capable Reader with the meaning of most of the Scholastic and Metaphysical Notions and Terms. Armandus de Bello visu (or Bellovisius) has explained almost all of them, in his Lexicon; Scheibler very many of them, in his Metaphylics.

I should excuse the great Number of Authors, and Authorities here, to the same thing, if I did not foresee that, it is absolutely necessary for appeasing those, who will be so much surprized that the Faith of the Church, is so different from the Vulgar meaning of the Terms

in which she expresses it.

. . .

I expect, to be again charged, as too nice and curious in these Institutions; I refer my self therefore to what I have largely said thereupon, in divers places, of this Treatise.

If

If that will not satisfy, I must answer to such my Accusers, as they deserve: namely that, Fools are always Incurious; and all the Incurious (so far forth, or in proportion thereto) are Fools. To such, I never intended to write; and they shall do well, not to concern themselves with Books.

ERRATA.

Page 3. lin. 15. for always, read ordinarily. P. 5. 1.32, 33. dele it is the Individual Intellectual Nature. P. 25. 1. 8, 9. f. constantly, r. ordinarily. P. 41. 1.32, 33. r. understand. P. 47. 1.3. r. dicitur. P. 52. 1. 26. r. Oeconomies. P. 65. 1. 27, 28. r. mijerable. P. 71. 1.15. r. concrete. P. 72, 74, 76, 78, 80. r. the running Title thus, Some Questions and Controversies. P. 109. 1. 9. f. Art, r. Act. P. 128. 1. 31. r. Legas. P. 147. 1. 31. r. Soncinas. P. 167. 1. 29. r. Gisbert.

ADVERTISE MENT.

THE three following Books publish'd by Mr. Stephen Nye, which contain a Vindication of the Catholick Church and the Church of England, in several Important Points of Faith, may be had of J. Nutt near Stationers Hall, either single, or bound up with these Institutions; viz.

The System of Grace and Freewill, in a Visitation-Sermon.

A Defence of the Canon of the New Testament, in answer

to Mr. Toland's Amyntor.

The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and the Manner of our Saviour's Divinity. In several Letters to a Peer.

A Catalogue of the Authors cited in this Treatise.

FATHERS.

Thanagoras. Athanasius. Augustinus. Ambrosius. Anselmus. Agnellus. Andreas Casariens. Basilius Cesariens. Basilius Seleuc. Boethius. Clemens Rom. Clemens Alexandr. Cyprianus. Constantinus M. Cyrillus Hierof. Cyrillus Alexandr. Chryfostomus. Chryfologus. Casarius. Damascenus. Eugenius Carthus. Edmundus Cantuar. Ephrem. Epipbanias. Fulgentius. Gennadius Schol.

Gregorius Nys. Gregorius Naz. Gregorius Thaumat. Guitmundus. Guilielmus Parisiensis. Gerson. Hieronymus. Hugo de S. Victore. Hilarius Pictav. Justinus. Irenaus. Joannes Hieros. Isidorus Pelus. Lucianus Mart. Lactantius. Leo I. Rom. Macarius. Maximus Mart. Methodius. Origenes. Peregrinus Laureac. Potho. Synesius. Tatianus. Theophilus Antioch. Tertullianus.

The.

Authors cited in this Treatife.

Theorianus.
Theodorus Abuc.
Thalassius.

Zeno Veronens. Zacharias Metylen.

SCHOOLMEN.

A Quinas. Albertinus,

Aureolus.

Alensis.

Ægidius Rom.

Bassolis.

Bonaventura.

Biel.

Cajetanus.

Capreolus.

Durandus.

Estius.

Ferrius.

Ferrariensis.

Fonseca.

Franciscus à S. Clarâ.

Faber.

Gregorius de Valentià.

Henricus Gandav.

Hurtadus de Mend.

Holkor.

Hervaus Natalis.

Joannes de Ripa.

Lychetus.

Lyranus.

Lombardus.

Molina.

Mairo.

Meurisse.

Nicholaus D' Orbellis:

Ockamus.

Palacios.

Petrus à Joseph.

Rada.

Richardus de S. Victore.

Scotus.

Scotellus.

Soncinas.

Suaresius.

Toletus.

Trombeta.

Vasquesius.

Zabarella.

MODERNS.

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Amesius.

Beza.

Becanus.

Bucanu.

Bullingerus.

Beumlerus.

Baxterus.

Calvinus. 1 2 to the contract of the contract

Cluto.

Chamierus.

Deodati.

Dutch Annotations.

Davenantius.

Fayus.

Forbesius, à Corse.

Fennerus.

Gomarus.

Grotius.

Hommius.

Harmonia Confessionum.

Illyricus.

Junius.

Fansenius.

Keckermannus.

Maccovius.

Maldonatus.

to the to

Martyr.

Musculus.

Matth. Martinius.

Maresius.

Melanchton.

Paræus.

Petavins.

Polanus.

Posewitz.

Polyander.

Sohnius.

Snecanus.

Jul. Scaliger.

Scheiblerus.

Scharpins.

Spanhemius.

Trelcacius Jun.

Thysins.

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Sec. 18.

Theses Sedanenses.

Theses Salmurienses.

Valla.

P. Voetius.

Ursinus.

Walaus.

Wigandus.

Zanchius.

Zuinglius.

Institutions, concerning the Holy Trinity, and the Manner of our Saviour's Divinity.

PARTI

An Explication or Declaration of the (General and Current) Doctrine of the Catholick Church, and of the Church of England, concerning those Articles; and a Defence of the same, against the Socinians, and Tritheists.

T is self-evident that, to hold the Doctrines of the Trinity, and of our Saviour's Divinity; in the Terms only, without knowing the Sense intended (by the Catholick Church) in those Terms; is to be no more positively Orthodox, in these Articles, than an Ideot is.

They properly are Infidels, or Unbelievers, that know not (or what is the same, understand not) the Faith of the Church. To know it, and yet deny it,

is not un belief, but dis belief.

There is no other difference between such a Heathen, that never heard of the Trinity; and a Chri-Rian, that understands not what he ought to mean

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by

by it; but that the latter is culpably (if not damnably) ignorant, as having both neglected his Duty, and abused his Opportunities; and the other (the Heathen) hath neither of those Guilts upon

him, he shall answer only for his Immoralities.

Whereas some say here, the Trinity and Incarnation are Mysteries; and that therefore all (pretended) Explications and Declarations of them, are to be rejected; as not only Presumptuous, but False also. It is true indeed that, so far forth as any thing is a Mystery, 'tis not Intelligible, and therefore not Explicable. But the Objectors were never taught by the Catholick Church, that these Articles of the Christian Faith are wholly and altogether Mysteries; but Mysteries, in some part and degree revealed: and that, fo far forth as they are revealed, they may and ought to be declared and expounded, to such as do not competently know them, or are in Errors concerning them. That these Articles are Mysteries revealed in some part and degree, is as much held and taught (and inculcated also) by the Catholick Church; as that, they are in some respects (still) great and absolute Mysteries.

I hope, these present Papers (the Effects of much Study and Reading, and of long Consideration) will sufficiently declare the revealed Part of these Mysteries: which is so necessary to be known, for the avoiding divers Herefies; and which the Catholick Church therefore bath fo many ways proposed to her Children. As, in the Creeds, and Canons of Councils; in the solemn Condemnations of divers. He-reticks, or Heresies; and in the Didactical and Controversial Writings of so many Fathers, Schoolmen, and

Modern Divines. I say therefore,

The Belief of the Church in these (necessary)
Articles of, three Divine Persons, and the Divinity of our Saviour; as it lies in the Creeds and Canons of Councils,

Councils, the (judicial) Condemnations of Herefies, and the Gurrent of approved Writers; may be couched in these (following) Heads, or Distinctions.

I. There is but One (Infinite All-perfect) uncreated BEING, SPIRIT, or MIND; who is fole MAKER of Heaven, and Earth; sole Object of Divine Worship, properly so called; and whom we usually design by this word, GOD.

II. The Divinity, or God, (and more especially the Logos, WISDOM, or WORD) hath affumed the Humanity of Christ, into fuch an intimate, personal, and indissoluble Union with it self; that thereby the Human Nature is always under Divine Illumination and Conduct; and the Divinity doth always exert its natural and eternal Perfections in, and (as far as the Humanity is capable) by the Human Nature. The Mary Cylno J

When I say, the natural and eternal Perfections of the Divinity; I mean the Attributes of Omniscience; and Omnipotence, and the rest. For the Omniscience of the Lord Christ was manifested in the knowledg of the Thoughts, and of the Future: His Impipotence, in the Power of Miracles; and of Creation, as when

he twice multiplied the Loaves.

When I say, as far as the Humanity is capable, it is to obviate the Eutychian Herefy, that turned the Hu= manity into God: And because some of the Divine Persections seem altogether incommunicable, as the Omni-presence, and Pra evernity; tho also Christ as God, or with respect to the inhabiting Divinity, is Præeternal, and Omni-present.

The Catholick Church expresses this Faith very justifiably, by the Terms Incarnation; Perfonal Union, God, God-man. Some others, more nice than is needful, keep to the words of Scripture; the Man 7e sus

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Jesu Christ, in whom dwelleth the Fulness of the Godhead: which yet is all that the Church means by those exceeding proper Terms, Incarnation, God-man, &c.

We shall see by and by very fully, what is intended by the Logos (which the Greek Church interprets WISDOM; the Latin, not so properly, WORD) and which we say was Incarnate. But here we must fo far anticipate, as to observe that; whereas 'tis the general (and I think, truer) Opinion, that only the WISDOM, or SON was Incarnate, not the whole TRINITY; cis to be understood thus. The WISDOM (not as it a mere PERSON A-LITY, but) as 'tis Understood with, or as it Implies and Compriseth that whole Divine Nature, or Godbead, with all its Attributes and Perfections, was united to the Humanity of our Saviour, or doth inhabit his Human Nature: whereby he is as compleatly and perfectly God, as he should be if the whole Trinity (and not the SON only) were Incarnate. And by occasion hereof, I must add also here; when we say, the Divinity (the Fulness of the Godhead, as St. Paul speaks) doth inhabit, or is united to the Humanity of Christ: 'Tis not meant by the Church, the Divinity becomes but commensurate to the Huma-nity, Infinite to Finite; nor yet, as Eutyches ima-gined, that the Humanity is deified, that is, becomes Omnipresent; Impassible, and the rest of that kind; Perfections that are plainly incommunicable to the Humanity, and would destroy it. But we mean; as God is perfectly and equally God in whatfoever portion of space, in the least imaginable Extension, no less than in the whole Immensity of his Essence: therefore he can fully and perfectly communicate himself to the Humanity of Christ, tho but Finite. As the whole Nature and (physical) Perfection of Fire, is in, every part of the Fire, even in a Spark; and the whole (constitutive). Perfection and Nature

of Water is in a single Drop, no less than in the whole Rhine or Danube: So is the whole Nature and (essential) Perfection of God in every (and the least) assignable part of the Divine Infinitude. But if we reserve these Considerations, till we are got over the next Head, or Particular, they will be more easily and fully apprehended.

III. God is most perfectly One, in respect of Essence, Understanding, Power of Action, and Will; these are truly and numerically one in God, as in an Angel, or a Man. There is however such a Modal Distinction in God, that thereupon he is called, and is three Persons; not in the ordinary and vulgar Sense of the term Person, but in the Theological.

This modal Distinction hath been declared and explained, with some Latitude; as to the Terms, and

even as to the Characters of the Persons.

Some Divines (as well Fathers as Schoolmen) make the Character of the first Person to be attive Power, or Life, or VITAL ACTIVITY; of the Second, to be Understanding, or Wisdom, or SELF-KNOWLEDG; of the Third, Love, or WILL. For Love in God is not, as in us, a Pafsion; but his Essential WILL. In short, these three, SELF-LIVING, SELF-KNOWING, SELF-LOVING, are God's (Essential Immanent) Alts on himself, the Eternal Object: therefore several of the Antients, of the School-Doctors, and of the Moderns, go no farther, in accounting for the Mystery of the Trinity. They alledg that, "A Divine Person is a Mode, or Property, of an "individual intellectual Nature; it is the indi-"vidual Intellectual Nature; it is the individual Divine Nature, with a discretive Property, or parti-Consequently, God, or the Divine Nature, is THREE PERSONS, on the ac-"count B 3

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"count of the aforesaid Modes or Properties; that
"u, as he is SELF-LIVING, SELF-KNOWING,

and SELF-LOVING. Nor is he more than I bree

Fersons; because these are the only Essential, Im-

manent (or Internal) Acts of God.

These Doctors were never censured, or blamed in the Church; as desective in the Faith, or as less Orthodox than they ought to have been. The Fathers that go this way; are mentioned in the (following) Difference: The School-Doctors that I have noted, are Durand. I. d. 38. qu. 1. Thom. I. qu. 19. a 4. ad quintum, and qu. 25. art. 1. Suarez, Metaphys. disp. 30. p. 113, 114. Of the Moderns, Wendelinus, Alstedius, and Sceibler. Of our English Divines, Mr. Baxter in his Catholic Theology, but very largely in his Methodius Theologia; indeed it is the governing Thought that directs his whole Method or System, and goes through it.

But because the this Explication accounts for the notion of PERSONS in the Divine Nature; yet it doth not, with so obvious Facility, satisfy for the RELATIONS (Father, Son, and Spirit that proceeds from both) in God: therefore the more current Exposition is St. Austin's, as here followerh.

The first Person in the Holy Trinity, is unbegotten Mind, or Intellect, or GRIGINAL WISDOM; the sole Cause (or Principle) of the Second, and therefore (by analogy to things, Natural, and condescension to the Human Understanding) called the FATHER.

Next is the Logos, the Reflex or begotten W1S-DOM; even the Wisdom that is generated by, or that resulteth from, Eternal MIND's contemplating and knowing its own Persections; that Ideal Representation, Self-knowledg, or express Image (as St. Paul speaks) that is necessarily begotten within himself, by the Facher's knowing and understanding himself, and therefore is named the SON.

Lastly,

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Lastly, The Divine Volition or LOVE (the joint Act of Father and Son;) by which God loveth or willeth himself; the Eternal SPIRATION, or, as it were, breathing of Love towards himself; on that account fitly called the SPIRIT.

They do not mean however that, mere WIS-DOM, or KNOWLEDG, or LOVE in God, is a Person: but each of these Idioms, as 'tis understood with, or as it includeth the Divine Nature, or Godhead, with all its Attributes and Perfections, is rightly called a Person, and a Divine Person. And hence also we fay, each Person is truly and properly GOD, BE-ING, SPIRIT; but not a God, a Being, a Spirit; because 'tis the same (numerical) God, Being, Spirit, who, as having these three Idioms (Characters, Acts, Modes, Personalities) is therefore named Three Persons.

It is (undeniably) with respect to this Explica-tion of the Trinity, that the Divines of the Schools, the General Councils of the Lateran and Lyons, the Councils of Toledo, &c. have defined that, the SON is eternally generated, and the SPIRIT eternally proceeds. They rightly make the Generation and Spira-tion (or Procession) to be Essential, Permanent, and Eternal Acts; because eternal original Mind must needs be understood to Know, and Will, or LOVE it self, by a continual perpetual Act. And from hence also they truly infer that, the Generation and Pro-cession are natural and necessary, not arbitrary and free Acts. As also that, there can be no more Persons in the Divine Nature, but only these three; only original MIND, the reflex WISDOM, and the eternal Spiration of Love, or SELF-COMPLACENCE: for these compleat the Notion, and Perfection of God; and without them he should neither be Happy, nor God.

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LOVE naturally ariseth, or proceedeth, from what is apprehended, and is KNOWN, as our greatest and most connatural Good: And the greatest Good of God can be no other, but that he perfectly KNOWETH himself; for He only is a perfect Object. From whence we see, how the Spirit, who is the Divine LOVE, proceeds from the Father and the Son, (or from Mind or INTELLECT, and from SELF-KNOWLEDG;) and that this whole Discourse, of Original MIND, reslex KNOWLEDG, and LOVE, is verified (as the Schools and Metaphysicians speak) in the Divine Nature.

When we say, this Trinity is a Mystery; 'tis because all the Terms in which the Holy Scriptures or Church have delivered these Articles, are equivocal, or do not fignify the same thing as in Human Speech: Father, Son, and Spirit are not here intended, as among Men; as neither is Persons. Persons, Father, Son, Spirit, Generation, Procession, Spiration, Begotten, in the Divinity are so called, as was before said, only by an Analogy (or remote likeness) to things Natural, and by condescension to the Human Under-standing. In all created Persons, so many Persons are so many distinct Substances, Understandings, Wills, and Powers of Action; they are so many distinct BE-INGS, MINDS, and SPIRITS. In like manner also do Father and Son differ, in all the created kinds; they are as distinct and several (by their respective Substances, Understandings, Wills) as three Angels do differ (or are distinct) from three Men. How extremely unlike is this Alterity and Diversity, to the real Unity of the Divine Persons; or of Father, Son, and Spirit, in God? For these in God, as we have said, are not distinguished, by distinct Substances, Under standings, Wills, &c. but are numerically one Substance, Understanding, Being, Spirit; they differ, as a Mind and its Ads.

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The great variety of Terms; used by Divines, in treating of this Question; perplexes and confounds most Readers: who are not aware that, all these so (seemingly) different Terms signify the same thing; but because none of them express it adequately, therefore for a more clear and perfect. Conception of this Article, we willingly use all forts of Terms and Explications that help to enlighten it. Thus, Mr. Hooker, Author of the Ecclesiaftical Policy, says: "The Divine Substance (or Essence) with this Property, to be of none, maketh the Per-fon of the FATHER; the same Divine Es-" sence with this Property, to be of the Father, maketh the Person of the SON; the self-same Divine Essence or Substance with this Property, to be of Both, maketh the Person of the Holy SPIRIT. So that, in every Person there is implied, the SUBSTANCE of God, and also the PROPER-"TY, which causeth the same Person to differ

"from the other two. It is not a novel Explication, devised by Mr.

Hooker; but the Explication commonly received in the Church, and only represented in other equivalent Terms. For by the Property, to be of None (which, he saith, together with the Divine Essence, doth make the Person of the Father) he means O-RIGINAL WISDOM. Mr. Hooker calls it the Property to be of None, because 'tis un-begotten and unoriginated. By the Property to be of the Father, he means the Reflex, or BEGOTTEN WISDOM; which is generated (in the manner before declared) by Original Wisdom, or the Father, and is therefore named the Son. He faith again, to proceed from both maketh the third Person. Right, for Divine LOVE proceeds from unbegotten MIND and the reflex WISDOM. He concludes as foundly; "Each Divine Person is the Divine Substance with one of " these these Properties, and consisteth of the Property and the Substance. Tis as much as to say; a Divine Person, is either ORIGINAL WISDOM (which is of none) together with the Divine Essence: or it is the Divine Essence with the REFLEX WISDOM, which is of the former; or (lastly) 'tis the same Divine Essence or Substance, with the Spiration of

LOVE, which proceeds from both.

by abstract or concrete Names; which when used of Creatures, or their Qualities or Acts, are readily understood by every Body: but when applied to the Subject of this Article, are understood only by the Learned's and often misunderstood even by them, unless they have been long conversant in these Questions: I say, those as well abstract as concrete Terms and Names, do all refer to that Explication of this Article that is before given; they are intended only farther to explain it, and do explain it.

These Terms or Names are Acts, Properties, Modes, Subsistences, Characters, Idioms, Notes, Noticus, Ideas, Relations, Persons, Personalities, Essence, Substance, Trinity. Their meaning is, briefly, as

here follows:

The Divine Persons are called ACTS; because Wisdom and Love are indeed Essential Asts of God, on himself the Eternal Object. Yet it is not the mere Att that is a Person, but the Divine Essence (or God-

head, or God) thus alting.

They are PROPERTIES, IDIOMS, and CHA-RACTERS; as they distinguish, and thereby variously denominate, the Divine Essence. For in respect of one Property, Character, or Idiom, the Divine Essence is named the Father; in respect of another, the Son; in respect of the third, the Holy Spirit. But we must always remember that, these Appellations are not used Universally (or in the same sense and respect)

spect) concerning God and any Creatures, or their Acts. Only the Term or Word Ens, an Entity or Being, is predicated Univocally of God and Creature; and the more nice Metaphysicians will scarce allow, that, the Creature is Ens in the same sense as God is. Mr. Baxter, for instance, says: "If God and Creature is Ens, then either distinct or the same; not " the same, for then the Creature should be God: "if distinct and several, then there is more Entity in God and the Creature, than in God alone; for " two is numerally more than One, and two Beings have more Entity than One, how small soever " the lesser be; and then God shall be but part of

" Universal Entity, which is Imperfection.

They are NOTES, NOTIONS, IDEAS; as they serve to norify, or declare to us, the peculiar and proper Distinctions and Acts of the Divine Perfons. As namely that, the first Person is the Godhead (or God) under the Notion of Un-begotten MIND; the second is the same God, Godhead or Divine Essence, under the Idea of Reslex WISDOM; the third is the same Godhead under the Note of Di-They are RELATIONS, as from the (analogical)

Acts of Generation and Spiration there ariseth in God the mystical Relation of FATHER, SON, and SPIRIT

proceeding from both.

They are MODES, and SUBSISTENCES; or if you will, MODES of existing; as by occasion of them God is considered as existing, after three Modes or Manners; namely, as Un-begotten MIND, reflex or generated WISDOM, and as loving or WILLING himself.

They are PERSONALITIES, when consider'd abstractedly; that is, separately, from the Divine Essence or Godhead: they are Persons, when consider'd concretely, that is, together with the Divine Efsence ;

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sence; each of them so consider'd, is no longer a mere Personality, but a Person; a Person living, intelligent, really existing. [Note, In my four Letters concerning the Trinity, printed Anno 1701. to these last words of this Paragraph, a Person living, intelligent, really existing; by the liberality of the Press, there are also added these words, and not subsisting only, which were never intended by me, and indeed destroy the Sense; tho (I see) some have taken

them as implying some great Depth.]

The Divine ESSENCE, or SUBSTANCE, is the Godhead, or God; with all Divine Attributes and

Perfections.

The TRINITY is the same Divine Essence, as distinguished by its three Properties or Relations, that have been before fully described.

But we may note farther that, of these Terms,

fome are more generally used, and are warranted by greater Authorities, than the rest are: such are the Terms, MODES, PROPERTIES, and PERSONS; therefore I will speak more particularly of them:

MODE is a Term more antient than any of the rest, and also more proper; it is older than the Term TRINITY it self; it was used by Justin Martyr within less than 140 Years after our Saviour. His words are, Μία ἐπόςκοις, τρόποι ζ ἐπάρξεως τρεις, One Substance or ESSENCE, three MODES of Existing. 'Tis used also by J. Damascen, the first of the Fathers that collected together the scatter'd and confused parts of Theology into a regular System or Body; his words are, Έπι της άγίας τριάδιω, τρόως της δείν ο άναρχο τρόωο της αιδίε τωάς-ξεως; " In the Holy Trinity, a Person is an Eternal "MODE or manner of existing." Tis also the most common Term of the Divines of the middle Ages, called the Scholasticks, or School-Doctors. What

is meant by it, in these Questions, was intimated before, when we said; "The Divine Persons are " called Modes, as by occasion of them, God is confidered as existing after three Modes or Manners; namely, as un-begotten MIND, as gene "rated and reflex WISDOM, and as loving or WILLING himself. 'Tis a frivolous Exception that Maccovins makes to this Term, when he fays; "Tis but improperly used of the Divine Persons, " for a Mode is always posterior to that of which it is the Mode; which we must not say of the Divine Persons, in respect of the Divine Essence or "God. For the Affections of Being that we call Modes, are often connate to the Beings of which they are the Modes: And in particular 'tis evident' in the case before us, that INTELLECT SELF-KNOWLEDG SELF-COMPLACENCE are fuch Modes of Divinity, as are Co-eternal to it; and therefore Damascen (before-cited) calls them Tpóποι άναρχοι praseternal Modes. w chow all 26 24 100

PROPERTIES is much used by the Greek Fathers; and it signifies here much the same, as in common Speech : for INTELLECT SELF-KNOW-LEDG SELF-COMPLACENCE are Properties of God, in such sense as Rationality and Risibility are said to be Properties of Man; they are not the Essence of Man, but are natural and inseparable Adjuncts of his Essence, and thereby distinguished from Accidents. That which has made this word the more authentick, is the Programma of the Emperor Justin, to which all the Churches of the Orient (tho not especially thereto required) gave their Affent ; as Evagrius has informed us, Hist. Eccl. 1. 5. c. 4. In this Programma it is said; "We adore the Trinity in Unity, " and Unity in Trinity: an Unity, as to ES" SENCE or GODHEAD; a Trinity, as to PRO-

" PERTIES or PERSONS. In the Greek,

τριάδα ή ματά τας Ιδιότητας ήτοι Πρόσωπα.

Mr. Calvin, after a judicious and learned Differtation concerning the Holy Trinity, and the Term Persons, concludes, and summeth up all in these words: "But if any are so nice, that after all they "will not allow the word Persons, yet do what they can, they must confess that when we say One, we mean the Substance: when we say Three, we intend that in the Divine Essence or Substance there are Three Properties. Which being sincerely action when the substance will not litigate with them. Instit. C. 6. S. 25. p. 179. Genev. 1550.

But PERSONS is now more commonly, and almost only, used. St. Austin faith of it, "We use the Term Pensons, not because we find it in Scripture, but because the Scriptures do not contradict it; and by a kind of necessity, as labouring under the scripture of the scripture.

Sider wants of words de Trin. Lyjinivic in bold

As the Latins did not at first like the Term Hypostasis, so the Greeks were distainsfied with Prosopon, or Person: but they came to an Agreement, by fixing a determinate sense on those very ambiguous words; the Batins were content with Hypostasis, and the Greeks with Prosopon, as both are interpreted by Justin Marryr's Trow & waxpeens, a MODE or manner of existing in

well established; but one Sciolist or other would be excepting to it; either out of Vanity, or on Mistake and Ignorance accordingly this Faith of the Church, has been attacked by divers Objections; some of them indeed from otherways Learned Men, but the most from such as were ignorant. I shall mention only the Objections that are considerable; and from able Persons, or Parties.

Bridge

Of some Objections.

Of this fort I account the Author of the Intellectual System, Dr. Ralph Cudworth, who revived the Errors of Valentinus Gentilis, concerning the Trinity. He makes the Three Divine Persons to be di-finct Substances in number, and only the Father to be truly and properly God, or Almighty, and Al-knowing; the other two Persons to be Subordinate to the Father in Power and Authority, and wholly dependent on him. Therefore he could not endure the Doctrine of the Schools (which is indeed the Doctrine of the Catholick Church) concerning the Trinity. He complements us in a very extraord nary manner, on our Explication of that Article; he saith, 'The Scholastick Trinity is a pure fargonry, the Philosophy of Gotham: a Trinity that falls not under Human Conception, and which cannot be in Nature. A phantastick Trinity, of merely nominal Persons; Persons only in name, not in reality. It was invented by P. Lombard, Father of the School-Doctors, and Bishop of Paris; and never was authorized by any publick Authority, except at the Council of Lateran, in the Year

I was surprized I confess, that Dr. Cudworth should presume to say; the Catholick Faith, or as he calls it the Scholastick Trinity, is a Novelty, devised by the Bishop of Paris: and which hath no Warrant, but the Council of the Lateran. We quoted before, the Words of Justin Marty, scarce 140 Years after our Saviour; one ESSENCE, three MODES of Existing: and the Definition of J. Damascen, a Person in the Holy Trinity is a MODE or Manner of existing; which, tho in so few words, implies the whole Doctrine of the Schools concerning the Trinity. The Programma

also, receiv'd by all the Greek Churches, is about 600

Years older than P. Lombard Bishop of Paris.

As for the Latin Church, St. Austin has written 15 Books of the Trinity; the Sum and Substance of them all, is only this; "Mens, Notisia, Amor, "(MIND, WISDOM, LOVE,) are the three Persons of the Holy Trinity: the Blessed Trinity is God, considered as original WISDOM, and as KNOWING and WILLING Himself. This was followed by the School-Dostors, and middle Ages; in particular, by the General Councils of Lateran, and Lyons, and by the Councils of Toledo. Those Councils, as well in their Consessions as Canons, very carefully adhere to the Doctrine of St. Austin, and of the Schools concerning the Trinity.

Of the modern Jargonists, I shall mention only Mr. Calvin. He is a perfect Disciple of St. Austin; as well in this, as in other Articles of Religion: in the 6th Chapter of his Institutions, Genev. 1550. he saith. Non est tamen inanis vel supervacua ordinis obse servatio; dum primus recensetur Pater; deinde ex eo Filius, postea ex utroque Spiritus. Nam & Mens uniuscujusque eò sponte inclinat, ut primo DEUM consideret, deinde emergentem ex co SAPIENTIAM; tum postremo Virtutem, qua confilii sui decreta exequitur: qua ratione duntaxat a Patre existere dicitur Filius; a Patre simul & Filio Spiritus. In short, thus; "Tis even natural to conceive, first GOD, next his Restex WIS-DOM; then his POWER, by which he executes his Counsels and Will; on which account only we say, the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Spirit of both. But note here that, Mr. Caluin, in his reciting the Order of the Divine Persons, calls only the Father, GOD; but he did this only by way of Appropriation, as they speak. That is, not as if the second and third

third Persons were not also God, and equally so with the First; but on the account that the Father is Fons Deitatis, as the Antients spoke, the Fountain and Cause of the other two Persons; as is before described. And this way of speaking of the Father, is not peculiar to Mr. Calvin; other Orthodox Writers, and the Scriptures themselves, sometimes use it, as hath been observed too by others, who have written on these Questions.

The Authority of the Lateran Council is not so light, as Dr. Cudworth would intimate; much less is this the only Council that confirms the Exposition of the Holy Trinity, now generally received. The Council of the Lateran, in the Year 1215. consisted of LXX Metropolitans, CCCC Bishops, other Fathers more than DCCC; the Ambassadors of the Roman and Greek Emperors, of the Kings of England, Spain, France, Jerusalem, and Cyprus. They followed the preceding Councils, in accounting for the Mystery of the Trinity; and have been expressy approved by all the Subsequent Councils.

Dr. Cudworth, in opposition to that Council, describes the Divine Persons to be Nóes, MINDS; and Trévuata, SPIRITS: but neither he, nor Dr. Pain, could alledg so much as one Council or Father, that ever so spoke. So little reason had they, to accuse the Catholick Doctrine, as Novel; or not warranted

by a sufficient Number of good Authorities.

In short, the Gothamites and Jargonists defend themselves very well against this sirst Objection; and re-

tort it, on their Oppolers.

But others have rais'd another Exception, to the Doctrine of the Church; before described. They say; by this Account, not only GOD, but every other intelligent Being, shall be three Persons: for every Angel, and every Man, has these three Modes, Properties, or whatever else you will call them; Mind or original WISDOM, restex or generated KNOW-LEDGS.

LEDG, and LOVE towards it self. If these internal Distinctions do not make a Man, or an Angel, to be three Persons; or introduce the Relations of Father, Son, and Spirit: why should it be said, they are three Persons, or introduce three Relations, in God? This is an Objection of the Unitarians; much infisted on by a *Polander*, who undertook to answer B. Keckerman, Professor at Dantzick; and by M. Ruarus in his Letters to (the Learned Minim) Marinus Mersennus. The Metaphysicians, and particularly, our Countryman Mr. Serjeant, in his Appendix to his Transnatural Pholosophy, answer here with many Subtleties and Finenesses; from the Metaphysical School: in my Opinion, the Catholick Faith hath no need of them; and the true Answer is this. The Objectors have not considered that, PERSONS and RELATIONS, when used of God, are scientifical Terms; and therefore have a peculiar meaning in Theology, altogether different from their Intendment in familiar Speech. There is no Science or Art; whether Sacred or Civil, whether Learned or Mechanical; but has its Terms that are peculiar to itself only: which Terms are Words, all of them borrowed, from common and familiar Speech; but used by the Art, in quite another Sense; a Sense peculiar to the Science or Art. Therefore we are not to be surprized at it, that PERSON, in common Speech and use, is a particular Being, distinct from all other Beings; and that hath sundry Properties or Modes belonging to it: but in the Science of Theology, when we speak of God, it is only a Mode or Property; as such Mode is considered together with the Divine Essence, Godhead, or God. The Terms of Sciences and Arts are most commonly Arbitrary; we are not to demand a Reason of them: tis sufficient that, they are explained to us; and that when we know what is intended by them, we fird our selves instructed in something that is either use-

ful, or curious. Notwithstanding, in the choice of Terms, we sometimes affect some fort of Analogy; some Degree of Likeness, between the things: that is, the thing intended by the Word, as it is a scientifical Term; and the thing intended by it, in ordinary Use and Speech. And hence, because SELF-KNOW-LEDG, and SELF-COMPLACENCE, are generated by MIND; therefore in Theology, these Acts and Properties have the Names of Father, Son, and Spirit proceeding from both; and for the same Reason they are called RELATIONS. And again, because by Person in ordinary Speech we mean a particular Intelligent Being, distinguished from all other Beings, by some peculiar Property or Mode; therefore the Godhead, or God, as considered to three different and discretive Modes or Properties, is considered as (or is named) three Persons. And we appropriate to God this way of speaking; we extend it not to Creatures, whether Angels or Men; out of Reverence to the Divinity: and because these Properties are so much more excellent and perfect in God, than in what soever Creatures; that the same Name agreeth not to them. And lastly because, as the Fathers exprest themselves in this Matter, WISDOM and SELF-COMPLA-CENCE in God are Permanene; and always in Act: while ours is transient, and passes away, dying in the very Act; of which, more hereafter. And it should feem, this Account must necessarily be admitted, by all the Orthodox; who acknowledg no other but a modal Distinction in God. It was a Remark, worthy of his Learning and Judgment, that Dr. Edward Stilling sleet, late Bishop of Worcester, makes in his Preface to his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Triniy. When we consider, saith the Bishop, a Divine Essence; there can be no Distinction conceived in it, but by different MODES of subsisting; or what is the same, RELATIVE PRO-66 PER-C 2

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PERTIES in the same Divine Essence. Pref.

p. 16.

There is yet this farther Scruple. It is not very obvious, how reflex or generated WISDOM can be said to be incarnate: or how, if the Son and Spirit are only the SELF-KNOWLEDG and SELF-LOVE of God, they can be invocated in such a Form as this: "O God the SON have mercy upon us " miserable Sinners; O God the HOLY GHOST have mercy upon us miserable Sinners. Nay, and the words, O God the FATHER have mercy upon us miserable Sinners, will be as improper; for the Father, in this Hypothesis, is not a distinct Being; the Father, as the first Person of the Trinity, is no more but unbegotten WIS DOM. Farther, the Expresfions in the Nicene Creed, and divers in the Holy Scripture, attribute such Properties and Acts to the Divine Persons, as plainly suppose them to be Beings and Spirits: It seems, they cannot be interpreted (unforcedly and naturally) of a mere SELF-KNOWLEDG, SELF-LOVE, or Original WISDOM of God.

This is the great Objection of the Tritheists; or of those that hold, the Persons of the Trinity are, so many infinite Spirits, Minds, and Beings: It is solely grounded, on a misapprehension of the Chur-

ches Meaning, and Doctrine.

For first, the Church doth not say that, mere SELF-KNOWLEDG (or generated WISDOM) was Incarnate; but this Property, "as taken with, or as it comprises the Divine Essence, Godhead, or God, with all his Persections and Attributes, was Incarnate. Which is warranted by divers (clear) Texts; as, Col. 2. 9. In him [Christ Jesus] dwelleth the Fulness of the Godhead. Col. 2. 3. In whom [the Lord Christ] are all the Treasures of WISDOM and KNOWLEDG. I Cor. 1. 24.

We preach Christ, the Power of God, and the WIS-DOM of God. Rev. 19. 13. His Name is called (δλόγ Φ 78 Θεδ) the WISDOM of God. These Texts amount to this, "The Fulness of the GOD-"HEAD in the Person of the WISDOM, was "Incarnate in the Humanity of Christ.

It is hard indeed to apprehend, how the Divinity (or God) should be incarnate in the Person only of the Logos, or WISDOM; while the other I two Divine Persons were not Incarnate: and the Answers, usually made, methinks, are not very satisfactory. Some Learned Men have said, not the Aby (WORD or WISDOM) only was incarnate, but the whole Trinity: and that, otherways we cannot fay, God was Incarnate; for GOD implies the whole Trinity. Others have answered; there lies the same Disficulty against the Tritheistic Hypothesis: for if there are three infinite Spirits, who yet are all but one God; what was incarnate could not (in this Hypothesis) be perfect God, if only one of those Spirits was Incarnate: we cannot say, God was Incarnate, if only one Spirit of the Trinity (or God) was Incarnate. Let the Objectors therefore clear their own Explication from this Exception; and at the same time they will clear ours.

I should chuse to say, We are not concerned in this Difficulty, because we say only, God was Incarnate, and the Divine Wisdom Incarnate: We go no farther; we affirm nothing in this matter of the Incarnation, concerning the other two Persons. We speak of the Incarnation no farther than it is revealed; that GOD, perfett GOD, in the Person of the WISDOM, was Incarnate: this is intelligible, it hath nothing of difficulty to our Apprehensions. He that is disposed, to ask hereupon; Can God be Incarnate, and not the whole Trinity, which is God; the Fulness of the Godhead, and not all the Persons of the Godhead? Such a one is too curious,

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and

and importunate; he puts Questions that cannot well (it may be) be answered, without our affirming on denying beyond what hath been revealed by God, or is required by the Catholick Church to be believed. Yet to such a one we may say; It is evident that, perfect God; can be communicated; when the whole of God is not communicated. For God being perfect God, as was before observed, in whatsoever portion of Space; in the least imaginable Extension, no less than in the whole Immensity of his Essence: He can therefore, tho Infinite, communicate himself perfectly, to the finite Humanity of Christ, as to Divine Persections; tho he do not communicate himself wholly, as to the Omni-presence and Infinity of his Substance or Essence. Therefore if something like to this hath also happen'd in the Incarnation of the WISDOM only, while the other two Persons were not Incarnate: It implies no Contradiction; nay it feems sufficiently illustrated by the other, that is to fay, so far illustrated or cleared, that we need not

to hesitate at it.

The Prayer, "O God the Father, O God the Son, O. God the Holy Ghost, have mercy upon us "miserable Sinners, hath been disliked by divers Learned Men, in particular by Mr. Calvin: But we must interpret the Church's Prayers, by her known Doctrine. The Church doth not intend, cannot intend, by that Form; to acknowledg more Divine Objects of Worship than one only; for she profesfeth the contrary. She intends only therefore here, to invocate God, by, or under, the several Distinctions, which she acknowledgeth to be in him; and by which she endeavours more perfectly to apprehend him. But these Distinctions; tho for good Reasons named Persons, and Father, Son, and Spirit; are understood by her as only the different MODES of the Divine Existence, or Existence of God: and therefore as often as they 500

occur in the Prayers, they are to be taken in the Theological Sense, not in the Familiar and Vulgar. But to this Exception, I shall have occasion to speak

more fully hereafter.

As to fome Expressions in the Creeds, and Holy Scriptures. Many things are faid of our Saviour in the Scriptures and Creeds, which not only suppose him to have been pra-existent to the World; but to be the Maker, and Governor of it. The Catholick Church understands them, as spoken of his Person; but of his Person, only in respect of the inhabiting Di-vinity: And she believes that, not the generated WISDO M only, but GOD in the Person of the WISDOM or SON, was Incarnate. These two Keys open all the Difficulties of any Expressions in the Church Creeds and Holy Scriptures; whether concerning the WISDOM, WORD, or SON, or concerning our Lord Christ as he is God and Man.

Concerning the Holy Spirit, where-ever fuch Attributions are given to him, as imply him to be an actual distinct BEING, MIND, or SPIRIT: They are spoken of him, either by a Prosopopeia; or as the Person of the Spirit includeth, in its compleat Notion, the Divinity, Godhead, or God; and are not spoken of his Personality only, which is no more but Divine LOVE, or Divine SELF-COM-PLACENCE. And the same is to be understood of

the other two Persons.

And now, upon review of the whole Explication, I have given of these Articles; I have but this farther to add. First, I will be thankful to any that shall inform me, on good grounds, wherein the Exposition here given, is more or less, or otherways, than the usual Doctrine of the Church?

Next, I think, nothing hath been said, but what is obvious enough to any ordinary Capacity; using fuch heed, as is required to the understanding and

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comprehending the Mystery of any other Art or Science. There is no Science or Art, but must have an intent Application of the Mind of the Learner, or he shall never comprehend it: The Institution in Arts and Sciences, in the very meanest of them, must be diligently and often considered; or a Man shall never be an Adept, or Master of his Art. Therefore, if also in Divinity or Religion, some Articles must be heard or read with a close Observation, to apprehend them rightly, fully, and distinctly; if they must be read, it may be, over and over again: Let us be content with some Study, in a Matter of so high a Nature, and so great Concernment to us. I think however, it were well, if the Articles of the Holy Trinity, and the Incarnation, were proposed to our People, and even to all Learners, in a plainer and shorter manner than is usually done: for instance, in some such Form as this.

"There is one Eternal BEING, one Infinite " SPIRIT; fole CREATOR of all things. "In the Unity of this Godhead, we are to consider this following Distinction; Eternal MIND, Divine SELF-KNOWLEDG generated by Mind, "Divine SELF-COMPLACENCE necessarily proceeding from both. Of these the first is called " the FATHER, as being manifestly the sole Ories gin and Cause of the Second; the second is cal-" led the SON, as being the Generation and Off-" spring of Eternal Intellect or Mind; the third, as the joint Act, and (as it were) Spiration of the two former, is fitly called the SPIRIT. They are " PERSONS; not as an Angel, or a Man, is a er Person: But as each of them is understood with, " or compriseth the Divine Nature; that is to say, as it comprehendeth, and is comprehended by this " Word GOD. Concerning our Saviour, we are

not to think of him as a mere Man; he is GOD-

MAN. Man, in respect of his reasonable Soul, and human Body; God, in respect of the indwel-" ling Divinity. Which is not to be understood only of an occasional (assisting) Indwelling, such as " that in the old or later Prophets: But of fuch an "Union of the Humanity to the Divinity, that the former is always under the Conduct and Illumina-"tion of the other; and the Divinity doth confeantly exert the Divine Attributes and Perfections in, and by the Human Nature. What was "thus incarnate, was perfett God, in respect of Di-" vine Perfections: It was not however, if we may so speak, the whole of God, in respect of Persons. " For the Divinity, or God, communicated himsee self (in the manner beforesaid) to the Humanity of Christ; only in the Person of the generated WISDOM, or SON; not in the Persons of the FATHER, and SPIRIT. Which hath "more of Difficulty, and less of Necessity, to comprehend the manner of it; than to be (ordi-

" narily) requifite for us to inquire into it.

Such an Exposition (or Declaration) of the Faith, as is this, would prevent all the (numerous and dark) Questions and Disputes of the Schools concerning these Articles; and satisfy the Dissenters from the Churches Doctrine: as well as be a true and just representation of what is necessary to be believed and affirmed; either because it is revealed in Holy Scripture, or is discovered by Reason, or defined by the Catholick Church. As it is certain, this is all that the Church intends; so it would happily supersede and nullify a vast number of Logical and Metaphysical Terms and Distinctions; besides the many (dangerous and captions) Questions that occur in the Writings of the Scholastics, and other Polemical Writers; which will clearly appear to any that shall, with judgment and heed, read the Differtation

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to say something more particularly, of the Socinians; and to them: because many think, and themselver also for the most part, that they have a great
Controversy with the Catholick Church on these
Articles; while in truth the Dissent and Controversy (on both sides) is only from a misapprehension
of one anothers sense and Meaning. The last, and
one of the most considerable Writers of the Socinians, is Guil. Vorstim, in his Bilibra. Let us examine
and discuss this Book.

Of the Socinians, and the Bilibra of Guil. Vorstius.

ar never is noited to the side of the In this Book, Vorstius has published his Thoughts on the Question, What the Synagogue believes concerning God, and the Messias; that is, whether the Jews know (and acknowledg) any thing of the Holy Trinity. and the Divinity of the Messias? His Book is (chiefly) in answer to Mr. Voisin, a Learned Jesuit; who maintains that the Jews believe, at least have (generally) believed a Trinity of Divine Persons, and that the Messias is to be God as well as Man, or God intearnate: Vorstius denies both these. He had the Advantage of his Antagonists, Voisin and Rittangel, as to the Subject in question; whether any Jews, who are so by Religion, believe these Christian Articles: and being a Learned Rabbinist, he not only answered, and exposed, his two Opposers; but prevented also (for the most part) what the Author of the Judgment of the Jewish Church has (since) farther objected.

But in the Bilibra, Vorstim not only proves that; no few by Religion, ever owned a Trinity of Divine Persons, or that the Messias is God; but he also openly and directly opposes the Truth of those Articles.

ticles. He is so much the more to blame; because the Fesuit, to whom he replies, had rightly stated these Doctrines. The Jesuit cites divers Fathers and Councils, who explain the Divine Trinity by Intellect, or original WISDOM; the Word, or reflex WIS-DOM; and Will, or Divine LOVE. He observes. Knowledg, and WISDOM being the Product of MIND. is fitly called the SON; and LOVE as it is the Spiration of WISDOM and INTELLECT, is properly named the SPIRIT. One of his clearest Authorities, is the Canon of a Council of Toledo, which fays; " Let MIND be put as the Person of the Father; then "the Word (or WISDOM) issuing from MIND will be understood to be the SON; as by the WILL. " proceeding from MIND and WISDOM, is meant the Spirit. He says farther, as this is the Trinity believed in the Catholick Church; one may find the fame Notions among the Jews. But the Jewish Books that he alledges; he either mistook, or wrested their meaning. And besides they are partly spurious (pseudepigraphal) Books; and partly have talked in such an obscure or equivocal Cant, mixed with so many absurd Fables, that neither can any certain Sense be made of the most part of what they fay; nor can they be confidered at best, but only as Visionaries and Enthusiasts. hoof the whole

Vorfius could not endure this fooling; and being an Anti-Trinitarian, makes what advantage he can of Voisin's trifling and mistakes. He often falls foul on the Explication of the Trinity, by Voisin; he exclaims against it, as a mere notional Trinity; a Trinity (faith he) of Logical Notions, not of Phylical or real Persons. To the Authorities of Councils, and Fathers, cited by Voisin, he answers. "Indeed maof the Antients greatly pleased themselves, with "those Subtleties; Mind, reflex Wisdom, and the Spiration of Love: but the Holy Scriptures have

of being aware of what the Jesuit had proved by so many Authorities, that the Trinity believed in the Catholick Church, is only a Modal Distinction in the Divine Nature; and is as evident and certain in Philo-Saphy, as it can be made by the most express Revelation: consequently that, it is not the Trinity of the Church; but of Philoponus, Joachin, Gentilis, and fuch others; that He and his Friends meant to oppose. I say, not being sensible, as he ought to have been, of his own and Parties mistake of the Churches Doctrine: he takes notice only of the Jesuits (unlucky) overdoing in the Case; his false and impertinent pretence and endeavour, to find the mystery of the Trinity in the Kabbalistical and Allegorical Books of some Jews. We grant, Vorstius had here a sufficient Advantage: but it had become so learned and able a Person, rather to have observed the Jesust's true Explication of the Trinity; and thereupon have urged him with it, that there is no difference in the Ideas that the Church and the Unitarians have of the Unity of God; than to throw fo much Salt upon him, for his overcurious and partial Discussion of the Jewish Books, in search of a Doctrine, with-

But he feeks to cramp us, by saying; "The Holy "Scriptures mention no such Trinity, as original "WISDOM, reslex WISDOM, and Divine LOVE. First, they mention no other. The Church never pretended, to have learned from Holy Scripture, or from the Antients, any other than a Modal Distinction in God. Which she expresses by the Terms TRINITY, and PERSONS; and explains those Terms, as has

out which the true Unity of God is not rightly ex-

been already declared.

plained or understood.

Next, the Exception is frivolous and impertinent; in this place. For the Controversy between

him and Voisin was not, concerning the Proofs of the Trinity from Holy Scripture: which, we shall grant, our ordinary Controversial Writers have so mistaken, as to give occasion to People to misunderstand the Doctrine and Faith of the Church: but their Debate was, concerning the Trinity it felf; namely whether there be not fuch a Distinction in the Divine Nature, or God, as has been before described; and whether some of the Jews have not owned it? That there is such a distinction in the Deity, neither Vorstius, nor his Party, will think fit to deny why then do they litigate about mere Terms, Trinity, Persons, Hypostatical Union; which the Church professes, not to use in the vulgar Sense, but in a Scientifical and Theological.

But to open the Question between the Church and the Univarians, to the capacity of every body; and to make it undeniable to these Gentlemen of the Unitarian Persuasion, that there is not the least Reason to divide from the Church. They may observe that, as there are two very different Significations of the Term Persons; the Theological, and the Vulgar: 10 in speaking of God we sometimes call him a Person, fometimes three Persons. When we speak of God, with exactness; that is, when we speak of him, as be is in himself; we cannot but own, he is three such Persons, as the Catholick Church teaches ! that is, the modal Distinction of original and restex WISDOM, and of Divine Love or SELF-COMPLACENCE, are fo certainly in his Nature; that without them, he should neither be bappy nor God. But when we consider him, only as a particular Intelligent Being, and as distinct from any other particular Intelligent Being, or Beings; which is the vulgar Acceptation of the Word Person: we generally call him a Person. Thus we fay, for Instance; some Irregularities are Sins against the Laws of God: but others are Sins, against his Person; as Blasphemy, Perjury and some

more; such Wickednesses are Sins against the very Person of God, considered as this particular Being. In like manner, the most learned Divines of the Moderns and Antients are sometimes wont to say; the Angels that appeared during the Old-Testament Oeconomy, had sometimes the Names of Jehovah and God given to them, because they represented his Person, and spake in his Name, In this Sense of the word Person, the Church of England, even in her Translations of Holy Scripture, call God a Person; namely, in the Texts that speak of him, as a particular (Intelligent) Being, and as distinct from some other, or all other particular Beings Job 13. 7, 8. Will ye speak wickedly for God, will ye talk decentfully for him, will ye accept HIS PERSON? Heb. 1.152,3. GOD, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past to the Eathers by the Prophets, hath in these last times spoken to us by his SON; mho being the brightness of his (God's) Glory and the express Image of his (God's) PERSON; when by bimself he had purged our Sins, fat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high. In the first Text, God is intended to be distinguished from the Persons whom he at any time judgeth; in the other from the Lord Christ considered as our High-Priest or Intercessor with Godon There is no Learned Divine, but is aware of this; and therefore all such do sometimes, as well in writing as preaching, say the Person of God: namely, when they speak of God, not according to the internal Perfection of his Nature; but according to some external Relation, to other Intelligent Beings; that is, as distinguished from them, or as opposed to them, or some such like. who say the distribution of the

I do not wonder, F. Socious was not aware of this; as having no other but Grammatical Learning, not the least tincture of Academical, much less of Theological: But Vorstins ought to have been aware

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of it. Because Socious knew not, what the Church intends by Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, when she uses them of God; therefore he denied, there are three Persons of God, or three Divine Persons: And because he mistook what is meant by Incarnation, Hypostatical Union, and such like, when he heard of them in Sermons; therefore he denied the Divinity of our Saviour. I shall make this undeniable from the Raccovian Catechism, which is the Socinian System of Divinity; contrived and compiled originally by Socious, Smalcius, and Moscorovius, at Raccou in Poland; and often re-printed, with the Notes and Improvements of all the Great Men of that Way; and last of all by B.W. (that is, Benedict Wissowatins) at Stauropolis, (that is, Amsierdam) in the Year 1680. When this Catechism would prove that, there is but one Person of God; What is their Argument, or (as they call it) Demonstration? Take it, in their own words: Essentia Divina una est, non Specie, sed numero: quapropter plures numero Persona in ca esse non possunt; cum Persona nibil aliud sit, nisi Essentia individua intelligens. In English thus; 'The Essence of God is but one: and there can be but one Person " of God; because a Person is as much as to say, one Intelligent Essence. Catech. Racc. p. 26. This is their Demonstration, to prove that, there is but one Divine Person; or one Person of God: But they will never be able to produce one Catholick Writer, that ever said; God is three Persons, in this Sense of three Persons, i. e. three Intelligent Essences. The Catholick Church ever owned that, in this respect God is but one Person; she ever taught, he is but one Intelligent Essence: She declares it to be Here-sy, and Tritheism, to affirm three (infinite) Intelligent Essences, she believeth but one such Essence; consequently that, in that regard God is but one Person. Let Let these Gentlemen know therefore, their Patriarch hath misinformed them, concerning the Churches Doctrine: He has engaged em, to oppose a Trinity that was never held in the Church; and to impugn his own (unlearned) Mistakes, as the pro-

Tis too certain that, Socious had never read one Theological Book, when he first set up for an Heresiarch. The Method of Education and Study, in his time, was this; they first learned Grammar, and the Classical Authors: they went then from the School to some University, where they read first Logick, then Ethicks and Physicks, then Mathematicks and Astronomy: This qualified them for an Academical Degree; which Degree entred them on the study of Medicine, Law, or Divinity. Socious began no part of the Academical Learning: He knew nothing of the very first part of it, Logic, till the latter part of his Lite; as his Books show, and as himself consesses. It is no wonder therefore that, when he heard in the Church-Consessions, and Liturgies, of three Divine Persons, of Father, Son, and Spirit; of Incarnation, Hypostatical Union, and such like; he took them, as its to be feared the Unlearned too commonly do now, in the familiar and vulgar Sense.

He imagined three such Persons, as three Men, or three Angels are; that is to say, Persons that are essentially distinct, and not modally only. When he heard of Father, Son, and Spirit distinct from both; he conceited a physical and natural Generation, or that they are distinct Beings, and distinct Spirits. He took Incarnation, and Hypostatical Union, as implying that; the whole of God was Incarnate, and the Humanity of Christ was dessed: The first, the Heresy of the Patripassians; the other, of Eutyches. Because he was not aware, perset God may be Incar-

nate; when the whole of God is not. And because he knew not that, we say indeed the Lord Christ is true God, Creator, and from all Eternity; and we say this, of his Person: But of his Person, not as Man; but in respect only of the indwelling Divini-

ty, or God in him.

Briefly, I say; had Socious been qualified by any Theological, or Academical Learning; he was a Man too discerning to have opposed the Destrine of the Church, or have controverted the Terms she uses: but because Ovid's Epistles, Tully's Offices, and a sew Pages of Hesiod and Homer, were the whole Extent of his Learning; he sirst mistook the Church, and then opposed her. This provoked A. Rivet; Professor at Leyden, to say of him; Ego in isto homine nihil video, prater imperitiam, omnia ignorandi; & audaciam, omnia negandi.

Some of the most Learned of Socious his Followers, have known that the Church doth not intend three such Persons in God, as are three distinct Essences; which is the Trinity they oppose. Therefore to excuse themselves, and Socious, they have said that; the true meaning of the word Person, in common and familiar Speech, is, one Intelligent Essence, distinct and diverse from all other particular (Intelligent) Essences: And that therefore, if indeed the Church means not, there are three distinct Essences of God; neither ought she to say, there are three Persons of God. In short, she giveth the Scandal, by her unproper Language.

To this, I answer: If the Gentlemen of this Way, will not allow us to use any Terms in Theology, that are borrowed from familiar and vulgar Speech; and to give to them such signification, as is proper to declare the Nature of the Subject of which we treat: they deny to us what is yielded to all other Sciences and Arts, whether Liberal or Mechanical,

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without any contradiction. For the Sciences adopt the Words of familiar Speech, and appropriate them to their Mysteries; in a Sense that shall make the Mystery more intelligible, without wholly or intirely stripping the Word or Term of its primitive or vulgar Signification. Why do we quarrel with the Church about Persons, and other Terms; because not used in Theology, as in vulgar Speech; when we are content that, all other Sciences use that liberty? Why, for instance, are not large Vo-lumes written also against the Logicians, or the Metaphysicians; for their Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, and Accidens: which those Gentlemen have borrowed from the (Roman) Classical Authors, and from common Speech; but have clothed them with a new Sense, utterly different from their vulgar meaning? In Latin Authors, Genus is the Family, or Linage of any Person; Species is the Form, Physnomy, or shape of a thing; Differentia, on the contrary, is the dissimilitude of Persons or Things; Proprium is a Man's own, in opposition to things borrowed or stolen; Accidens is any Casuality, good or bad, that happens to any Persons. But when these words are used, as Terms in their Science or Art, by the Metaphysicians, or the Logicians; Bless us, how do Mysticks transform them? Genus, according to them, is not the Linage or Pedigree; but is, as BEING to Substance and Accident, and as SUBSTANCE to Spirit and Bodies. Species is not the Form, Shape, or Phyz.; but is, as MAN to Peter and James, or as the specifick general Nature of Lion and Bear to particular Lions and Bears. Differentia is not, as among the Vulgar, the external Dissimilitude of things; but the particular Modality of each Individual in the several specifick Natures, namely the Angelical, the Human, and that of Mutes. Proprium is by no means a Man's own Goods and Chat-

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tels; but is, as Risibility in a Man, a Property that is no essential part of his Nature, but yet is always in it. Accidence, or Casualty, they metamorphize into an inferior fort of Beings; it is as Colour, or other Qualities are in Bodies; which are things that may be away, or may be changed into their Contraries, or be varied in degree, and yet the Body (to which they belong) remain the same. Here now was a-bundant Matter, for Socious his Grammatical and Philological Skill: He may eternally confute the Logicians and Metaphylicians from the good Authors he has read; from Terence, and Plantus; nay from Tully, and Quintilian, who spake not only a true, but learned Latin. And truly every body must grant that, he might as well (or better) have attacked the Metaphysicks, and all other Arts; for ufing words, as he thinks, improperly; that is, not as they are used by the Vulgar: as have reformed, or pretended to reform the Language of the Church; which he understood too, just as much as he did the

Met aphysicks.

Tis pertinent here to take account of what passed between Mersennus, and Ruarus, two Men very well matched, in respect of Elegance of Learning, and Freedom of Thought: there have scarce been two Contemporaries so eminent, in both these respects. Mersennus was a Roman Catholic; a Regular, of the Order of the Minims: but to whom all Learned Men that visited France, always took care to be recommended, and to pay their Respects to him. Ruarus was a Holsteiner, a Gentleman of am-ple Fortunes, and a Mind no less great: He was a Socinian; and tho he never wrote a particular Book, yet his Letters to Learned Men of all Persualions, procured him a Reputation all over Christendom, as well as among his own Party, as the (Honorary) Head, or Principal, of that whole Sect. These

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Letters were published, after his Death, in two Volumes, at Amsterdam; the first Volume, Anno 1677. the other, Anno 1681. both in Octavo.

Mersennus having heard of this Gentleman, and being defirous to read the Socinian Authors, wrote to him; entreating him, to send to him the princi-pal Books of the Men of that Way: which were scarce in France; but very common in Poland, where Ruarus had chose to reside, at a place near Dantzick Ruarus immediately made a Remittance of the Works of Crellius, Volkelius, and Schlichtin-gius; which was requited by Mersennus, by a Pre-sent of his own Books, and of the Works of the Jesuit Peravius.

But when Mersennus had looked over the Socinian Books, he presently observed what I have been now saying, that; the Socinians wholly mistook the Doctrine and Terms of the Catholic Church. They feem, fays this Great Man, not to be well informed what is the Faith of the Church concerning the Holy Trinity; I assure you, I will even swear to you that, there is no Tritheism in our Doctrine. We say, "The Father is Original WISDOM, the Princiof that WISDOM by which he knoweth himself; and of that WILL by which he "loveth himself, or is delighted in his own Perfecti"ons. Pater est ORIGO INTELLECTUS, quo se persette Intelligit; & VOLUNTATIS etiam, mediante Intellectu. The words mediante Intellectu, were added to fignify the Procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Son; or by the Son, as mediante In-tellectu more properly signifies. His words may be thus Analysed, viz.

Pater est Origo INTELLECTUS, the Father is Original Wisdom. Clade . The

Intellectus, quo se perfecte Intelligit. The Original or Cause of that WISDOM, by which he perfectly understanderb himself, or of the SO IV.

Et voluntatis, mediante Intellectu. The Principle also of WILL, (or the Spirit) by the restex WIS-

I have not feen the Catholick Doctrine couched in so few words; but as it is said in the Proverb, A Word faid enough, to such a Mercury as Ruarus; and that he had fully answered all the Socinian Books that Gentleman had sent to him. And so it proved; for tho Ruarus took a year's time to answer, his Reply serves only to confirm what Mersennus had said. He answers,

First. This Explication of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church, is Σόφον φάρμαπον, a good Excuse. Is it so? But had it not been as easy, and a little more sincere to have said; Tis a just Desence? For

if it be the former, 'tis the latter.

Secondly. He is in bodily fear lest it should be Sabellianism. I scarce think that, he is in earnest; so Learned a Man could not but know, the Doctrine of Sabellius is directly contrary to this of the Church. For the Divine Persons, according to the Church, are Modal Distinctions in the Divine Nature, or Essence; whereof the second is generated by the First, and the Third proceeds from the other two: Whence they are rightly called, INTERNAL RELATI-ONS of the Deity, to it self. On the contrary, the Trinity of Sabellius, is three EXTERNAL RELATIONS of God, to bis Creatures: That is to say, God acting in the three Dispensations; the Law, the Gospel, and the effusion of the Spirit on the Apo-ftles, and other Faithful. I shall own however, that this is an old Objection to the Churches Doc-trine: for Socrates witnesseth that, the Council of

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Nice was accused by many, as reviving Sabellianism, by their term Homo-usios; by which they meant, God is one Substance, and the Divine Pensons are one Essence, and one Spirit. Socrates, Hist. Eccl. 1. 1.

Thus these two Wits parted; and made no more words of the Matter, in their following Letters:

Ruarus found there was no more to be said to the Objection; and Mersennus perceived, he had al-

ready objected enough, tho in so few words.

To Aboverguel Of St. Austin.

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The Disputes we have lately had in England concerning the true Notion of the Divine Trinity, make me willing to confirm what hath been (hitherto) said; by some such Authorities, as may entirely fatisfy the doubtful: I will begin with that of St. Austin, because it includes so many more. For as to this Father, Monsieur Du Pin has rightly and justly observed, in his History of the Ecclesiastical Writers, 5th Century, p. 207. St. Austin Bishop of Hippo, framed (if we may so speak) the Body of Divinity for all the Latin Fathers that came after him: They have not only taken out of his Books, the Principles they made vse of; but ofttimes they have only transcribed him. The Councils have borrowed his words, wherewith to express their Decisions. P. Lombard, Bishop of Puris in the 12th Century, undertook to make an Epitome of the whole Body of Theology; his "Work, after all, is little else but a Collection of " Passages out of this Father. And tho St. Thomas and other School-Doctors followed another Method; " yet for the most part they adhere to St. Austin's Principles, and upon them have erected their Theo-" logical

logical Opinions and Conclusions. In short, he faith, the Councils of the Church, the Fathers, and School-Doctors or Divines of the middle Ages, in the Latin Church, have all strictly followed the Doctrine of St. Austin. We shall see hereafter that the Greek Churches have no less deference for St. Austin, especially in the Article of the Holy Trinity;

than the Latin (or Western) have.

Of all the Works of St. Austin, his fifteen Books of the Trinity, seem to have cost him the most time and pains. Mr. Du Pin saith, he began them in the Year of our Lord 400. and finisht them in 416. No doubt that Learned Critic had very good Reasons for that Supputation; but St. Austin himself, speaking more generally and laxly, saith, De Trinitate (qua Dem verus & summus est) libros juvenis inchoavi, senex edidi: The Books concerning the Trinity, which is the true and most High God, I began "when young, I published them when old. They are directed, (or if you will, dedicated) to Aurelius Bishop of Carthage, and Primate of Africa, in these words: Beatissimo, & Santto, & sincerissima charitate Venerando, Fratri & Consacerdoti, Papa Aurelio. "To the most blessed, holy, venerable, our beloved Brother and Fellow-Priest, Pope Aureli-" us. To which we may note, by the by, that Pope and Saint were Titles that were given indifferently to all Bishops in that Age, and down to the latter end of the 11th Century; when Pope began to be appropriated to the Bishop of Rome, and Saint was bestowed only on the Dead, and by that Bishop.

Mr. Du Pin well expressed the Nature, and Defign, of these Books of St. Austin, in these words: "They are rather a dogmatical Discourse (or Institution) concerning the Mystery of the Trinity, than

tion) concerning the Mystery of the Trinity, than concroversial Writings against Hereticks. He insofteth not so much, on resuting the Reasons of the

"Hereticks, or proving the Doctrine of the Church; as upon subtle and curious Enquiries, for clearing or expounding this Mystery. Eccl. Hist. Cent. 5. p. 193. I mention this, the rather, because a late Learned Writer has thought fit to fay, in his Prefatory Discourse, to an Examination of an Exposition of the XXXIX Articles, by my Lord Bishop of Sarum; There is very little, if any thing, to be met in "Holy Scripture, to explain the Trinity: nor is it what any one ought to pretend to explain, any farther " than to prove a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trice nicy, (according to what is revealed in Scripture) is to be worshiped. St. Austin, on the contrary, thought that; when we fay Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, and these are to be worshiped; itis as necessary that one should understand what is meant by Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, as 'tis to worship such Unity in Trinity, or Trinity in Unity. And truly other-ways, either by false Ideas, we shall be guilty of Idolatry; or by none, of Acheism. But let us hear the Father himself: Certè cum credunt Scripturis sanctis, agant orando, & bene vivendo, ut intelligant bec. Id est, ut quantum sieri pobeat; imo quis ad boc non bortetur? "Let'em endeavour by Prayer, and by Holy Living, to underfrand these things; that is, to comprehend by the Mind, what is believed by Fairb. Who will forbid "em; or rather, who will not advise them there-"to? De Trin. L. 15. c. 27. Again, "That God is a Trinity, we ought to evince (if we can) by of some Demonstration, to all capable Persons; as well as to Believers, that rest in the Authority of Scripture. Why I said if we can, will better ap-pear; when the Matter itself begins to be opened, in the following Enquiry concerning it. But God will help us: for it is written in the Psalms of Da-" vid, " vid, The Heart of them shall live that seek the Lord. " And, Let those that seek thee, rejoice. And again, se feek ye the Lord, seek him always. Farthermore, he often takes notice of St. Paul's words to the Romans; The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: to which he as often adds the words of God, in the first Chapter of Genesis; Let us make Man, in our Image, after our Likeness. Grounding himself on these Texts, he discovers a Trinity, in the visible and sensible part of the Creation; but more especially in the Soul of Man, on which (saith he) the Image of the Trinity is manifestly impressed; in his own words, Immortaliter immortalitati ejus instra. Which things, saith he again, we have made to be the Subject of this present Writing, from our 9th to our 14th Book. Lib. 15. c.2. He believes, it was the very Reason that an Intelligent Nature is given to us; even this, to enquire and fearch concerning God; ad hoc debet homo esse Intelligens, ut requirat Denm. L. 15.c. 2. He speaks there, not of knowing that God is, but what he is; the Unity of his Nature, the Trinity of Persons, and how both are to be understood: which is the matter of his Enquiries, in all these Books.

St. Bazil surnamed the Great, St. Gregory called the Theologer or Divine, and St. Gregory Nyssen, Greek Fathers that flourished sometime before St. Austin, are very much employed in explaining the Mystery of the Trinity: there will be occasion hereafter to set down their Explications; here I only mention them, to show that the most celebrated Fathers believed it to be lawful, and even thought it to be necessary, to unfand with the Mind (as we have heard St. Austin Speaking) what is believed by Fatth.

The Councils also, General and Provincial, the Confessions of Faith by the Protestant Churches; have almost all of them given some Explication, and

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divers of them a very large Explication, of the Trini-

ty in Unity, and Unity in Trinity.

Neither ought we to omit that, the Heretical Explications of Sabellius, of Arius, and Philoponus, among the Antients; of Joachim, Gilb. Porretan, P. Abailardus, in the middle Ages; of Gentilis, Curcellaus, and Mr. Bidle, fince the Reformation; do inevitably engage the Orthodox in very particular Explications of this Article: unless by only using the general Expressions of Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity, we should rather seem to license all of them, than difallow any of them. For tis undeniable that, all those Heretics contend for Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity; tho in Heterodox Senses.

Therefore if some Learned Men have more employed themselves in other Studies, than in this; so that they don't think sit, themselves to state the Doctrine of the Catholick Church in this Article: they ought not hereupon to forbid to others all Exposition of the Churches Faith, but only this; that we are to believe and worship Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity. Rather, we ought never to use those words, without an Exposition: to speak 'em without Ideas, that is without a meaning, is to speak them (to say the best) as Parrots; to speak them with wrong Ideas, implies Heresy. But I return to the Father.

To give addistinct Account of St. Austin's Work, we were best to observe this Method; we will consider, 1. The curious Questions, relating to the Article of the Trinity, that are here resolved. 2. The Expositions of some of the Greek Fathers, that St. Austin rejects; as partly imperfect, and partly as leading to Error. 3. Some likenesses of the Trinity, that he finds in the visible Creation, and in the Soul of Man; but which come not up to a tolerable Explication. 4. The Explication, that after much

much canvassing, he approves; and the Image of that Trinity in Man, Immortaliter immortalitati ejus enther Exercises or Compaction, to their inclusional number of the content of the

Questions concerning the Trinity, or the Divine Persons, resolved by St. Austin.

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It is a Question among the Modern Divines, whether the Apparitions of God to the Patriarchs, were indeed so many Apparitions of God himself, in the Person of the Aoy or WORD; or only of Angels, who representing God on those occasions, are therefore called the LORD, or as 'tis in the Hebrew JEHO-VAH. The Reason of the Doubt is, because in some Texts of Holy Scripture, particularly in divers of the New Testament, those Apparitions are called Angels. Thus, the appearance to Mofes in the burning Bush, is by Moses called Jehovab: he faith expresly, when Jehovah saw that Moses turned aside to fee; God called to him out of the midft of the Bush. Exod. 3. 4. But St. Stephen interpreteth this appearance of Jehovah to have been, not immediate. ly by himself, but by his Angel. Acts 7. 30. There appeared to Moses (in the Wilderness of Sina) an Angel of the LORD; in a flame of Fire, in a Bush. He not only fays, it was an Angel; but he denies that it was the LORD. Therefore to this difficulty, St. Austin answers, by saying. Scriptum est, dixit DOMINUS ad Mosem; non vero, dixit Angelus ad Mosem: quia cum verba Judicis Praco pronuntiat, non scribitur in gestis, ille Præco dixit, sed ille Judex dixit. " It is written (in the Book of Exodus) the LORD said to Moses; not the Angel said to Moses: because when the Crier of the Court pronounces the Sentence of the Judg; it is not register'd in the Rolls, the Crier said, but the Judg said. Libi2. c. 1 1.

It should seem, this was the Manner of the Courts in St. Austin's Time: and he thought it a sufficient, either Example, or Comparison, to show that what an Inferior says or does by express and immediate Order of his Superior, it is to be reckoned, not to the Sent, but the Sender; not to the Messenger, but to his Principal; and accordingly in the Case now before us, not to the Angel, but to the LORD that sent him.

He is troubled with that Text, Mark 13.32. Of that Day and Hour knoweth no Man; no not the Angels, nor the Son, but the Father. Or as St. Matthew has it, the Father only. Did not our Saviour know that time, of the last Judgment; or as others here inter-pret, of the Excision of Jerusalem? If not; how was he God? If he did; how shall we defend his Veracity? When he faith so expresly, the Son knoweth not that Day and Hour, but the Father; nay the Father only. Matth. 24. 36. The Father answers; our Saviour knew the precise Time, the Day and Hour, of the Event concerning which he was asked: but his Anfwer is such a form of Speech, as that of St. Paul to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 2. 2. 1 knew nothing (or I resolved to know nothing) among you, but only Jesus Christ; and him crucified. Or as when God said to Abraham, Gen. 22. 12. Now I know, that thou fearest God; seeing thou hast not witholden thy Son, thy only Son, from me. It appears by these Texts that, in the Phraseology (or manner of speaking) of the Jewish Nation, to know a thing, or not to know it, implies sometimes only that, we make it known, or do not make it known, to others. For when St. Paul fays, He knew nothing among the Corintbians, but only Jesus Christ; and him crucified: he means only, he made nothing else known to THEM, he spoke to them of no other thing. Of all the Learning he had acquired at the Feet of Gamaliel, or at the University of Tarsus, he said nothing to the Corinthians: Among them he knew

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knew nothing but Jesus Christ, and him crucified; tho they were curious and eager of other Knowledg. And when God said to Abraham, Now I know that thon fearest me; it is certain, he as much knew it before: but now he made it known to Abraham; for it was by this high Trial, that Abraham was made to know with certainty his own Heart towards God. Therefore so also it was that our Saviour knew, and did not know, that Day and Hour: he knew it as to himself, or personally knew it; he did not know it with respect to his Disciples, from whom he thought fit to conceal it: as the Apostle knew nothing with respect to the Corinthians, but only Jesus Christ: and him, crucified. Lib. 1. c. 12.

To the Question, Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, or from the Father only? St. Austin answers; The Holy Spirit is the Spirit both of the Father and the Son: He proceedeth from both; but not as from two Principles, but as from one. He saith however, the Spirit proceedeth principally from the Father; and he well explaineth this dangerous Saying, by adding that; The Son deriveth from the Father Being and God-

head; and herewith he also deriveth necessarily from the Father this Power, if we may so speak, of communicating (together with the Father)
Being and Godhead to the third Person in the un-

"divided Trinity. Lib. 15. c. 17. In short, the Holy Spirit proceedeth from the Father and from the Son; but from the Father principally, in regard that it is from the Father that the Son hath this Power of communicating Being and Godhead to the Holy Spirit, both equally and as one Principle with the Father. Besides the Texts usually alledged, to prove the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, St. Austin alledges also that; if the Spirit proceeded from the Father only, and not

from the Son, then the Son could not have given the Spirit; but he breathed on his Disciples, and said, Receive the Holy Ghost. John 20. 22. He saith hereupon, the Disciples (or any other Man or Men) had no power to give the Holy Spirit; but only to pray that he might be given to those Persons upon whom they should lay their hands. Upon this he enlargeth much; I shall only repeat one Paragraph, as being very remarkable. Quantus est Deus ille, qui dat Deum? Nec enim aliquis Discipulorum ejus dedit Spiritum Sanctum: Orabant ut veniret in eos, quibus manus imponebant; non ipsi eum dabant. Atque hunc morem in suis Prapositis etiam nunc servat Ecclesia: nos accipere quidem boc donum possumus, pro modulo nostro; effundere autem in alios non possumus. Ut boc stat, Deum (a quo efficitur) super eos invocamus. "How great a God is he, who can give God? For we are to be aware that, none of the Disciples gave the Holy Spirit; they prayed, that he might come upon those, on whom they should lay their "hands. And this Custom is still preserved in the Church, by the Bishops: We can receive this Gift, according to our Measure; bestow it on others, we cannot; that it may be given to others, we pray over them, to that God who alone can "do this thing. Lib. 15. c. 26.
Why do we say, the Son is begotten, but the Spi-

Why do we say, the Son is begotten, but the Spirit proceeds? As we say, the Son is begotten by the Father: why not also the Spirit is begotten, by the Father and the Son; but he proceeds from both? The Saint answers; besides the Reasons known to God, who himself maketh this distinction in his Word: we may say, with respect to our selves, we are taught this Mystery in the distinct Terms of begotten and proceeding; to preserve the Propriety and Significancy of Human Speech: if begotten and proceeding were indifferently used, we could not understand

Somuting

what was said. For we never say Son or begotten, but only where there is but one begetter; no Son is the Son of two Fathers. Non discitur Nasci, sed potius Procedere Spiritus Sanctus; quoniam si & iste Filius diceretur, amborum utique Filius diceretur: quod est absurdissimum; nam Filius nullus est duorum, nisi Patris & Marris. The Spirit is not said to be begotten, but rather to proceed; because if he also were called a San, he should be the Son of the Father and Son: Which were most unproper, and even absurd in Speech; for we never say the Son of two, but only when we mean it of Father and Mother. Lib. 15. c. 27. He observes however that, tho we must not say, the Spirit was begotten; which were to contradict the Holy Scriptures, which fay, he doth proceed: yet neither doth the Catholick Church say, he is unbegotten; lest any should suspect, that in the Trinity there are two Fathers, or two who are of None. In his own words, Ne vel duos Paires in Trinitate, vel duos qui non sunt de Alio, quispiam suspicetur. Lib. 15. c. 26. No doubt St. Austin would have declined this, and some other Questions, if he could; but he saith, there were great Enquiries and Disputes about it in his time, by all the Sects of Christians: So that it was necessary to say something to it, for appealing an untoward Curiofity, that has grown up among the generality of Christians. His answer, tho it doth not unfold the Mystery; it satisfies however the Enquirer thus far, that he needs not to ask or look any farther, but be contented with the Words of God: who hath used terms of distinction, because there is a Distinction; but hath not declared wherein the Distinction confists, either because it was not necessary for us to know it, or because (at present) we are not capable to know it.

Concerning the Question, lately controverted between some eminent Divines among us; Whether as there are three Divine Persons, these Persons are so many distinct Spirits, or only one (Infinite, Eternal, Allperfect) Spirit? This Father hath so explained the Mystery of the Trinity, (as we shall see hereafter) that there can be no manner of Doubt, that he understood the Trinity of Persons to be only a MODAL Distinction in God; not so many Substances, Beings, or Spirits. And wherever he un-dertakes to desine or describe the Divinity, it is under the Character of a Spirit, not three Spirits. De Creatore necesse est credere, eum summe vivere, cuntta sentire & intelligere; —— esse Spiritum omnium po-tentissimum, justissimum, optimum, beatissimum. "Con-"cerning the Creator, it is necessary to believe that, " he most perfectly lives, perceives, and under-" stands all things; that he is a Spirit, of all others "the most powerful, just, good, and happy. Lib.
15. c.4. But he hath also some Paragraphs, where he expressly denieth that, God is more than one Spirit. Et Pater Spiritus est, & Filius, & ipse Sanctus Spiritus: nec tamen tres Spiritus, sed unus Spiritus; ut non tres Dii, sed unus Deus. "The Father is Spirit, the Son Spirit, and the Holy Ghost Spirit:
yet not three Spirits, but one Spirit; as not three Gods, but one God. Epist. 174. He saith not, the Father is a Spirit, the Son a Spirit, the Holy Ghost a Spirit; but the Father is Spirit, and so of the rest: As the Father is God, not a God; the Son and Holy Ghost, each of them God, not a God. For if each of these was a Spirit, and a God; there must be three Spirits, and three Gods. The Father Spirit, the Son Spirit, the Holy Ghost Spirit, is no more but this; the Father Spiritual, the Son Spiritual, the Holy Ghost Spiritual. Whereas he cautions us at last, Non tres Spiritus, sed unus Spiritus;

Spiritus; ut non tres Dii, sed unus Deus. "There are not three Spirits, but one Spirit; as there are not three Gods, but one God. Tis as much as to say, we must no more affirm three (Divine) Spirits, than we would affirm three Gods. He could not have declared more plainly, and directly, against the Explication of those who make the three Divine Persons to be so many Spirits; than by saying, We must as little own three Spirits, as three Gods.

Parallel to this, is that Passage, Lib. 5. c. 11. de Trinitate. " The Trinity may be called One God, but not be called One of the Persons. We may not call the Trinity, the FATHER; except in this respect, that we are his Children by Adoption. " Nor may we call the Trinity, the SON, in any respect or sense whatsoever. But we may say, the Holy Trinity is (Sanctus Spiritus) a Holy Spi-" rit; because the Scriptures say, GOD IS A SPI-"Trinity, but in the Trinity; it is called Spirit, re-" latively only: i.e. As it is a Spiration from Father, and Son, and therefore related to them; as Principium and Principiatum. He often discourses in this manner, in the xv Books: and he excuseth his frequent Repetition of it, by faying; I often come over with the same things, in these Books, to fix them in my Reader's Memory; and because if there be a mistake, it will be more easily discovered by coming so often under consideration.

But the most important of all the Questions, that concern the Mystery of the Trinity, is; of the Terms Essence, Substance, and Persons: whether these are to be used, concerning God; and in what Sense? On this, it will be necessary to cite always the Father's own Words. Essentiam dico, qua 'Ouoia grace dicitur; & quam nos Latini usitatius substantiam voca-

mus. Dicunt quidem & Graci Hypostasim; & nescio quid volunt inter esseinter Usiam & Hypostasim: ita & pleriq; nostri Latini, qui bac Graco trastant eloquio, dicere consueverunt miav ovosav, Tpeis imosaveis; quod est latine, unam Essentiam & tres Substantias. Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit, ut hoc intelligatur cum dicimus Essentiam, quod intelligitur cum dicimus substantiam; non audemus dicere, unam Essentiam & tres Substantias, sed unam Essentiam vel Substantiam & tres Personas. In short thus; "The Greeks say, one Essence of God, " and three Hypostases: because they distinguish Hypostasis and Substance; [in the same manner as the Latins distinguish between Substance and Perfon.] But the Latins always using Essence and Substance in the same sense, or to denote the same thing; therefore we dare not fay, one Essence of God, and three Substances; but one Essence or

" Substance, and three Persons. Lib. 5. c. 8.

But is Persons then a proper Term to be used, in describing the ternal Distinction in God? St. Austin thinks, it is not; unless the very equivocal ambiguous Sense of this word be fixed. He observes, 'tis used of Men; for we call three Men, three Persons: but God is not so three Persons, as three Men (or three Angels) are three Persons. Three Men are three such Persons, as have distinct Substances, three individual Natures; with so many distinct Understandings, and Powers of Willing: And one of these Human Persons is not so much as all the three; as it is in the Divine Trinity, where any one of the Persons is equal to all the three; the Father to himself and to the Son and Spirit, the Son to himself and to the Father and Spirit, the Spirit also to himself and to the Father and Son. Each of these Persons having the whole Divine Essence or Substance, together with all Essential Attributes and Perfections thereof, is perfect God; and therefore not more or less than the whole Tri-

nity. There being this immense difference between the term Persons, when intended of three Human Persons, and the same Term when meant of the Divine Persons; St. Austin often concludes that, this Term is too ambiguous, and not strictly proper in the Mystery of the Trinity. Cum quaritur, Quid tres? Magnà prorsus inopià laborat eloquium humanum; dictum est tres Persona, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. When it is asked, What three? Hu-" man Speech is too barren to answer; we say three " PERSONS, not that we should say it, but lest " we should say nothing at all. Lib. 5. c. 9. And again, Lieuit loquendi & disputandi necessitate tres Per-sonas dicere; non quia scriptura dicit, sed quia non con-tradicit. Si autem diceremus tres Deos, contradiceret Scriptura; que dicit, " Audi Israel, Dominus Deus tuns Deus unus est. — Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur, loquendi necessitate parta hec vocabula; cum opus esset disputatione contra Insidias, vel Errores, Hareticorum? "In speaking and arguing concerning this Mystery, it hath become usual and lawful to say " three Persons; not because the Scriptures say it, but " because they do not gainsay it. But if we said, three Gods, the Scriptures would gainfay it; for they say, Hear O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God. What remains then but that, we cone fess that these words [Persons and Hypostases] "have been introduced by a certain Necessity; to repel the Sophistries, and consute the Errors of Hereticks? Lib. 7. c. 4. He repeats the same Thought, in another place, in these words; Non major Essentia est Pater & Filius & Sanctus Spiritus, quam solus Pater ant solus Filius; sed tres ille substantie sive Persone, si ita dicende sunt, equales sunt singulus. "Father Son and Spirit are not a greater Essence, than the Father alone, or the Son alone; but these three Substances, or Persons, IF WE E 2

MAY SO CALL THEM, are but equal to any one of their own number. Lib. 7. c. 6.

It appears by all this, that, St. Austin would willingly have set aside three Substances: because in Latin, and the Languages derived therefrom, Esence and Substance are the same; so that to say three Substances, is the same as to say three Essences, which in God (by confession of All) were three Deities, or Gods. Notwithstanding, because the Greeks say, one Essence, three Hypostases; and that by Hypostasis they do not mean Substance properly so called, but mean only what the Latins intend by Person: therefore he is not absolutely against saying three Hypostases, or three Substances; when by Substance we mean only (as the Greeks, and some Latins that follow them) Persons: Secondly, That, Persons it self is but too equivocal and ambiguous; and has not been introduced by any Example from Scripture: But the Sense of that Term being once rightly fixed, it is by all means to be retained; as of excellent use, nay as almost necessary, against Heretics. Against the Tritheists, who would introduce three Divine Essences, or Substances, properly so called. And against the Sabellians, who assign to the Persons no Substance or Essence at all, either in particular or in common; but represent them as only so many Oeconomists, or Manifestations of the Divine Will: namely under the Law, then under the Gospel by Christ; and again when after our Saviour's Ascension, the Apostles were far-ther instructed in all Matters, by the Effusion of the Holy Spirit, or Inspiration of God. The Holy Father having said thus much, one may wonder that himself has not defined the Term Person; as applied to the Mystery of the Trinity. It had been agreeable to the Accuracy that he uses through his whole Disputation, in xv Books, to have distinguish'd the several Acceptations of Person: which, taken for Sub-

Substance, hath occasioned the Tritheistick Heresy; taken for Oeconomy, or Manifestations, begets the Sabellian Heresy; taken for a Mode of Existing, or a Property, that includes in it the Divine Essence, is the Catholick Doctrine. But he hath left it to the observant Reader, himself to form the Definition or Description of Person, in the Divine Nature; from the Explication he gives of the Trinity it self. From that Explication, the Divines of the Schools describe a Person in the Holy Trinity, to be "the Divine Essence, or Godhead, under a particular (intel-lectual co-eternal) Mode of Existing. Of which "Modes, they note, there can be but three; ori-

" ginal Intellect, reflex Self-Knowledg, and the Love,

or Self-complacence that proceeds from both.

That these Doctors have rightly understood St: Austin, we shall see; when we come to his Explication. 75.1,0 %

Some Expositions of the Trinity, that St. Austin rejects; some Likenesses of the Trinity, that he finds in the Works of the Creation: The true Explication, and the Image thereof in Man. the the second of the second o

Certainly we must say, this Father was a right good Man: he argues on the Article of the Trinity, with a moderation and sweetness, that would oblige the widest Dissenter from him; oblige one, to consider well what he says, and to be forry if perhaps one cannot agree to every thing that he fays. He begins his Disquisitions, concerning this Mystery, with saying; Quisquis hac legit, ubi pariter certus est, pergat mecum; ubi pariter hasitat, quarat mecum: ubi errorem suum cognoscit, redeat ad me; ubi

meum, revocet me. "I desire my Reader that, whereever in these Books he is satisfied with what I say, he would go forwards with me, to what remains; where we doubt, let us together seek farther con-" cerning the Matter: If he finds that himself has miltaken, let him come over to me; where he sees "I have mistaken, let him call me over to him. Lib. 1. c. 3. In another place; Cum Homines Deum quarunt, & ad intelligentiam Trinitatis (pro captu infirmitatis Humana) animum intendunt; facillime debent ignoscere errantibus in tanti pervestigatione secreti. When Man seeks after GOD; when the Human Frailty feeks to find out the Trinity, as far as 'tis able: such a one ought to be very facile in for-" giving others, that have perhaps erred in their fearches concerning so great a Mystery! Lib. 2. c. i. He concludes yet better; he ends his Books with this Prayer. Domine, Deus Unus, Deus Trinitas; quacunque dixi in his Libris de tuo, agnoscant & Tui; siqua de meo, ignosce Tu, ignoscant Tui. "O Lord, One God, God the Trinity; what I have said in these Books from thee, let it be owned by all Thine; if I have faid ought from my felf, do "thou pandon it, and may Thine also forgive it. Lib. 15. c. 28.

But come we, as we proposed in the Title of this Section, to some Expositions that this Father notes,

and rejecter

Some Greck Divines, in their Books on this Article, had said. There is one Essence of God, and three "Hypostases; and it is to be thus understood. One Divine Essence, or one Divine Nature, as one Human Nature, or one Angelical Nature: and three are divers Angels; as in the Angelical Nature there are divers Angels; and in the Human Nature divers Men, for instance, Peter, James, and John.

And again, thus; three Statues of Gold, they are

Part I.

three Statues and but one Gold: as we say three Di-" vine Persons, each of them God, and all but one God. According to these Doctors, God is no otherways one God, than Peter James and John are one Man, or three Statues (all of them Gold) are one Gold; and the Divinity is as truly three Gods, as the Humanity is three (or more) Men, or three Golden Statues are three Golds; if we might have their leave so to speak, which we shall argue by and by. St. Austin was so moderate, as not to say expresly that, these Explications necessarily and immediately infer (or suppose) three Gods; tho all the Moderns say it: he contents himself to show that, they are not only, not just Explications; but not fit Similitudes, or Comparisons. We do not say, three Persons, and one Essence or one "God; in such sense as if a Substance or Mass were " made into any 3 things, Statues (suppose) or Vessels. " We do not say, tres Persona ex eadem Substantia, three " Persons formed out of the same Substance: like three Statues out of the same Gold; or like three " Men, in or of the same Human Nature. For there are more than three Men in the same Human Nature, and may be more than three Statues of Gold; and one Statue is not so much as three, or one Man as three Men: but contrary in the Trinity, for in the Trinity there are no more than three e Persons; and all them are not more than one of them is. This is the Sum of what he faith. Lib. 7. c. 6. I have abridged that Chapter, because his Latin would be obscure to those that are not accustomed to the Latin of Barbary; such as all the Afri-can Fathers, but only St. Cyprian, wrote: I will subjoin however his very Words, because some will ex-

Non sic Trinitatem dicimus tres Personas, unam Essentiam & unum Deum; tanquam ex una materia tria quædam subsisterent, etiamsi quicquid illud est, in his

pect and desire them.

tribus explicatum sit. Non enim aliquid aliud ejus Essentiæ est præter istam Trinitatem. Tamen tres Personas ejustem Essentiæ, vel tres Personas unam Essentiam dicimus: tres tamen ex eadem Essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod Essentia est, aliud quod Persona; sicut tres Statuas ex eodem auro possumus dicere, aliud enim illic est esse aurum, aliud esse Statuas. Et cum dicuntur tres Homines una Natura, vel tres Homines ejusdem Naturæ, possunt etiam dici tres Homines ex eadem Natura; quia ex eadem Natura & tres alii Homines possunt existere. In illa vero Essentia Trinitatis, nullo modo alia qualibet Persona ex eadem Essentia potest existere. Deinde, in bis rebus, non tantum est unus Homo, quantum tres Homines si-mul; & plus sunt Homines duo, quam unus Homo; & in Statuis aqualibus, plus auri sunt tres simul, quam singulæ Statuæ; & minus auri est una, quam duæ. At in uno Deo non ita; non enim major Essentia est Pater Filius & S. Spiritus, quam solus Pater aut solus Filius.

He thinks it necessary, often to repeat this last; for (besides other places) we have it again, Lib. 6.
c. 7. Nec quoniam Trinitas est, ideo triplex est; alioquin minor erit Pater solus, quam simul Pater & Filius.
Tho it be a Trinity, it is not threefold; for the Father alone is not less, than the Father and Son together. The short is; he advances two Reasons, against those Explications by three Men and three Statues. First that, in the Human Nature are more than three Men, and there may be more Statues of Gold than three; but the Divine Persons can be no more than three: therefore the Comparison is not adequate. But it would lead us also into Error, and therefore is not Just; for one Man is less than three Men, and of equal Statues one is not so much as three; but in the Divine Trinity, all the three Persons are not greater than any one of them is. Each of them

is perfect God, to whom nothing can be added; he is therefore as much as the whole Trinity: and if each were not perfect God, he should not be God at all; for no definite number of Imperfects, can make up an in-

finitely Perfect.

The Moderns have treated those Explications much more roughly, than did Sr. Austin. He considered them as the honest Endeavours of Orthodox Writers; to explicate (that I may use his own Words) what is more easily understood by the Mind, than expounded in words to others: but now they are judged to be so intolerable, that some pronounce them a broad-fac'd Atheism, others an implicite Tritheism. The Atheism consists in this, that these Expositors suppose the Divine Nature (or Godhead) is just such to the Divine Persons, as the Human Nature (or the Humanity) is to Human Persons. This, say some, is an open Arbeism: for the Humanity (or Human Nature) is nothing, 'tis only a Metaphylical or abstracted Notion; 'tis but only the general Idea that we form in our Minds, when we consider what is proper and peculiar to Man, as he is Man. The Properties, and natural Incidents, that belong to Man as he is Man, we give to them the general Name of the Human Nature: but this Human Nature is not a real thing, a Being, or actually existent; but only a notional Collection made by our Minds, of certain general Properties that are common to all Men, and peculiar to Men only. If therefore the Divine Nature or God be but such to the Divine Persons, as the Human Nature or Humanity is to particular Human Persons: it is only a Notion, not a Being, or a Substance, whether bodily, or spiritual; no more than the other Chimera (Human Nature) is. Then for the Tritkeism; say others, if one Divine Nature and three Divine Persons have just such respect to one another, as hath the Human Nature to Human Persons: besides the apparent Advantage of the Human Nature above the Divine, in that it comprise han infinite number of Human Persons, and the Divine but only three Persons, it will follow that, as three Human Persons in the Human Nature are three Men, so the three Divine Persons in the Di-

vine Nature are three Gods. . .

The Explication, or rather Comparison, of the three golden Statues; which are three Statues, and but one Gold; they reckon, it is scarce considerable enough to be confuted. The Strength of it consists in this, that we cannot fay three golden Statues are three Golds; they suppose it to be monstrously improper, to say three Golds: the themselves, that they may make three golden Statues an Explication (or at least an Illustration) of the Trinity, say three Statues and one Gold. It is asked; Are three Bars, or Rods, of Iron, three Irons? It is certain they are called so in common Speech. But if three Irons; which is most common: why not three Golds? If three Rods, or Bars of Iron, are three Irons: three Rods, or Bars, or Plates, or Statues of Gold, will be three Golds. It is not usual indeed, to say Gulds; but it is proper, and Grammatical, and therefore may be used whenever there is occasion, or when any one shall please. But it is as little usual, and altogether Ungrammatical, to call three Bars, or Statues of Gold, one Gold; as they, who use this Comparison, are forced to do.

Come we now to the Likenesses of the Trinity, that St. Austin finds in the Works of the Creation. He so propounds them, as to show also their Disagreement to the Divine Trinity; and that "they are infinitely short of an Adequate Representation (or 'Image) of the Trinity in God; yet some of them come nearer to it, than others do. He discourses largely of them, from the 9th to the 14th Book; I shall content my self, for the most part, to report them

as they stand abridged in the 15th Book. Premising. and admonishing, only thus much in general, that; all of them suppose, and imply that, the Divine Persons are not so many distinct Beings, or Spi-" rits: but that the Divine Essence, Godhead, or " God, is the Being; the Persons are the Modes, or Properties, or Alls of that Being; as the Reader

will immediately see.
In ipso Animo, ex iis que sunt extrinsecus introducta, est quedam Trinitas. Nempe Imaginatio [legendum puto IMAGO] corporis qua in Memoria est : & inde Informatio, cum ad eam convertitur, acies cogitantis: & denique utrumque [lege utramque] conjungens Intentio Voluntatis. "The Objects that enter into the Mind, make there a kind of Trinity. As first, the I-"MAGE of the Object, that is impressed (as it " were) on the Memory; then the Information or KNOWLEDG caused thereby in the Mind, when "it directs its Sight to the Treasure of Objects and Images stored in the Memory; and lastly the WILL that joineth together the other two. Lib.

Mens meminit se, intelligit se, diligit se: hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinitatem; non quidem Deuin, sed Imaginem Dei. " The Human Mind REMEMBERS it felf, KNOWS it self, LOVES it self: if we see " this, we see a Trinity; not indeed the Trinity " which is God, but which is the Image of God. Lib.

Sicut duo sunt Mens & Amor ejus; ita duo quedam sunt Mens & Notitia ejus, cum se novit. Mens vero, G Amor, & Notitia ejus, ita tria quadam sunt, ut bac tria unum sint. Amor & Notitia non tanquam in Subjecto insunt Menti; sed substantialiter ista sunt, sicut & Mens ipsa: quia etsi relative dicuntur ad invicem, in Sua tamen sunt quaque Substantia. — Unius igitur ejusdemque Essentie necesse est hac tria sint. "The

MIND, and its LOVE to it felf, are two; so are MIND, and its KNOWLEDG of it felf. But: MIND, its KNOWLEDG, and LOVE, are (apparently) so three; as that also at the same time they are but one. For KNOWLEDG and LOVE are not in the MIND, as Accidents in their Subject; but rather are substantial, as the Mind it self is for "tho these three are Relatives, yet all of them are in their proper Substance. - Therefore all three (of necessity) are one and the same Essence. Lib. 9. c. 4. When he faith, they are all in their proper Substance, he means in the Soul. For in this, and all fuch like Comparisons, by MIND he doth not mean the SOUL, but its prime Faculty, even the Intellect or UNDERSTANDING; as appears plainly by these words, at Lib. 15. c. 7. Non Anima, sed quod excellit in Anima mens est. By MIND we do not mean the Soul it felf, but the Faculty that is most excellent in it. But let us hear him discoursing these things more largely, and more explicitely, in fomé other places.

Istatria [Mens Notitia Amor] inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis; eorum quodque substantia est, & simul omnia una Substantia vel Essentia. "These three, [MIND KNOWLEDG LOVE] are inseparable from one another; every one of them is SUBSTANCE, and all of them but one Substance or Essence. Lib. 9. c. 5. When he says, every one of them is Substance; he uses the word Substance adjectively: for the meaning only is, they are substance stantial. And he calleth them substantial, because they are always in the Substance of the Soul: Not as Accidents in their Subject, but absolutely inseparable from it, or rather are one with it. But he goes on:

MENS cum seipsam cognoscit; sola PARENS est NOTITIE sue; & Cognitum hic & Cognitor ipsa est. —Quod Quod ergo cognoscit se, parem sibi NOTITIAM sui GIGNIT, quia non miniu se novit quam est; nec alterius essentia est PROLES sive NOTITIA ejus. Nec minor AMOR, quia tantum se diligit MENS, quantum novit, & quanta est. " MIND knowing it felf, is the PARENT of such its KNOWLEDG; and is the Knower, and thing Known. -- And " in that MIND knows it self, it BEGETS such a knowledg of it self, as is equal to it self; for it " fully knows it self, and its Knowledg is not of another Essence. This OFSPRING (the Self-knowledg) is not less than MIND, because Mind has an adequate knowledg of it self. Not is the LOVE less, because Mind loves it self as

adequately and perfectly as it knows it felf; even

with a just Equation. Lib. 9. 6. 12. William 1 ...

The fum of all these Arguings, is; MIND KNOWLEDG LOVE in the Human Soul, are a Trinity that is the image of God the true Trinity. For Mind or INTELLECT BEGETS (he faith) a SELF-KNOWLEDG, that is equal to it felf, or equal to Mind, and is the OFSPRING of Mind; and from these two naturally springs a LOVE, that is equal to either. And farther, they have all the same Essence, being all of them substantially (and not as flitting Accidents) in the Soul; which is their common Substance.

St. Auftin thinks, this is that Image of God in the Soul of Man, that was intended in those words. Let us make Man in our Image. He saith, it is indelible; Immortaliter Immortalitati ejus insita, "Immortally impressed on an Immortal Subject. Neither Sin, nor Death, nor the (future) Blessedness, hath or will efface it; the Soul will always be Mens confeia, & se amans, An Intellect that KNOWS and LOVES it self. 173. 1 1910 1007 10 1 101.2173

Having thus made his way, to the true Trinity; he faith.

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saith, An & hac sapientia, que Deus dicitur, non se intelligit, non se diligit? Quis hoc dixerit? An putandum est, sapentiam illam que Deus est, scire alia; nescire seipsam? Que si dici, & stultum, & impium est; ecce Trinitas, SAPIENTIA scilicet, & NOTITIA SUI, & DILECTIO SUI. "May we think that, the WISDOM which is called GOD, doth not know. " it felf, or not love it felf? Who will fay it? That "WISDOM that knows all things, is it ignorant of it self? But if so to say, is as foolish as it is im-" pious, then see here the Trinity; Understanding " or INTELLECT, SELF-KNOWLEDG, and SELF-COMPLACENCE. He doth not propound this, as a Similitude, Comparison, or Likeness; but as the very Trinity: He insists on it largely, in this and other Chapters, that; to see the Trinity of Intellect Knowledg and Love in our selves, who are God's Image; and not to see the true Trinity, or the Trinity which is God, is too much either Slowness, or Negligence; the Trinity within us, does even point to the Trinity without us, we be-ing that part of the Creation in which especially (as faith the Apostle) the invisible things of God may be clearly seen and understood. Lib. 15. c. 6.

We ought not to omit that Passage, at Lib. 15.
c. 14. Sciunt invicem Pater & Filius; ille Gignendo, iste Nascendo. "The Father and Son KNOW each other; the Father by begetting, the Son by being begot. He intends hereby; in the Holy Trinity, Father and Son, or INTELLECT and SELF-KNOWLEDG, are what we should mean when we say to beget and be begotten; and vice versa. This is a farther assurance that, he understood the Terms to beget, and be begot, in the Mystery of the Trinity; not, as Terms that naturally or properly express what we ought to conceive; but as sigurative Speeches: To beget in this Mystery, is to know; to

Part I.

be begot, is the Reservor Selfsknowledg in God; and vice versa.

This large Account of the Doctrine of St. Au-

fin, I apprehend, will not be unwelcome to the (inquisitive) Reader; because of the great (and determining) Authority of this Father, in the Catholic Church : and ait is almost necessary, to Me. As there is nothing so absurdly jealous as a superstitious Ignorance; it is commonly as barbarous and rude, as it is suspicious: And from hence are the Complaints, or murmurs of some, that in my four Letters concerning the Trinity of have been too curious and particular; I have pretended to find a Clue for that Labyrinebi into which Lought not to have enter'd at all, but should have consider'd it as a facred impervious Place. I should have contented my self with the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it is commonly propounded in the Church; a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity: without any (pretended) Explications, that might satisfy the vain (if not rather the profane) Curiofity of those, that will not submit to the only safe guidance of Revelation, " Explications, say these Gentlemen, are devised Commentaries; by which, for the most opart, the Church's Doctrine (is expounded away: They serve instead of Tolerations, and Comprehen-Gions; to relieve the Heretics; and Schismatics; and to let those into the Church, whom our Articles and Creeds were purposely designed to exclude. But it is News to me, that our Creeds and Articles are Labyrinths; and that we must not enter into them; or what is the same, must not understand them. Tis as surprizing that, these Gentlemen affect to feem zealous for the Church; while they openly contend for such an obscure Brevity, in declaring her Faith, as takes away the distinction of Heretic and Orthodox. Y

thodox. Nay they vend themselves for the only (Faithful and Dutiful) Sons of the Church, while they proclaim to every body, that they are afraid of nothing so much, as that the Church should grow like to the Tree in the Prophet Daniel; the height whereof reached to Heaven, and the fight thereof to the ends of all the Earth; all the Birds of Heaven sang in her Branches, and her Fruit was Meat for all Flesh. Dan. 4. 11, 12. Explications, they say, will let every body into the Church; and the Design of 'em (too often) is, to expound away the Faith of the Church. I shall confess that, I think, it were well if our Explications could (as they speak) let every body into the Church: But it is certain, their Defign, and their Effect, has always been quite contrary to that Fear of some; namely, to limit the Sense, and thereby exclude Herefy, and Heretics. There could be no need of Explications, if the Sense were clear, and withal not Equivocal or Ambiguous: He therefore that determines the Sense by an Explication, excludes all pretending Parties but one only; he is at the farthest Remotion from the Accusation, of opening our Doors too wide. If the Explication destroys the Doctrine, it is a Fault indeed: and that some such Explications and Expositions (of the Article of the Trinity) have been advanced, I not only do not deny, but I professed it was the principal occasion of the Four Letters. But sure the Exposition of St. Austin, should not have been suspected by any body: when they were told, in my first Letter, it is St. Austin's, and I have gone no farther than that Father led me; they should have considered me, only as a Relater, and the Father as the Expositor. I am satisfied with being of that Catholic Church, of which St. Austin was a Father, and a Saint: They that have accused the Explication in my Letters, as too particular and curious, I wish they

Invo-

they would tellius, which and where is their Church; who are the Fathers, and Saints of it? If it be a Church, that does not profess the Doctrine of St. Austin; I believe, it may be good discretion, to keep

it private to themselves.

Part I.

I think, I ought to mention here a Letter, fent me from Cambridg; my Friend the bringer of it, intimated that it was from the Head of a College there, but desired to be excused from naming him, because he had fubscribed only N. N. This Anonymous tells me, I have quoted St. Austin in the first of my four Letters, as Author of the Explication of the Holy Trinity given in those Letters: But, saith this Adviser, M. Du Pin gives a very different account of St. Auftin's Doctrine concerning the Trinity. M. Du Pin saith, when the Father accounts for the Trinity in God, by INTELLECT, SELF-KNOWLEDG, and LOVE; he doth not pretend, this is the very Divine Trinity, but an Image of it, and a very imperfect One. St. Austin saith that, all our Notions of the Trinity, are infinitely short of it; and that, we see it now but only in a Figure, and enigmatically or darkly. This Letter faith farther, that divers have found fault, that I should fay in the same first Letter; "The Prayer, O God the Father have mercy upon us, O God the Son have mercy upon us, O God the Holy Ghost have mercy upon us mi-ferably Sinners, being the first Invocation in our Litany, has been disliked by divers Learned Men; in particular, by Mr. Calvin. My Admonisher. finds, Mr. Calvin did dislike it; but he thinks "Fohn Calvin's Authority ought not to be laid in the Bal-" lance against the Liturgy of the Church of England.

To begin with this last; neither do I put Mr. Calvin's Authority into the Ballance, against our Church: But after I had incidentally, and as they speak en passant, mentioned Mr. Calvin's dislike of a distinct

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Invocation of the Divine Persons together, as if they were so many several Objects of Worship; I show, in what Sense our Church intends this Invocation. Not as Mr. Calvin seems to have taken it, as if we had three distinct Objects of Worship; but as one such Object, invocated under its several Distinctions: My words are these. The Church doth not in
'tend, cannot intend, by that Form; to acknow-

"ledg more Divine Objects of Worship, than one :
"for she professeth the contrary. She intends
"therefore here, only to invocate GOD, by or

under the several Distinctions, that she acknowledg-

good Reasons named Persons, and Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost; are understood by her, as only the different MODES of the Divine Existence, or

" Existence of God: and therefore as often as they

occur in the Prayers, they are to be taken in the Theological Sense, not in the Vulgar and Common.

But I wonder, it should seem a new thing to any at Cambridg, that; some Learned Men have disliked the distinct (Trine) Invocation of the three Divine Persons: When there is no Learned Man but doth diflike it, except with the Interpretation I have givenus No body will question the Orthodoxy of J. Forbesius : His Instructiones Historico-Theologica have been received by all learned Men, with great Acknow. ledgments of the Author's excellent Erudition, Judgment, and Exactness. He says; Non est ido-neus Adorationis modeu, si tribus distinctis Invocationibus tres Persone veluti seorsim Adorentur. Supplicatio fa-Eta uni Pensona, non est iteranda ad aliam immediate; ne in unami simplicissimum. Religiosi cultus objectum aliquam Separacionem vel Separacionis speciem, inducere videamur. Franciscus à Sancia Clara, & Doctores communiter, ipsis Divinis Personis (præcise sumptis) negant subesse terminum formalem adorationis Latrie; sed

hoc Deitati solium primo competit, Relationibus vero prout Identificantur cum Essentia. Lib. 1. c. 23. It is not a proper manner of Worship, when the three Divine Persons are severally adored, by distinct Invocations. The Invocation made to one Person, should not be repeated immediately to another Divine Person; lest thereby we make, or seem to make, a separation in the Object of Religious Worship; which is most strictly One. - Franciscus à Sancta Clara, and generally the Doctors of the Church, deny that, the Divine Persons as "Persons, are the Objects of Divine Worship: that belongeth only to the Deity it self; and to these Relations (the Divine Persons) but only as they are identified with the Divine Essence. That is, as each of these Relations, Properties, or Personalities, includeth (in its full Notion) the Godhead, or God. But of the Invocation and Adoration of the Divine Persons, more fully by and by.

As to Mr. Du Pin, he hath accounted for these Books of St. Austin, with too much brevity; his Abstract or Abridgment of them is comprised in one Page: As Brevity has always some Obscurity, my Cambridg-Adviser might (excusably) mistake M. Du Pin; tho that Critic (to do him right) hath

perfectly well understood St. Austin.

WYCH.

Mr. Du Pin saith: "St. Austin tells us, tho we have here below several Representations of the Trinity, yet we should not look for it but in Immutable and Eternal Things: And that, we cannot see it in this Life, but in a Figure, and Enigmatically. And thus he pretends that, we have an Idea of the Generation of the Son, by the Production of the WORD of our own Understanding and an Idea of the Proceeding of the Holy Spirits by the LOVE that proceeds from our Will.

But he confesseth that, these Nations are very im-

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perfect; and that there is an infinite difference betwixt these Comparisons, and the Mystery of the Trinity.

Hist. of Eccl. Writers, Cent. 5. p. 194.

As I said, he hath truly reported St. Austin; but only too briefly; that one cannot readily underst. Austin himself.

He faith, Sr. Austin teaches. "We are not to seek for the Trinity, but in Immutable and Eter-nal Things. Right, St. Austin often says it; We are not, fays the Fathen, to expect a true Image of the Trinity in the merely sensible Creation: but as God himself is Eternal and Immutable, his Image (or Likeness) must be sought in such a Being; and the Soul of Man, saith he, is such, it is Immutable

and Eternal. Again, he faith;

We do not see the (Divine) Trinity, but in " a Figure, enigmatically and darkly. He speaks of the Image of the Divine Trinity in the Soul of Man: Our Intellect, Saith be, our Self-Knowledg, and Self Love, is but a Figure, and that too, an enigmatical or obscure Figure; of the like Trinity in God; and yet it is in this only that we can (at present) see that Divine Trinity. The enigmatical Figure of the Divine Trinity in the Soul of Man, is as much short of that Trinity, as our Nature is short of the Divine Nature.

Lastly, He maketh St. Austin to say; "These Notions are very impersect: there is an infinite difference betwixt these Comparisons, and the Mystery of the Trinity. But St. Austin says not that, Divine MIND, Divine SELF-KNOWLEDG, Divine LOVE, are Comparisons of the True Trinity; much less that, they are imperfect Comparisons: for he faith often and often, that they are the very Divine Trinity. But these Notions, and these Comparisons, of Human Intellect or MIND, Human SELF-KNOW-

KNOWLEDG, and Human SELF-LOVE; or Human MEMORY, KNOWLEDG, and LOVE, and others of that kind; tho we find them in the Soul, an Eternal and Immutable Thing, are Comparisons and Notions infinitely short of the Mystery of the Trinity. This is what St. Austin said, and what Mr. Du Pin (if his words be heedfully observed) makes him to say; but this latter could not possibly speak as clearly and accurately in a Page, as the Father in fifteen Books!

We have said enough before, of the Deference of the whole Latin (or Western) Church, to the Person and Doctrine of St. Austin; the Greek Church, or the Orient, have not less respected him: The Greeks account for the Faith of the Trinity, in the very Words and Notions of St. Austin. In the Year of our Lord 1453. Gennadius Scholarius Patriarch of Constantinople, presented to the Grand Signior Mahomer, who had then lately taken Gin? stantinople, a Confession of the Christian Faithsvin the name of himself, and of the Greek Churches: You have it in the Turco-Gracia of M. Crucius, Lib. 2. and in Chytraus, Orat. de Statu Eccl. in Gracia; and in the last Edition of the Bibliotheca Patrum. Is It faith, first, in general; date the mod like 1919

We believe, there are in God three PROPER "TIES; that are the Principle and Fountain H(as it were) of all his other Properties: We call those Properties three HYPOSTASES, or PER= SONS. But in that the Properties do not divide the Divine Essence; therefore is God but one God,

tho endued with these three Properties. Them, more particularly;

"We believe that, in the Nature of God is the LOGOS and SPIRIT; as in the Fire is Light and Heat. And as Fire, tho there be no Object which it may either enlighten or warm, yet al-

ee ways

"ways hath both Light and Heats and emits both; in like manner, before the World was, "there were in God the LOGOS and the SPIRIT, as the natural Ass of God. These three, MIND "the WISDOM and SPIRIT, are one God; as in one and the same Soul of Man there is MIND "(REASON and WILL, which tho three, are yet. but one Soul in respect of Essence. We call then "LOGOS the WISDOM, and the POWER, and " the SON of God; because he is generated of the Effence of God, as a Man's Thought is the Ofspring is of the Human Saulin The WILL of God, we call "Siche SPIRIT, and LOVE; but MIND it felf we call the Father, because he is neither begotten, "inor has any Cause that is prior to him; and be-"cause he is the Cause of the Son and Spinit. Be-"Escause God understands and knows, not only thes 's Greatures made by him, but himfelf; therefore its "his plain that he bath a Logos or WISDOM by "liwhich he knows himself properly and distinctly "from all other things of Indike manner, he not on; "Iy Willeth, which is to say LOVETH, whatsay ever he hathmade; but Himself much moves So. Ithat, witis hereby evident that; there proceeds: eternally from God, both his LOGOS and SPIP "TRIT, Tand yet that they are eternally in him: and " farther that, the one God is the Father and these Satwoll Assisaid the Thoughts, and very Words those In three hyrostaspaniaha uzho Earling that the Monthless do not draids

I perswade my self, there are not many but will be fatisfied, by these Authorities. Notwithstanding, I shall add also a Scholastic Differtation, that will explain the Mystery more particularly; and which contains the Authorities of the other Fathers, the School-Doctors, and the Divines of the Reformation. Only first touching briefly on some Que-58 - W

stions,

stions, and Controversies, that are warmly argued on both sides) by the School Doctors.

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The Four Letters excited the Curiosity of many; a great number of Learned Persons, of all Orders in the Church, thought it worth their while, to fignify to me their Approbation of, or their Exceptions to, what I had published: But the most agreed, in telling me that, something should have been said in those Letters, to divers Questions, and Difficulties; that are there wholly omited, or but lightly touch'd. As,

When we say three Divine Persons; are we to understand it, in the cochrete, or abstract Sense, of the Term Persons? If in the abstract, that is, for the Personal Properties, it may be answered by some or other, Personal Properties are not proper Persons. If in the Concrete, that is, for an Essence (or Substance) and the Property together; so three Persons will be three Substances or Essences! which implies Tritheism. Scheibler fays, "To what the Photinians (or Socinior Essence, therefore three Divine Persons must be three Essences or Substances; the true Answer (I think) is. The word Person is sometimes taken complexly or concretely, for the Property and Substance together; as when we say a Person is an intelligent Substance: or only for the Property, "that is added (as it were) to the Substance or Essence, as when we say there are three Divine Persons; for the meaning of that is, the one Essence or Substance of God subsisteth under three distinct Properties. Metaphys. 1. 2. c. 2. n. 61. And a later (very Learned) Scholastic, J. Posewitz in his Theologia Scholastica, and his Metaphysica Scholastica, says; "Three Divine Persons taken concretely, seem to imply three Essences or Substances: and therefore tis the more common Opinion of the Doctors that, these words three Divine Persons signify abtractly; they denote the Subsistences or Properties.
Metaphys. Schol. p. 30.

Metaphys. Schol. p. 30.

It is a Question also, whether the Divine Persons are Infinite, or Finite? If we say, they are Infinite; there will be three Infinites: but as there is but one Eternal, and but one Incomprehensible, as saith the Athanasian Creed; so neither can there be more than one Infinite. But if we say, the Persons are but Figure 1.

nite; nothing Finite is God, or in God, s asid a soil

Whether the Persons of the Trinity are Objects of Divine Worship, and Invocation; especially of distinct Invocation, and Worship, at the same time; seems another hard Question, and necessary to be resolved. For on the one Side, there seems to be the Practice of the Church of England, in the first Invocations in the Litany; nay of all Churches. On the other; besides the Canons of some Councils; it may be said, seeing the Persons are not Beings, or Spirits, but the Modes and Properties of a Spirit and Being, only the Deity or God (who is that Spirit) can be the proper Object of Latria, or of Invocation.

And finally, as to the manner of our Saviour's Divinity; it confifts without doubt in the Hypostatical (or Personal) Union of the Logos to the Humanity of our Saviour: but what is this Personal Union? Is it such an Indwelling of the Logos in the Humanity, that the Humanity is always under the Conduct and Direction of the Divinity? as a Learned Prelate after divers Fathers and Schoolmen has lately explained it. But they object to him, that Nestorius said

as much: and it may feem that, this differs from the Inspiration and Indwelling in the Prophets and Apostles, only in time; in them it was occasional and temporary, in our Saviour constant and perpetual. Or is it such an Indwelling, as seems intimated in the four Letters; that Divine Perfections, Properties or Attributes, (as Omniscience and Omnipotence) are exerted in and by the Humanity? But this is very obscure. For what means by the Humanican Divine Properties (or Perfections) be exerted by the Humanity, if they are not communicated to the Humanity? But how can Infinite Properties be communicated to a Finite Subject? Or how can the Properties of one Being be communicated to another? for it is by their Properties that things are distinguished from one another. If therefore Properties can be really communicated, the Natures of all things are confounded; they are no longer distinct but Identified. Or if you say, not Identified; you incur this Contradiction, that they are the same by a Communication of their distinctive Properties, and vet not the Same. And a Property, say the Metaphysicians, as it is a Property is incommunicable; else it were not a Property: for proper and common are directly contrary, and therefore inconsistent with one another.

To these Questions, and Arguings upon them, I say,

Is it is needless, methinks, to ask. Whether three Divine Persons is to be understood in the Concrete, or Abstract? For they that mean concrete Persons, intend no more than others do. They intend not that, as there are three Properties and Modes, so there are three Essences and Substances: they mean only, (as Posewitz and Scheibler and the rest, who say three Persons in the Abstract) each Person is a Property and the Divine Essence; and otherways it should be a mere Property (Personality or Mode) and not a Person. In short,

short, the Modes of existing are three; and each with the Essence, is a distinct Person: but the Essence being bû? One; therefore the Divine Persons are not, bas Human and Angelical Persons, somany distinct Bell ings ; but one Being, Subsilling after a threefold man ner. That is, as original WISDOM, reflex KNOW LEDG, and SELF-LOVE; or, as UNBEGOTTEN! BEGOTTEN, Hand PROCEEDING: because the reflex, or SELF-RNOWLEDG is the Act, and therefore (humanly speaking) the Generation of Of foring of Original WISDOM or Intellect; and the LOVE or Self-Complacence necessarily proceeds from Intellett and Self-Knowledg. This being the whole meaning of both Parties; it is a mere verbal Contents? on, whether we are to speak and mean in the concrete, or abstract way oracli il . rodrone one mort be

To the second Question, Are the Persons Finite, or Infinite? If we fay Infinite there will be three Infinites; which is impossible, and contrary also to St. Athanafius "If Finite"; nothing Finite is God; or in a little of the Color of the Metaphysicians; as the Metaphysicians; as

III. To avoid this Dilemma, tis usually answered; neither Finite nor Infinite is to be fled of the Divine Persons, but only of the Effence? Infinity is an Essen-

But in my Judgment there is little danger, from the first Horn of the Dilemma ! for tis no morelinconvenient, or contrary to Achahasius, to say three Insure Persons, than to say, three incomprehensible, or three Eternal Persons. When Achanasius denies three Eternals, three Incomprehensibles, three Infinites, he means three Infinite (Eternal Incomprehensible)
Substances, Essences, or Beings; not three Infinite
Eternal or Incomprehensible Persons: for by three Divine Persons he means only the Divine Essence or Substance, under its three Properties.

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But if we should take Person, not in the Concrete, for Property and Substance; but in the Abstract, for the Property only: I see not, why we may not say, each Person is Infinite, and there are three Infinites. For certainly the Divine Intellect, Self-Knowledg, and Self-Complacence, are each of them Infinite; in their formal Conception, abstractly from the Essence, they are Infinite.

III. The third Controversy; Whether the Divine Persons are Objects of Latria, and of Invocation; like the first, it is but Verbal. For whether they are invocated singly; or conjunctly; it is not the mere Mode or Property that is invocated, or is worshiped; but the Mode or Modes as including the Divine Essence, Godhead, or God. When they are invocated singly; it is the Property with the Essence, or rather the Essence under such Property; when conjunctly, God is (intended to be) invocated as distinguished after a triple manner.

But occasions of scandal, or mistake, ought to be

But occasions of scandal, or mistake, sought to be removed by careful, and often explaining the Public Forms, in our Sermons, and Catechisms.

IV. The fourth Question, concerning the manner of our Saviour's Divinity. It consists, without doubt, in the Hypostatical Union of the Divinity, to the Humanity of our Saviour; but what is this Hypostatical Union?

If we say, it is such an Indwelling of God in Man, that the Divine Perfections which are the Properties of the Divine Nature (such as the Omnipotence, Omniscience, and the rest) are exerted in, and by the Humanity.

First, if only in the Humanity; it should seem, Christ shall thereby be no more God, than the Prophets and Apostles were the area of the prophets and Apostles were the same of the prophets and the prophets and the prophets and the prophets and the prophets are the prophets and the prophets and the prophets are the prophets are

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Secondly, If by the Humanity, it should seem; the Divine Perfections, which are the distinguishing Properties of the Divine Nature, cannot be exerted by the Humanity, except they be communicated to the Humanity: against which there are many Exceptions; and the Catholics and Calvinifts impute to the Lutherans the Eutychian Heresy, on the account that they maintain a real Communication of some Divine Properties, (as namely, Omniscience, and Omnipotence) to the Humanity of Christ. Of the Calvinifts, Francise. Turrettinus, Instit. Theol. par. 2. loco 13. quest. 7. p. 345; &c. L. Ryssenius, Com-pend. Theoloco 11. Controv. 5. p. 1-06; &c. Of the Lutberans, J. Posewitz, Theoli Scholis Metaph. Schol. p. 30. and Chr. Scheibler, Metaphy Lib, 1. c. 23. Of the Catholics, M. Becanius, Theol. Scholast. par. 3. and Card. Bellarmin, de Christo Lib. 3. 6. 8, 9, ro. have perplexed this Enquiry, with extraordinary Difficulties Yer there feem to be but two Opinions: the Cardinal and the Calvinists well agreeing is blad however propound their Doctrine, in their own Terms.

The Cardinal, after proposing and rejecting divers Forms, and Explications, of the Fathers and Moderns, acquiesces in this; The Humanity of Christ hath not a proper Subsistence, or Subsistence of its own, but exists in the WORD, as the Arm (for instance) in the Body: the Divinity so sustaineth the Humanity, (ut totum sustant Partes sibi intime consumity, (ut totum sustant Partes sibi intime consumitas & unitas) as the WHOLE sustains its PARTS. de Christ. L. 3. i.e. 8. With due reverence to his Purple; the Union is greater, or we cannot say Christ is God: for hereby no real Advantage, but only an Honorary, is given to the Humanity. The Humanity becomes hereby a kind of Adjunct, or Appendix, to the Divinity; but receives nothing from it, but only Nominally: and as the Arm is not

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the Body, nor any part may be called the whole; so neither may Fesus be called God, by such an Union to God.

The Calvinists say, there is a Communication in-deed of Idioms or Properties; but it is to the Person of Christ, as God-Man; not of the Divine Nature to the Human Nature, or vice versa. The Perfections or Properties of the Divine Nature are no more really communicated to the Human Nature, than the Imperfections of the Human Nature to the Divine. The Humanity is no more Omniscient, Omnipotent, Self-living, Adorable; than the Divinity is passible, that is, Hungers, Thirsts, Grieves, Dies. We say indeed, God died for the Sins of the World, God was born of the Virgin Mary, and divers such like: but we mean, he who is God was born and died; but not as he is God, or according to his Godhead, but as he is Man, or in his Manhood. So we fay also, the Man Christ Jesus is Eternal, Creator of Heaven and Earth, knoweth all things, can do all things: but not as Man, or according to his Manhood, or by the Manhood; but as be who is Man, is also God, or according to his Godhead, or by the Godhead! In short, the different Properties of each Nature, are ascribed rightly to the Person who is made up of these two Natures: but they are not communicated from one Nature to the other Nature, or may be ascribed to the other Nature; for that were to confound the Natures, and introduce Eutychianism. They say moreover, the Hypostasis or Sublistence of the WORD is not communicated to the Humanity; but only the Humanity is so assumed into the WORD, as to be sustained by it, as a Part is sustained by the Whole. The Reasons of this Opinion, are these. I go are the continue of the continue o

What is a Property of (or what is the same, is proper to) one thing, cannot be communicated to another:

ther; for so, it would lose its Nature: it would cease to be proper, and become (the contrary) common.

Again, the Divine uncreated Nature cannot be communicated to any created Nature; for then it would no longer be created, but uncreated. Therefore neither can the Properties of the Divine Nature be communicated; for the Propenties are identified with the Nature, and are but so many inadequate (or partial) Conceptions of the Nature.

Farther. The Properties of the Divine Nature are inseparable; they are really one, and more but only conceptively, for they are the same with the Essence: But now it is granted, some of the Divine Properties are not communicable vias the Præs

eternity, Omni-presence, Independence.

And the Union between the Divinity and Humanity is reciprocals Therefore, if in virtue of the Union, the Divine Perfections and Idioms are really communicated to the Humanity; the human Idioms, which are all of them Imperfections, are communicated to the Divinity. Such as to be passible,

to Hunger, Thirst Grieve, be Fallible.

The Lutherans fay, these are Finenesses, very proper to defend Nestorianism; and the Doctrine it self is no better or other: They say therefore roundly, the Hypostatical Union and manner of our Saviour's Divinity, confifts in the Communication of Divine Properties, to the Humanity of Christ. Or Christ is God by such an Indwelling of the Divinity, in the Humanity; that the Divine Properties (or Perfections) are communicated to, and are exerted by the Humanity: And the Humanity is formally united to the Person of the WORD; and not only assumed into it, or sustained by it. They expound this, by some Comparisons; taken out of Origen, St. Athanasius, St. Basil, and other Fathers: The e 12011

Comparisons are (usually) these two.

As Fire communicates its Property of Heat, to Iron and other Metals; while still Fire remains Fire, and Iron Iron : So are the Properties of the Divinity, communicated to the Humanity; only with this difference, they are in the Divinity ountains or naturally, in the Humanity xexapitamevas, or by gratuitous Communication; in the Divinity primarily,

in the Humanity Secondarily.

The other Comparison is better, and is hinted in the Athanasian Creed. As the Soul communicates its Properties of Life, Sense, and Understanding, to the Body, without communicating to it Spirituality; for the Body lives, sees, tasts, and (in the Brain) understands, and not the Soul only in the Body: So the indwelling Divinity communicates to Christ's Humanity, the Divine Properties of which it is capable, Omniscience, Omnipotence, and some more; without communicating to it Præ-eternity, Infinity, or Independence. "If, say they, as the Reasonable Soul, and Human Flesh is one Man, of God and Man is one Christ; which are the words of the Albanasian Creed, received by all Churches. Churches: as the Soul communicates its Properties, Life, Sense, and Intellection, some of them to the whole Body, others to some part of it; so does the Divinity communicate its *Properties*, that are communicable without a Contradiction implied, to the Humanity of our Saviour, or to the Man Christ Jesus. And by less than this, 'tis manifest, Jesus is not Θεος, God; but only Θεόφορ, a Man in whom God is: which is the Herefy of Nestorius.

The Church of England not having defined, that

I know of, in these Matters; I am not willing to be too forward: I shall only say,

1. The Properties of a Being are so called, because they are natural to, and are primarily in, such Being; not because they are absolutely incommunicable cable. This is clearly proved by the Instances of St. Basil and Athanasiu, namely of Fire and the Soul, that communicate their Properties to Iron, and to

the Human Body.

2. It does not feem to impossible that, the Indwelling of God should communicate Divine Properties, the communication of which implies no Contradiction, to Christ's Humanity; as that the Soul (that has but a finite Power) should communicate its Properties of Life and Sense to the whole Body, and Intellection to the Brain. It may be, these two Considerations do answer all the Reasons (before-mentioned) of the Calvinists and Cardinal Bellarmine against the real Communication of Idioms or Properties.

3. It implies a Contradiction that, Pre-eternity or Instity should be communicated to a Man, or to a Human Nature, which had once a beginning, and is circumscribed in a place: therefore these and suchlike Properties are not communicable to a Human

Nature.

4. The sole Dissiculty seems to be this; Whether it imply not also a Contradiction, that a Finite Being should receive Persections that are Insinite, such as Omniscience, Omnipotence, and the rest? And I make this a doubt, because tho there seems an incapacity in the Recipient, by its being finite in its Exrension; yet, are we sure that the Incapacity of a Finite Extension, may not be surmounted by the Infinite Power and Wisdom of the Giver? For is it more impossible, than to make all things out of Nathing? And hath not God all infinite Perfections, in the least (assignable) part, of his immense and infinite Nature? Nay, hath no finite Recipient, any infinite Property, or Properties: are not eternal Duration, and infinite Divisibility, such Properties; and are they not actually communicated to some elda's.

Creatures, in particular to Matter or Bodies? And would it not better answer to the Scripture-Expressions, concerning our Saviour's Knowledg and Power; to fay, the Divine Indwelling is such in him, as to communicate to him Divine Properties: than to fay, all was meant of God in him?
But I determine nothing in the case; the more

knowing may be more adventurous: I submit my

felf to Information.

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Institutions, concerning the Holy Trinity, and the Manner of our Saviour's Divinity.

PART II.

A Scholastick Dissertation, concerning the Trinity of Principles, or Essentialities; and Persons.

HAT I may not confound, rather than edify, the common Reader; or leave him mad, whom I found only ignorant; I resolve to say nothing of divers bold and overcurious Questions, of which the Scholastics (or Divines of the middle Ages) largely treat.

Quest. 1. The Trinity being a tremendous Mystery; and not only Heretics, but even the Scholastics, having been so unfortunate in their Enquiries and Determinations concerning it; shall we not presume too much, if we undertake to discourse accurately and clearly of it?

Answ. Those Considerations should caution us, against a proud or profane Curiosity and Boldness; and Strifes concerning Logical and Metaphysical Terms; or fuch things, as being above us, and not

revealed.

revealed, must therefore be unknown to us: but they may by no means discourage us from a sober enquiry and search of Truth revealed.

For, 1. the Doctrine of the Trinity, is the very Foundation of all true Theology; and is (as it were) the Life of the other subsequent Doctrines.

2. There are every where many Adversaries of this (first and chief) Article of our Faith: some of those directly oppose it; others, yet worse, taking Scandal and Offence at this Doctrine, do thereupon deny and renounce the whole Christian Religion.

Against these, that every Minister, nay that every Christian, be well instructed; Souls, the Church, Christianity, and even Christ (our Head and Lord) are most deeply interested. For when Insidels and Hererics (Deists and Socinians) dispute with any of our Clergy, or Laity, that are not well informed concerning these Questions; they go off with a clear Victory; to the great damage and difgrace of the Christian Verity. 201 202 203 203 10 20 203

Quest. 2. How much of the Doctrine of the Trinity, is necessary to be believed by all Chaillians;

as a Condition of their Salvation?

Answ. So much as is the true, clear, and neces-sary Sense of our Baptismal Profession and Faith; when we say, I believe the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Namely, r. That, we believe Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, to be the one, true, co-eternal God; one in Essence, three in a manner that is incomprehensible by Mortals. 2. That we believe also, Christ is God-man, the Saviour of the World. 3. Whereas in this Sacrament, as in a Holy Covenant, God offers himself to us, under the Relation of our God, (of Creator, and reconciled Father, of reconreconciling Mediator, and fantifying Spirit;) that we profess on our part, we accept this God with a cordial fiducial Assent, and practical Consent, and as it were Oblation and Surrendry of our selves to him. This Faith in the Holy Trinity is necessary, chiefly as practical; that is, as we devote our selves to God (under the aforesaid threefold Relation) to be sanctified, saved, and perfected in Love by him.

When St. Austin sets himself to discover and explicate the Mysteries of the Trinity; not to discourage those Christians who were not capable of such Depths and Subtilties, he answers to the Question, that I last proposed, in these words. ther let us unfaithfully doubt, of what we ought " to believe; nor determine rashly of what may be " learned: In the first let us hold to the Authority of Revelation; in the other, let us enquire out the "Truth, with diligence. Therefore to the Question, I say; let us believe, Father Son and Spirit is one God, Maker and Governor of the whole Creation: That the Father is not the Son, the 4 Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son; but a Trinity of Persons related to one another, and an Unity of equal Essence. But let us endeavour to understand this; begging help of him, concern-66 66 ing whom we enquire; and as he shall enable us, explicating it to others, with that heedful regard 2 66 to Piety, that if by mishap we say that of one Person which belongeth to another, we say not however what is unworthy of either. As, if we say that of 66 the Father, that properly belongeth not to the Father, but to the Son, or the Spirit, or the 66 Trinity; or of the Son, that appertaineth not to him, but appertaineth to the Father, or the Spi-"rit, or the Trinity; or lastly, of the Holy Spirit, that doth not explicate the Character and er Property of the Spirit, but is found in the Fa"ther or the Son, or the one God the Trinity.

" And fuch is the Question I would next answer,

Whether LOVE be properly the Holy SPIRIT;

" or whether the Father be LOVE, or the Son, or the Trinity it self be LOVE? For the Word of Truth saith, GOD IS LOVE. 1 John 4.8. De Trin. lib. 9.

Reader, allow me this Latitude of St. Austin; confine thy Censures, and Faith, in these Bounds; and both Faith and the Peace will be secured.

Quest. 3. Whether there are not some Traces (if we may so speak) of the Divine Trinity, in the External Creation; and also the Image of it, in Man?

Answ. Almost all the Fathers so thought; especially St. Austin, de Trin. lib. 10, & 11, & 14. And well near all the Scholastics, chiefly P. Lombard, Dist. 3. and T. Aquinas, 1. qu. 93. ar. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. This last (in the place here cited) proves, the natural Image of God is in all, his holy Image in the Sanctified, his glorious in the Glorified that this Image is in the Mind only, but some Traces or Strictures of it, in the inferior Faculties, as also in the other Creatures. To which the greatest part of those Doctors agree; tho I do not cite here their Words, or refer to the Chapters or Pages in their Works. which white were we have you at this

water players gains stated as a milest a like Quest. 4. What is that in Man, that is the natural Image of the Divine Trinity; and what Trinity in Man, or other Creatures, is chiefly observable?

Answ. We must distinctly consider these three things. 1. What Traces, and what Image of the Trinicy, in Man, are certainly and plainly discoverable by Reason, and common Sense. 2. Doth this Image confishin the Faculties, or their Ads; and in which soever of these, whether as they respect our selves, or as they refer to God? 3. That, St. Austin mistaking about this, misled the Divines of the Schools.

I. I omit the three Passive Natures; Air, Water, and Earth. The Active Natures (whose Form tends to Action, as the Passive do to Rest) are three; the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational; and have

each a threefold Virtue.

The Vegetative Nature; which I take to be Fire, incorporated, and working; in Matter rightly difference to Vegetation; its Virtue radically and centrally is but one, but Exeunter (or in the Effects) is threefold. Viz. Active, or Morive; Diferetive, by which it distinguishes Foods proper and apt for Nourishment, from those that are inept and improper; and Attractive, that (as it were) desires, draws and assimilates the Nourishment, and answers to the natural Appetite in Animals. Which so far deceived Campanella and others, that they thought all things were and need with Sinse; because (as a faid) there is in Vegetables something Analogous to Sense.

centrally and radically (in its Substance, whether that be Corporeal, or as I rather think Spiritual) but one: but in the Essects, or operatively, threefold. Viz. vitally Active, Apprehensive, and Appetitive, in the way of Sense.

The Intellective or Rational Nature also hath centrally one Formal Virtue essential to it; which operatively and externally is threefold, Active Vital, or vitally Active, Intellective; and Violitive. This Nature, as renewed by Grace, has likewise a certain Trinity; a holy Vitality or Power, a holy Wisdom, and holy Love.

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All these meet in Man. He has the three (material) Passive Natures; also the Vegetative, Sensitive, and Rational Natures; with the trine Power (or Virtue) in each of them. As renewed by Grace, he hath the moral Image of God, or the Trinity, viz. in his Vital Power, Spiritual Life; in his Intellectual, Spiritual Light, or Knowledg; and his Volitive, Divine Love. We are not to look farther or elsewhere, for the natural or the moral Image of God in Man, as Man; or as renewed: This is the

Image intended by Moses, and by God, Gen. 1. 27. and 9. 6.

There is scarce any Controversy concerning these things; saving that, T. Aquinas, and some that sollow him, have unhappily said, the Virtues or Powers (before-mentioned) of the Rational Nature, are Accidents: but the Scotists and Nominals have clearly proved the contrary. And he that shall read Zabarel, and the more moderate Thomists, will plainly see that, it is a strife about Words and Terms only. For they confess the Soul operateth (at least so far as it produceth these Powers) by its Essence; and that these Virtues and Powers are proximately and in-separably in the Soul; or (what is the same) emane from it, by a natural and constant Necessity. The state of the s

II, As to the second Question, I see not the least reason, why we should think; the Divine Image in Man is in the Virtue, or Power, or Faculty only, or in the Act only. It is radically in the Faculty or Power, actively or operatively in the Acts. For as our distinct Notions of the Power (or Virtue) and the Act in the Divine Nature, are but inadequate (or partial) Conceptions of the same thing; for the Act and Power are in God the same thing, the Att being nothing else but the Power acting: so it is necessary that, the Conception of the Objective Vir-

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tue or Power, and the Act, do concur to the form-

ing of the Image of God in us.

To the second part of the Question; Whether the Image of God in the Soul confists in the Acts towards it self, and the Creature, or towards God? I answer; T. Aquinas will have it to consist only, in the Acts towards God. But we must distinguish, between God's Natural, and Moral Image in us: And again, between the primary, and inferior part of the natural Image. And hereupon I fay; T. The primary and more eximious part of the Divine Image, is in the Faculties of the Soul, and their Acts towards God; as to know God, and to love God, &c. The inferior part is in every Act of the Mind or Soul, as it is an Act. 2. The whole Nature of the Holy or Moral Image, is seated in the Inclination, Acts, and Actions towards God; and towards the Creature, as dignified with the Image of God, in some degree; or at least for God's sake. But our Question is only concerning the natural Image.

the Anal In The Landerson head an III. St. Austin has not rightly named the triple POWER, and ACT, in the Soul; he puts Memory, instead of active Vital-Power or Vital-Activity. We are not however to wonder that, in those first and ruder Ages, they understood not so well the Nature and Powers of the Soul; for St. Austin was the first, that discoursed and argued accurately, of Theological Matters. He formed, as it were, and perfected, the too general and confused Notions of the Antients; establish'd, and fixed, their loose indetermined Thoughts. Being a Man of a penetrating Wit, and clear Head; untaught by any, he laid those Foundations of the methodical Scholastic Theology, on which Boethiss and Damascen, and after them P. Lombard, built more regularly and fymmetrically. Few Philosophers will allow that, Memory is a Faculty distinct 2 3

distinct from the Phantasy, and Intellect; all Memory is an Act of the Intellect, or Phantasy. See Durandus, Lib. 1. dist. 3. qu. 3. where you will find, they understood by Memory, the Intellect as acting; or they distinguishit from Intellect, only in Power, that is, as capable of acting: And Scotus, with others that follow St. Austin, do not make Memory a distinct Faculty, but the Intellect as pregnant; and in this respect, give it a place in the Trinity of Acts: and thus it is only Mind.

Divers Scholastics confess in express words, that; they acknowledg Memory to be a part of the Image of the Trinity, only out of regard to St. Austin, from whose Doctrine we must not depart in the least. But as it is certain, Memory and Intellect are not distinct Faculties of the rational Soul; so 'tis most certain that Vital-Activity, Intellect, and Will

are, and that there is no fourth.

Quest. 5. Is there a Trinity of PRINCIPLES

(or Essential Attributes) in God?

Answ. Yes, out of Controversy. I will not however litigate about the Name: whether you will say Principles, or (as Campanella) Primalities; or Essentialities, or Attributes, or Essential Properties. But the other Attributes are to be distinguished from these, which are the Formalities (as it were) of the Divine Nature, and do essentiate it.

1. All sober Men must confess, the Life, the Intellect and Will of God, are not formally the same with ours: These Words are not used of God and Men univocally, but equivocally; or not in the same Latitude, and (precise) sense. And the some say here, they are used of God and the Creature, neither Univocally nor Equivocally, but Analogically: Yet the Scotists are in the right, who prove there is no third; but what is said Analogically, is said Equi-

vocally.

vocally. See on this, Phil. Faber, Meurisse, Rada, Trombetus, Lychetius, and the rest of that School. But fee also on the contrary (the judicious Metaphysician) Scheibler, pag. 86, 87. of the Oxford Edition. To we have been able to the mental the test

2. It must not be dissembled here that, God is no otherwise known to us Mortals, but (as saith the Apostle) in a Glass: which Glass is the Creature, and the written Word; of the Creatures, chiefly the Human Soul. Therefore we are necessitated to think, and speak, of God; after the Likeness of the Soul: only removing from our Conceptions of God, our Imperfections; and acknowledging the equivocalness or impropriety of our Ideas and Expressions. But to speak better or otherwise of God, we cannot; we must thus speak of the Trinity, or not at all.

And I pray, why is this Trinity of Faculties in the Soul, confessed (by all) to be the Image of God in us; if we are not to conceive of God and the Trinity, according to this Image, rather than any other Ways?

If any doubt, whether Omnipotence Intellect and Will, are to be attributed to God; let 'em read Aquinas, the Scholastics, the Fathers, or the Scriptures themselves: for I would not spend time, in proving what is almost universally acknowledged. Some indeed have faid, there is no Power in God; tho they confess his Omnipotence: as Petavius, and some more. As if Omni-potence were not Power. But the rest explain themselves better, and say; there is no passive Power in God, active there is: and that, this active Power is always in Act, never quiescent; in short, they own an active Omni potence, that always acteth, at least immanently, tho not exeunter or externally and terminatively on the Creature.

The state of

Quest. 6. In what, and how many things, doth the Trinity of PRINCIPLES in the Image, agree with the Divine Trinity of PRINCIPLES, or of PERSONS?

Answ. 1. In the Human Soul, or in an Angel, Essence and Virtue or Power make no Composition. But because we cannot well conceive of a Spiritual Substance, but only by inadequate (or partial) Conceptions, after the manner of Matter and Form: therefore we are constrained in speaking of the Soul or other Spiritual Being, to use the Terms Substance and Formal-Virtue, intending them in the analogical way; that is, so as to answer Matter and Form in Bodies. But by those Terms and Notions I intend no Composition, in the Spiritual Beings. I would have this to be applied also, and more especially, to the Principles, and the Divine Persons, of the Trinity in God.

tained in this triple Virtue; neither is there any fourth. But even these, Vital-Activity Intellect and Will, have many Names, connotatively; that is, as assing and terminated on External Objects. And the same is to be understood of the Divine Trinity, whether of Principles or Persons.

cident in the Soul; but is its very Essence. And the fame is to be confessed by All, of the Divine Trinity

of Principles and Persons.

part of the Soul were the Active vital Power, another part the Intellectual, and another the Volitive; but the whole Soul is vitally-Active, the whole Intellective, the whole Volitive. And so also in both the Trinities; the whole Divine Essence, not part of it, is Active-Life, the whole Intellect, and

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the whole Will; the whole is Father, the whole Son, and the whole Holy Spirit.

5. But the whole Soul is not wholly Active-Power, or Life; nor wholly Intellect, or wholly Will. That is, each of these denotes or signifies the Soul, not wholly, but inadequately; all of them together, as conceived also with the Substance and all Modalities and Relations, are the Soul adequately and wholly. In. like manner the whole Divine Essence is expressed, tho not wholly, by Active-Life or Power; or by Intellect or Will: or by the word Father, or Son, or Holy Spirit.

6. As to immanent Acts of the Soul; (1.) An immanent Act properly so called, is when, not only this Act effecteth nothing externally; but the very Object of it, is nothing that is external, but the Soul it felf. (2.) Or more generally, and less properly and strictly, when the Act is on some external Object; but abideth in the Soul, and (as before) effecteth nothing externally. The former of these is not any thing different from the Soul; but is the Soul it self, knowing or loving it self, or as in Vital-Action. In short, it is only another State, Mode, or Manner of the Soul, differencing it from the same Soul, when consider'd as not thus acting, or as not in the Act of knowing it self, or loving it self, &c. And the some call these Acts, Accidents of the Soul; yet they intend that Term improperly: namely, on the account that (as they think) these Acts are not always in the Soul, but die away sometimes, without the Soul's dying; but not because they are adventitions things, externally adventitious, but so many several Modes or States of the Soul.

If it be true, which I much doubt; that the Soul doth not always understand, and always love; no not by a profound and unobserved Act: this hapneth only by occasion of its unperfectiand dependent Nature, which is finite and limited. It hapneth not to sti

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the uncreated Divine Nature, which is Infinite and Persect. It seemeth truer that, these Acts of the Soul are permanent and constant; they are a sort of Habits, that are not (sensibly) perceived by the Agents, but only when the Effects are also perceived. As a Traveller, tho thinking or talking of other things, continues his Journey, in the right way, and by all its windings or its turnings off from the direct Line; or as the Musician plays his Tune, without reflecting or perceiving what he doth, but wholly intent upon other Matters. So perhaps may the Soul perform always its Essential Acts, of Intellection and Love, as well as of Vitality; without Notions, or Observation of those Acts.

The Soul understanding and loving it self, may be consider'd not only, as Asting or in Ast; but also, with its Object; that is, as acting on it self. And thus it has a double Respect, of Agent, and of Object; from whence a special or particular Denomination ariseth. While its Acts are toward it self, and within it self; they are nothing but the Soul it self; nor can it be called any thing but a mutual Relation. But when its Acts are towards external Objects, tho they do not operate on them; these Acts, as Acts, for so much as the Agent is concerned, are nothing else but the Soul in a particular State Mode or Manner: but as they are specified by those external Objects, they ought to have (and they have) another Name; for they are now of a mixt Nature, viz. as they are the Acts of the Agent, and as terminated on external Objeds. Again, when the Faculties of the Soul have an External Object or Objects, and do operate on them; such Action as it is the Agent's, 'tis but a mere Habitude or Mode of such Agent; or as Scorns speaks, it is not any thing different from the Soul, but as it is Specified (or specifically denominated) by its Object, Term, or Effect; tis to be conceived of as distinct from the Soul. How

How these things in the Image, are to be applied to the Divine Trinity of Principles or Persons, I need not particularly explain; the Reader will do it in his own Mind, and I would not offend by an un-

necessary-Prolixity, and add with the land of the second

7. The Order and Conjunction of the three Faculties of the Soul in their acting, is really admirable. We perceive a diversity of the Action; but what or how great that diversity is, we can scarce tell, or rather cannot tell; for our Faculties have such a mutual dependence, and conjunction, that whenever one Faculty is principal in acting, the other co-operate; as much as the capacity of the terminating Object will permit. And all Divines say the same thing of the Principles and Persons in the

Divine Trinity.

8. The first of these Faculties, in the order of Nature, is the Active-Vital-Power; this we may fay is the Foundation and Principle of the other Powers, in all their Actions: for we must conceive the Soul as aching, before we can conceive it as alting intellettually, or in the way of Volition: and the Saul's thus acting is its Living; I do not mean, its living as it animates or vivifies the Body, but its Essential Life. From hence some have taken occasion to say, Vital-Activity or Active-Vitality is not one of the three Powers of the Soul, but is their Genus; they are only Branches of this Power: but this I shall fully confute in its proper place. And tho we have no particular Name or Word, whereby to discriminate the Life, or Active-Power of Man, from that of Brutes; yet that they are of a different kind or fort, their Operations and their Effects show.

By the Vital Power is first GENERATED the Intellectual Act, and from both PROCEEDETH the

Volitive- Act.

I don't think, that I need teach my Reader, to

All Profile

apply or accommodate these Notions to the Divine Life, Intellect, and Will; to the Father, the Logos,

and Holy Spirit.

9. The formal Virtue or Power of the Soul is one and three; single, and yet triple. One centrally, radically, or with respect to the Essence; wirtually, processionally, and by connocation and respect to its triple Act.

And certain it is, the Divine Principles are radically one as they are the Essence; but virtually, connotatively, and relatively to the Acts, they are three: and the same is to be held of the Divine Persons.

10. But to make a just Distinction of the Faculties or Powers of the Soul, and to adapt to them Names that shall accurately express their Nature and Differences, is (it may be) what a mortal Wit should attempt in vain: and otherways there would not remain so many Controversies about it, among (the most subtle and distinguishing Heads) the Divines of the Schools. Who will think that, he can explicate (whether in more or fewer words) that abstruce difference, that recondit arcane Distinction; so as to satisfy others: that difference, I say, of the Faculties of the Soul, that has escaped the clear and penetrating fight of Aquinas, Aureolus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis; of Scotus, Trombet, Mairo, Eaber, Rada; of Ockam, Gregorius Ariminensis, Hurta-dus; and so many more? And much more should we say the same of the Principles, and Persons, of the

Divine Trinity.

11. But the least Difference that we can (with reason) affirm of them, is a Virtual-Relative, and Denominative by connotation from their Acts: The whole Controversy is, Whether their Difference be real, and formal in the nature of the thing. Apply this also to the Trinity of Principles and Perfons. 12. What-

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12. Whatsoever diversity of Action there is in the Human Life, it all arises from this Power (of the Soul) which radically is one, and processionally three. And (in like manner) all the Diversity in created Beings, is wholly owing to that (Divine Essential) Power or Virtue, which (as we have faid) is three and one; or the Trinity of Persons in one Essence.

13. As the Trinity of Faculties and Powers in the Soul, are known (with certainty) that they are; but scarce can we express, or conceive, what they are: We must be willing to acknowledg the same, of the Divine Trinity of Principles, and Persons.

14. The Powers (or Faculties) of the Soul al-

ways Act, their not to Act were not to Be; but they do not always act on outward Objects, nor by the Spirits of the Body: They do not always animate or vivify the Body; as namely, not in a State of Separation, or when the personal Union of the Soul and Body is dissolved. Nor do they always know, or will this or that particular thing; nor even themselves, sensibly, by the bodily Organs.

The Divine Virtue also always acts, to Ast and

to Be are the same in God; but it doth not always create, or govern the World, or operate on external Things. The Divine Persons do not always Create, Redeem, or Sanctify; tho they always are, and all immanently, or internally.

15. The active-vital-Power, Intellect, and Will,

in the Soul, are centrally and radically one formal Virtue or Power; yet we must not say, the Soul lives or acts by the Intellect, or understands by the Will. But we must say, (1.) Formally the Soul acts by its vital-Activity, understands by its Understanding, and willeth by its Will. (2.) And effectively the Will willeth by Intellection, and the Intellect understandeth by vital-Activity. The Soul acteth it self, by its 1,819 17 12.1 Vitality:

vitality; understandeth it self, by Intellect; willeth it felf, by Will. And tho it be truly faid, the vital- A-Etivity understandeth and willeth, by it self with the Intellect and Will; and the Intellect willeth, by is self with the Will: Yet 'tis better said, and more properly, the Soul acteth, understandeth, and willeth, by its Virtue or Power; as was noted before. Therefore 'tis not properly said, God formally liveth (or vitally acteth) by his Intellect, or understandeth by his Will; or that the Father vitally-afteth by the Son, or the Son (eternally) understandeth by the Spirit. But it is rightly said, God acteth by his vital- Activity, and understandeth by his intellective-Power, and productively by his vital-Activity; and he willeth by his Volitive. Power, but productively by his Active and Intellective. By this the Reader sees also, how he is to speak of the Persons in the Divine Trinity.

16. Saith Hurtadus de Mendoza, de Anim. Disp. 5. S. 5. " A thing is said to be specified, when it hath " its Essence in order to something else; as Form in order to Matter, and Matter in order to Form: And every Power receiveth a Specification immediately in order to its own Acts, and remotely in order to Objects. From hence then it is that, the Faculties of the Soul are to have names that express a Distinction and Diversity; and from hence also the Divine Principles are diversly named. Whether it be so in the Persons too, I leave undetermined: But cerrain it is, the Father is thus named; for he is called the Father, 1. Respectively to the Act of Generating. 2. With respect to the Son as generated. Therefore I ask, Whether also the Logos (WIS-DOM, or SON) is not named, 1. From the Act of Intellection. 2. From the Deity as the Object understood. And in like manner the Holy Spirit,

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1. From the Act of Self-loving. 2. From the Deity

as the Object loved.

17. The triple Virtue or Power of the Soul, is not only the Essence of the Soul, not an Accident, as Aquinas mistook: but we are also to conceive those Faculties as distinct, tho not as divided; if we will have an adequate Conception of the Soul. The sirst part of this Assertion has been (long ago) proved by Ockham, Gregory of Ariminum, Henr. Gandavensis, Gabriel Biel, Hurtadus de Mendoza, Scotus and all the Scotists. Durandus affirmeth the same, Dist 3. qu. 4. n. 8. of Angels. Gregory of Valentia saith, it is probable; Suarez and Vasquez say, the contrary cannot be easily proved. The second part clearly follows.

What in this Matter is said of the Triple Power of the Soul, is to be understood also of the Divine

Trinity.

must think of it under the Notion of a Spirit, or purest Substance, as well as of a formal Virtue; yet it is more known to us, under this last Conception, than under the other. For we know but little, if any thing, of the substantiality of a Spirit; or as others speak, the Metaphysical Matter of it: But we clearly apprehend what it is to Will, Understand, and vitally Ast; and from thence, what Vital Power, Intellective and Volitive Power, are? And from hence, Cartesius and his Followers argue, Cogito, ergo sum; I Think, therefore I am: Hereby making the Ast of Cogitation the first part of Knowledg, and from whence our Existence (or Being) it self is proved.

all those things are to be said of the Divine Principles (and also, in its measure, of the Soul) that are

commonly said of the Trinity of Divine Persons. "The Catholick Faith is this, that we worship one "God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the Principles, nor dividing the Subfrance; for the vital Active-Power is one, the In-" tellective another, the Volitive another: But the " Deity of the Life, of the Intellect, and Will, is "the same; the Glory equal, the Majetty co-eter"nal. As is the Life, so is the Understanding, and Will. The Life uncreate, the Intellect uncreate, " the Will uncreate; the Life incomprehensible, the Intellect incomprehensible, the Will incompre-" hensible; the Life eternal, the Intellect eternal, the Willeternal: yet not three Eternals, but one Eternal; as neither three Incomprehensibles, nor three Uncreate, but one Uncreate and one Incom-"prehensible.—and so of the rest. All the Question is, Whether Omnipotence may be ascribed, in proper speaking, to each of them distinctly and severally; concerning which fee the Author, whether Arbanasius, or Anastasius, or some other. For my own part I scruple not to say, the Divine active-Life is intelligent, or wise; and the Intellect (or Wisdom) is vital; and the Love is vital and intellective. But 'tis not properly said in the Abstract, the active Vital Power, is a Power formally intellective; or that, to live or act, is to understand; or to understand, is to will; or the Wisdom is Love, or Love is formally Wisdom or Life. And the like of the Persons in the Trinity.

20. As the most adequate Conception of the Soul is that; 'tis "a created Spirit (or most pure Sub"france) endued with a formal, vitally-Active, In"tellective, Volitive Power; first and necessarily toward it self, then towards external Objects. So we cannot have a truer Conception, in the present Life, concerning God; than this. "He is one, in-

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dependent, infinite, necessary, immutable Es-" sence; a Spirit (that is, Life, Intellect, and Will)
"most perfect; Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; " Self-living, Self-knowing, Self-loving: of whom, " by whom, and to whom, are all things. And from this, inferring his Relations to his Creatures; Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier.

Quest. 7. Is the Trinity of Principles (Active-Life, Intellect, and Love) and of Persons, the fame?

Answ. To answer this, I shall first propose these

Points to be considered by the Reader.

I. What doth the term Logos (which we render WORD) signify in the Context of John 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, &c.
II. What is a Person?

III. What is a Relation?

IV. What are the Grounds or Foundations of the Relations?

V. Wherein, or how, do the Divine Principles (or Virtues) differ from one another?

VI. What have the Fathers said of this Matter?

VII. What say the Scholastics, or Doctors of the (Academical) Schools; that lived in the middle Ages, between the Fathers and the Divines of the Reformation?

VIII. What is the Doctrine of the Moderns, or

those since the Reformation?

I. Of the LOGOS.

The word LOGOS, in Ecclesiastical and Profane Authors, is variously used; sometimes for Reason in general, sometimes for an Argument, sometimes

times for a Definition, for a Speech also and Word, and many more; as may be feen in Lexicons. But it being used by the Spirit of God, in the Context of St. John before-named; therefore its Theological fignification is there chiefly to be fought. And tho in the beginning there, is by most Interpreters rather taken for in the beginning of the Creation; than as St. Cyril interprets, in the Father: And tho in that Context the Evangelist speaks of the Creation of all things by the WORD. It will not thence follow that, Christ had then his first Original or Beginning, or was then created: For 'tis there also said, on the contrary, the WORD was with God; which intimates his Eternal Co-existence. Nay it is said there, the WORD was God: therefore, not a Creature; much less, then first originated. But from hence it is evident, first that, this name the WORD, has respect to the Work of Creation; when God SAID, Let there be Light, and so of the rest. And therefore it is, that the Works of God are often in Holy Scripture ascribed to his Word, Psal. 33. 6. and 148; 8. I Pet. 3. 5. And Solomon (Prov. 8. 22, &c.) says almost the same thing of WISDOM, for so we render Logos in that Context, viz. that, "It was from Everlasting, from the Beginning, before the Earth. "When there were no Fountains, or Depths; before the Mountains, and Hills; when he prepared the Heavens, I was there. Secondly, We must understand St. John as speaking of the Word as præ-existing, even from Eternity; tho named the Word in time, with respect to the Creation. So the Logos is both the eternal WORD, or inexisting WISDOM, of the Father; and that creating WORD and WISDOM of the Omnipotent, that went forth to make all things. The Context it felf teaches us to understand the LOGOS, neither as only the eternal inexisting WISDOM, nor as only that proceeding H 3 WORD

WORD and WISDOM that went forth to create; but so as to comprehend both these Senses. The Philosopher Zeno is deservedly commended both by Tertullian and Lactantius, for faying; the Logos is the maker of the World! See their words at length in the Annotations of Grotius on this context.

At the 4th Verse it is said, In bim was EIFE; as 'tis said elsewhere by Christ, "As the Father " hath LIFE in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have LIFE in himself. By which is meant, not only that, Christ is the Cause and Author of our Life; but is that Radix or Root of Life, or Eternal WISDOM, that was generated by the Omnipotent Divine LIFE: and therefore 'tis here said of Christ, both as eternally inexisting, and as proceeding to give Life to Men.

The LIFE was the LIGHT of Men. It was said, to signify the Property of the Person; for it is not meant only of the Act of illuminating the World, but of the eternal Property of the Enlightner: Light, the second Property of the Sun, is always likened to Intellect the second Faculty of the Soul. So the sense is, "The Logos or INTELLECT, the Eternal WISDOM of God, being Incarnate, was the Light of the World: The Eternal, Inexisting, Intellectual Light, is our Teacher or Proceeding Light. John 11: 10. and 12.35. 1 John 1.7. Rev. 21.23.

Grotius observes here that, Seneca and the Stoics say, the creating REASON; and Chalcidins, "The REASON of God, is God taking care of human " Affairs; and is the cause that Men live well and

"happily, if they neglect not the Gift of the most High God." happily of the most

I do not oppose the Exposition of Deodati, and some others, that say; Christ is called the Light of Men, because he created the Reasonable Soul; and because

because he enlightens it, after it hath been darkned by Original Sin. Nor would I contradict those, that have said, the WORD is so called; because in all Ages he hath declared the Father to Men, as a Word or Speech doth the Mind. But I would have these to pass but only as secondary Reasons of this Name.

The Belgic Annotations have rightly said, "The Logos, that is, the substantial Word and REASON; as Reason signifies also, both the Internal Reason or Intellect of Man, and that external Word by which the Internal Reason is expressed. And on the 4th Verse, The Light of Men, i.e. "The Author and "Cause of Light, namely of that Reason and Un-"derstanding with which the human Kind was en-

"dued and ennobled, when created...

this Context. The Jesuit Maldonat, after observing and censuring divers impertinent and inept Interpretations here, saith; "A great number of the "Antients, and almost all the Moderns, think the SON is called the LOGOS, because he is Novictia Patris; the Knowledg (or Wisdom) of the "Father. This Opinion hath been received with a marvellous Consent and Agreement of Divines; and hath obtained such an Authority, that it would be rashness to depart from it: Notwith- standing, there may also other Reasons (and true ones) be given of this Appellation. Yes, I will give two Reasons; that will comprehend all the rest. 1. By the Word of God, the World was made; God said, Let there be Light, and so of the rest. 2. Because the Son declares to Men the Commands and Will of God. And I am wholly of Opinion, we ought here to take the most comprehensive sense, rather than any narrower.

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Lyra notes that, the Word or Conception of the Mind, not which is unformed and confused, but which is determinate and perfect, and therefore called Definition, is the Image of the Divine Word in us; because God understandeth himself, and all things, by one Ast of Intellection: And thus there is in God but one Word, because in him there can be but one (most perfect and compleat) Conception. But he disagrees here, in part, from the generality of the School-Divines, who say; "The Son or WORD" is not God's KNOWLEDG of other things, but only of Himself.

II. Of the word PERSON.

Or, What is a Person? We ask, 1. concerning the Name or Term, Whether the Term Person be necessary in explaining the Trinity? 2. Of its signification?

1. If Necessary be taken in a large sense, for what tends to preserve the Faith pure and entire; the term Person may be called Necessary: because its signification is so determined and fixed by Ecclesia-stical Use and Custom, that he that rejects this Word, is suspected to reject the true Faith it self. Otherwise no Term whatsoever is necessary, because no one Language is necessary to Religion; much less is the word Person necessary, which is not found in Scripture in this sense.

2. To the second; Boethius and Aquinas define a Person, to be an individual Substance in the Rational Nature. Aquinas, much perplex'd and distrest, opens the whole Matter, thus. "Person in general signifies, an Individual Substance, of the Rational

Nature. Individual is what is distinct from all others, and indistinct in it self. Person in what" foever Nature, signifies what is distinct in that " Nature; and in the Human Nature, it signisses this Soul, this Flesh, these Bones: for these are the individuating Principles of a Man.

But the distinction in the Divine Nature, is not e made but by Relations of Origination; i.e. Gene-" ration, Spiration, Procession. Relation in the " Divine Nature is not an Accident inhæring in its " Subject, but is the Divine Essence it self; and " therefore subsisteth, as the Divine Essence subsist-" eth. Therefore as the Deity or Divinity is God; so the Divine Paternity is God the Father, who is a Divine Person. Therefore a Divine Person signifies a Relation as subsisting; and this (a Relation as subsisting) signifies a Relation after the manner of a Substance, which is an Hypostasis " subsisting in the Divine Nature: though a "Subsistence in the Divine Nature is not any thing different from the Nature, but is the " Nature. And Quest. 30. when upon this Question, Are there more Divine Persons? He is puzled with this Objection, There is but one Person, because there is but one individual intellectual Substance or Nature; which hath since been the Objection of the Socinians; He answers thus. "In the Definition of a " Person, the word Substance doth not denote Es-" sence, but Suppositum. And in Qu. 39. Is Essence, and Person the same in God? He answers, "In God, " Essence and Suppositum is the same; and Suppositum in all Intellectual Substances is the same as " Person. But it seems to be a Difficulty, that tho "there are three Divine Persons, there is but one Divine Essence. To this, some have said; Per-" sons and Essence differ in God, as the former are ce assisting Relations; considering Relations only as "they refer to one another, and not as they are Entities or Things. But in truth, Relations in " created

created Beings are only Accidents, in God they are the Divine Essence; from whence it follows that, in God Person and Essence differ not quoad rem, or really. And yet the Divine Persons really differ from one another; for a Person signifieth a Relation, as subsisting, in the Divine Nature. A Relation, with respect to the Essence, differs from the Essence ratione tantum, i.e. only by an Act of our Mind, or in our manner of conceiving; but a Relation, with respect to its Correlate (or opposite Relation) differs from it reselved (or opposite Relation) differs from it reselves ally, for it is opposed to it. The Sum is, in the self-same Essence or Substance are three Relations, that are really distinct: Which Relations are yet really the same with the Substance or Essence; not as it is an Essence, but as a Suppositum, or Person. See 2.39. a. 1. ad 3. I shall take leave to hope that, all shall not be damned, that do not understand these things; or understanding them, cannot reconcile them.

Cajetan saith, God (precisely considered) is a Suppositum: but Fonseca, Suarez, and others blame this. According to Scheibler, a Suppositum is a Singular (or individual) Substance, compleat, and incommunicable; and therefore is more general and comprehensive than Person, which is defined an intelligent Suppositum, to distinguish it from a Suppositum (or individual Substance) not intelligent. According to Valla and Scaliger, a Person is not a Substance; but a Quality. The Objection of Valla (and the Socinians) is better answer'd by Scheibler, than by Aquinas. The Objection is, If a Person is a Substance, then three Persons are three Substances; he denies the Consequence. "Because Person is sometimes taken complexly or concretely, that is, for the Substance and Property toge-

ther; it is thus taken when a Person is said to be a Substance, and when we say the Father is a

66 Person.

"Person. But Person is also taken abstractly, or for what it signifies above or more than the mere Essence: it is taken thus, when we say there are three Divine Persons; for the meaning of that, is, there subsistes one Divine Essence, under three (Personal) Properties. He means, the Holy Trinity is three Properties, added (as it were) to the Divine Essence, Godhead or God. And he explains it, by the Trinity of Assections in every Ens or Being; verum, bonum, unum; and by the Unity of a Being, as it is a Being.

But a Difficulty still remains; What are these Properties? Are they the Relations; or their Founda-tions; or their Antecedents, or their Consequents? Do these Properties differ from the Effence, and how? Lest I should rather confound, than edify, my Reader; if I undertook to discuss all the Opinions of the Scholastics, concerning the difference between Nature and Suppositum: therefore I will refer him only to Scheibler, Metaph. 1. 2. c. 2. n. 74, 60; and to Suarez, Metaph. d. 34; and Fonseca, 5 Metaph. c. 8. 4. 6. And if he would see the Matter treated more copioully, he may read (and tire himself in) the Thomists, Scotists, and almost all the Nominals. But if we might have leave to say, "Personality in the Deity is radically the Eternal Trinity of Principles, Life Intellect and Will; next the formal Existence of this "Eternal Trinity of Principles, as in immanent Act" in God himself, that is, as Self-living Self-knowing Self-loving, with mutual Relation of Act to Act, and of each Act to its Object; and lastly with respect to the Creation, (or processionally) first objectively, and then effectively. I say, if it were sufficient, thus to speak; which I do not, here, or now, determine; the whole Matter would be certain, and clear, so far as the Divine Nature is comprehensible, by us Mortals. a start taute.

III. Of a RELATION.

We have often occasion to say, a Person in the Trinity is a Relation; which is therefore obscure, because the Entity or Nature of a Relation is obscure. Scheibler has said well, Metaph. Lib. 2. c. 9. n. 1. "Because the Human Understanding hath but a middle Perfection, therefore it doth not readily underfland some things on the account of the Excess of their Perfection, and again others as hardly on the account of the Defect of their Perfection; for in both Cases they are disproportioned to our Understandings. Our Intellect is almost blind, in the Knowledg of God, the most perfect Being; and but weak in the Knowledg of Relations, because their Beings or Natures are so impersect as to be scarce discernable. It is asked, is Relation a real thing; or only a Notional, that is, a Conception? Is it any thing distinct from its Subject, Foundation, or Term? And if it is, what is it? In good truth, the Order of things, as distinct from the things themselves, occasions great Trouble and Puzzle to the Human Understanding; and notional Entities are innumerable, and take up a great part of our Life: such a Play, such a Dream, is the Human Life. Yet all Notional Beings are not to be thought little Matters, for it was the Divine Wisdom that was the cause of ORDER; and not only all Relations do result from the Order of things, but (if I mistake not) all Morality is formally in Order and Relation, and materially in the Mode or Manner of it. God, as Maker, is the Cause and Foundation of Nature; as a Wise Governour, of Order; as Love, of Perfection. But what the Order of things is, and what their Relations (thereupon) to one another, is better known by the things themselves; than by artificial studied Notions.

The Foundation of Relations is in the Order of things; this Order is found in Substances, Quantities, Qualities, Actions, Passions, and even in Relations; for Relation is the comparability (or if you will, the comparing of things) that are in Order, with one another. The Understanding is endued with a Power, of comparing things; and thence that passive Capacity of things, by which they are Objects of the comparing Art, is called their Comparability or Relation: which is not something really different from the Order, nor the Order something diverse from the things in Order; nor (in short) is it any way more clearly or better expressed, than by the bare Names of Order and Relation, assisted by our Sight or other Senfes. From Order, and the Relations, resulteth all that which we call Beauty, and Harmony. and Comparability are only between things that are diverse from one another. I know nothing farther of the Relations of things, tho I have been often wearied with the Disputations concerning them. I don't think that we should enquire or study for new or other things, concerning the Order of things, or their Relations. Tho they are not real things, or real Entities: yet one may fay, an Ordinal is Nonnibil, or somwhat considerable; as being found in every part of the boundless Field, or Champain rather of Nature. We may say, it is a World that the Human Understanding hath framed or created, as it were out of nothing: and with how much Noise, and what Conflict, have the most Learned Metaphysicians and Logicians contended in it, and about it?

The Logicians hitherto, for the most part, distinguish Relation, from its Foundation. And otherways why have they several Names; and why do we say that, Relation resulteth or ariseth from the Foundation? But what the difference between em, is; they are not so well agreed. Some

dream

dream of a real Distinction, such as is between one

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Thing or Being and another; as Cajetan, 1.p. q.28. a. 2. Ferrariensis cont. Gent. L. 4. c. 14. Capreolius, 1. d. 30. q. 1. But Hurtadus is for a mere modal Distinction. Some contend for such a modal Distinction, as between Quantity and Figure; others (as Scotus and Fonseca) are for a formal Distinction, at least where Relations are separable from their Foundation. The Opinion of Durandus may be seen in himself, 1. D. 30. 2 2. and that of Suarez, in his Metaphysics, Disp. 47. Sect. 2. n. 4, 5. Yet others tell us, Relation is distinguished from the Foundation, only ratione ratiocinata, by a mere Act of our Reason; so Ockam, 1. d. qu. 1. and d. 31.q. 1. Ariminensis d. 28. q. 2. 2. 2. Ægidius I. d. 26. 9.4. Herveus: and Suarez, Metaph. disp. 27. S. 2. n. 22. And Scheibler Lib. 2. c.9. punct. 2. n. 50. Those that are for a Modal Distinction, differ from those that maintain a formal, most commonly only in the Name; Albertinus who defends the Formal, instances in Quantity and Figure: what difference they pretend between Modal and Formal, see in Albertinus de Rel. Q. 6. p. 387; and Q. 13; and in the Formalists. They alledg the Authority of Aquinas; see Hurtadus, Metaph. d. 15. p. 898, 899. And verily there is nothing but is the Effect of some Cause, except only the first Cause; and Relation requireth no efficient Cause but the Foundation,

And verily there is nothing but is the Effect of fome Cause, except only the first Cause; and Relation requireth no efficient Cause but the Foundation, the Term, and Subject. This Egg (for instance) is like to never so many thousands of new laid Eggs, without any change in it self. And if Relation were a real Entity, how many millions of Entities must there be in every Person, nay in every Dust and Sand?

P. Hurtadus has most fully proved that, Relation is distinguished from its Subject, Foundation, and Term, only by mental Conception; not really, formally, or modally, unless by Formality and Mode

you mean only mental Conception. Also that, the Term is essential to the Relation; and tho the Relation is denominated from its Foundation and Subject, it hath essential reference to its Term: for it is the Comparability of one thing to another, and therefore belongeth to both, or is between both. When Scottle says, 'tis a false Conception, if Reason distinguishes where the thing is not diverse: Albertin rightly answers, it is no false Conception; for while Reason conceives one thing without conceiving another, it doth not affirm, but only abstracts negatively; as the Sight doth not err, while it perceives Colour, and doth not perceive Tast. Albert. de Rel. qu. 12. p. 400.

IV. Of the FOUNDATIONS of the Divine Relations.

The School-Divines speak obscurely of the Foundations of the Divine Relations. They say enough indeed of the twofold Procession, the Procession of the Word or WISDOM by an Act of the Intellect, and of the Spirit by an Act of the Will: In God, fay they, there is no Procession but by an Act. Thomas (1. q. 27. 3. c.) saith; "In the first Procession, the thing understood is in the Understander, in the other the thing loved in the Lover. But whether they would have the Acts, or the Processions to be the Foundations of the Relations; I know not how they will be able to distinguish the Relations from one another. For they say, the Divine Intellect and Will are the same, and to Understand and Will (in God) are the same; so are to Speak and Will, and to Beget and Breath. But if thus the Foundations are the same, and the Terms the same; what Mortal can understand but that the Relations also must be the same? Aquinas indeed says, 1. 9. 27: a. 3. ad 3m. 200

Tho in God the Intellect is not another thing than the Will; yet it is of the nature of the Will and the Intellect, that the Processions that result from the Acts of these Powers, should have a certain Order. But we cannot understand Order, but only between distinct things, as neither Relation. If there be no real diversity in the Divine Act, no Modal or Formal in the nature of the thing; it seems unconceivable that an Act in all respects the same, should be related to it self by distinct and opposite Relations.

- They make four real Relations, in the Deity; the words of Aquinas are these, 1. q. 28. a. 4. "There " are four Relations; Paternity, Filiation, Spira-"tion, and Procession: They say moreover, Rela-"tions cannot be in God but only as founded on Action, and fuch Action too as is Immanent or Internal. Of fuch Processions there are only two; one by the Action of the Intellect, which is the " Procession of the WORD; the other by the Acti-" on of the Will, which is the Procession of LOVE: But in each of these Processions, there are two opposite Relations; one of that which proceeds from " the Principle, the other of the Principle it self. "The Procession of the WORD is called the Gene-" ration-Relation of the Principle Paternity; the Re-" lation of what proceeds from the Principle, is called Filiation. The Procession of LOVE hath " not a particular Name, nor yet the Relations ari-"fing from it: but the Relation of the Principle
here is called Spiration; the Relation of what proceeds from it, Procession. So far the Angelical Doctor; but if the real Relations are four, either a Person and a real Relation in God are the same, or not the same: Is the same, there are sour Divine Persons; if they are not the same, we must find some other definition of PERSON, such a one

one that real Relation shall not be the formal Reason of it. And again, if there be four Relations in God, let 'em give a Reason; swhy both the Relations arising from the first Procession are Persons, and nor the Relations from the Second? Lastly, Seeing the Processions are from one At, how can either the Processions or Relations be diverse? The Reason of the Question, is, as Durandus expresses it, 1. d. 5. q. n. 8. p. 67. It is impossible, when things are perfectly the same, that one should differ (or be distinct) from the other, when this other doth not distinct) from that. For if it be a true Rule that, things that are the same in fome third, are necessarily the same with one angcother: It will follow, by a stronger Reason, that, things perfectly the same with one another, are the fame in respect of whatsoever Third. And what Faber has faid of Novity, is another Objection against the diversity and real distinction of Relations. Real Relation, properly so called, necessarily follows on the Position of Extremes; and so there can be no new Relation, without some Noviny in the Extremes. I ask, Can the Relation be diverse, " without diversity of Extremes? As D. Orbelles " saith, 1. d. 32. the Relation of the same thing to it self; is not a real Relation. Theor. 98. c. 2.

[Note here, the Learned Author often sets him-

felf to perplex the Doctrine of Relations, and other Heads of Scholastick Learning; for what reason we shall observe hereafter: but the whole that he hath here either observed, or collected, is all of it an-Iwered, by that known (and certain) Aphorism; Idem diversimode consideratum, Formalitate Relation non est idem; a thing diversly considered, is not the same in its Relative Formality, but is diverse from (nay

opposed to) it self by those Relations.

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fays, is in its measure and sense true. "The natural Logic is defective, when applied to Matters. " of Faith. And, the Rational Logic of Faith is different from the Logic of Nature : the Philosoophers saw not that, a thing might be Three and but "One; and therefore they faid nothing of it in " their Rules. The Logic of Faith hath such Rules as these, every Absolute may be predicated of three in the Singular, and not in the Plural; Unity "holdeth its Consequent, where the Opposite of the "Relation doth not hinder; we may grant, contradictory Propositions of the same Suppositum, when it is with specification of diverse Natures. Notwithstanding, I will not deny clear things concerning the Trinity, as some do, only because they are relear. O don't think we may argue after this manner " The Doctrine of the Trinity is a My-Mystery, a your Account of it is no Mystery, therefore it is not the true Doctrine of the Trinity: For it will be still mysterious enough to us, tho we do not reject what is clear, or certain, about it. See on this Ruez, d. 15. &d. 21. es ar granding to select

V. Of the Difference of the Divine PRIN-CIPLES of ATTRIBUTES.

Nor are the Schools well accorded, how the Principles, or Attributes, as some call them, differ from one another: The most grant that these Attributes or Principles (viz. the Divine LIFE, INTEL-LECT, and WILL) are the very Esence of God; but it is questioned, Whether they are of the Essence as such, that is, as an Essence? Suarez, Metaph. Disp. 30. S. 6. says; "The Attributes, ac"cording to their formal Reasons, are not of the " Essence; "Essence; the in reality they are not distinguish'd from it.

Aureolus, m. 1. d. 8. q. 3. a. 2. and the Nome-nals, Ockam, Biel, Hurtadus, Ariminensis, 1. d. 8. q. 2. do not distinguish the Attributes from the Es-

Scottes, 1. d. 8. q. 4. & d. 2. q. 7. and the Scottists, teach, that the Attributes are distinguished from the Essence by a formal Distinction, in the nature of the thing, without any Act of the Understanding.

Of this, see Rada, cont. 4. p. 57.

Thomas Aquinas, 1. p. q. 4. a. 2. & q. 13. a. 12.

q. 28. a. 2. says; The Attributes are distinguished from one another, by an Act of the Understanding. And so also the Thomists, some of em calling it a Virtual Distinction, others a Fundamental, others an Apritude. By this last they mean, when a thing on its own part is one and undistinguished, yet the Understanding formeth different knowledges of it, that fignify or denote something that is real. And in truth, the Opinion of the Nominals, approved by Suarez, comes up to this. The Scotists siy, it is Non-identity, where there is not distinction; as, between Ens and Non-ens, and between Hubit and Privation; for Distinction as it is an incident and affection of Being, can only be between positive Extremes. And here they deny real Distinction; but assert a formal, viz. distinct objective Conceptions, and Definitions. They mean by Form here, any manner or way under which a thing may be conceived (as they speak) in the Nature of the thing; and hence they coin the term Formality. Saith Rada, "The Formality is nothing else, but the objective way or manner, under which a thing may be conceived, in (or according to) the Nadistinct, which is neither part of a Definition, nor the whole Definition; nor agreeth to it per se, or of

its own Nature, in the first Mode or Instant. But it is to be noted that, Scottes; and the Scotts, Trombita, Lychetus, Mairo, Faber, Meurisse, Bassolis, Rada, and the rest; say both that, the Divine Relations or Persons, and these Attributes, are formally dissinguished from the Essence; and so affirm the same

formal distinction of them both.

- Here the confounding of Attributes, is no small occasion of Error. These three essential Attributes (the Divine LIFE, INTELLECT, and WILL) are not to be confounded with the Attributes of another fort. And the Essence of God is taken, either inadequately for Ovoía, or general Notion of Being, or for a Conception analogous to Metaphysical Matter; and so the Principles are not de Essentià (of the Essence) as an Essence. But if we take Essence in the most perfect Sense, or as some speak for the Divine Form; that is, for an objective Conception analogous to Form; so the triple active Power (or Principles) are de Essentia Dei, of the Essence of God, as it is an Essence: but in the Radix of the Essence it is one Power, not three. We must hold, contra-ry to Section, such Conception of the Divine Essence is not adequate and perfect, that doth not include all these Principles. Methinks Rada hath not well said, p. 73. "The Divine Essence, prescinding from the Attributes, is an Entity so perfect, that a more perfect cannot be conceived. What? An Essence that understanderh not, and willerb not, may it be called most persect? Of Mercy and Justice, which are nothing else but the same Principles as they respect the Creatures, we must indeed say otherways; because to respect the Creature, is not Essential to God. Therefore however we conclude and determine concerning the distinction of Auributes among themselves, or from one another; we must hold as certain truth that, these three are Es-Sential sential to God, and must be distinguished as so many inadequate Conceptions of the Essence. And tho Rada faith rightly, p. 80. Append. 1. "The Divine "Perfections are not said of one another, formally, in the Abstract, viz. Wisdom is not, formally, Love; nor Intellect formally Will. Yet he hath not rightly said, God, as considered quidditatively, or in the quidditative Conception, is not wise. Yes, he is Life, Intellect, Will, Power, Wisdom, Love.

But it is asked, Whether the same must be said of the Trinity of Persons or Relations? Suarez, Metaph. 2. d. 30. S. 4. fays; There is a great difference between Relations and these Attributes: For prescinding the Relations, yet the Essence of God is fully compleated; and each Divine Perfon, separately considered, by the same absolute Essence, is formally, and essentially, and fully, and perfectly God, without the other Relations. And hence the formal Perfection of a Relation, is in reason eminently contained in the Essence, before it is formally joined to it: because the there is of formally no Imperfection in a Relation, there is "however somewhat in it that doth not simply appertain to Perfection. But I dare not subscribe to these things; nor do I understand, how it can be true what many Scholastics say, that a Relation is the Essence of God, and yet doth not belong to the perfection of the Essence: nor dare I to say, the Divine Essence is adequately conceived, as compleat and perfect, without including the Trinity of Persons. If, as Aquines saith, 1.9. 29. a. 2. c. a Person in the rational kind of Substances, signifies as in the whole kind of Substances, Subsistence, a natural thing, Hypostasis; and as he saith, a. 4. c. Person is to be used in the Divine Nature, because it implieth Perfection; and a. 4. c. a Divine Person signifies a Relation in the way of Substance and Hypostasis in the

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Divine Nature. I say, if these Maxims of St. Thomas be true, I see not how a Conception of the Di-vine Essence can be quidditative, adequate and per-fect, that doth not include the Trinity of Principles and Persons. Is that Intellect persect, that doth not understand it self; or that Intellect that doth not produce a Self-complacence, or that Life that is not ellerially Life to it self? essentially Life to it felf?

Gregory Ariminensis saith, 1. d. 8. " No attributal Perfection in God; whether you call it Formality, or quidditative Reason, or whatever else; is an Emity, either great or little, if confidered as distinct from the Divinity (or Divine Essence) of precifely taken. He proves it thus: Taking, saith be, the Divmity by it felf, without any sort of Mode distinct from it; either it is Wisdom, or not. If it is; then either no Wisdom, or the Wisdom that is Formality is in God distinct from the Divi-" nity, which is the thing desired: or there are more Wisdoms in God, which is erroneous.—— If the Divinity is not Wisdom, which no Christian, nay no Heathen, will deny; it follows that, God is "not the Wisdom by which himself is wife, which false. And indeed it seems to me that, the Conception God abstracted from Wisdom, is a lame inadequate Conception; as the Conception Fire abstracted from Hear, is inadequate and imper-

But it is a greater Question, whether Attributes are distinguished from one another; the not in this primary Essentiality? The Reason why Gregory and others deny it, is chiefly the Divine Simplicity. But the Scoliffs, as particularly Rada, Cont. 4. & 24. p. 389. says; "Forma! Non identity is not contrary to the most perfect Simplicity. Whence a formal Distinction in the nature of the thing, tho it be confistent with Composition, yet does not neces"a farily infer it; because things that are distin"guished formally, by precise formal Reasons, are
"not necessarily as Ast and Power; but as two Asts,
"neither of which is in Power to the other. To
which Argument notwithstanding, it is answered by
Gregory Ariminensis; "Tho perhaps Composition may
be so avoided, yet the Simplicity is not salved.

The Reason is, because no thing that in the aforefaid manner doth include more, is simple; and it
shall be so much the less simple, as the things included make it less one. And it is certain that,
those more, of which every one is in Ast, and
none of them in Power to another of them: I say,
such more make a thing to be less one; than do
those more, of which one is in Power to another.
But we will not proceed farther in these Matters;
dark, and therefore ungrateful to most Readers.

VI. The Doctrine of the FATHERS.

For what the Fathers have said, in these Matters; the best, and largest account given of it, is by the Learned Jesuit Dionysim Petavim. One cannot deny that, many of the Fathers of the first Ages Platonized but too much; I am not he that will undertake to defend all their Sayings; I would not corrupt Theology with any thing unsound, from a superstitious Reverence of Antiquity. I grant to Petavins that, divers of the Antients have endeavoured to explicate the Mystery of the Trinity in a rational way; thereby to facilitate the Conversion of Heathers: But I will not grant to the Arians, that almost all the Antients were Arian; or to the Heathers, that well near all the Fathers were Hypocrites and Dissemblers, who to deceive the People have wrote what themselves did not believe. But he that shall read

on the one side Philostorgiu, and the later Arian Sanding; and on the other the rigid Discussion and Irrition of the Doctrine and Sayings of the Antients, by Peravius; will see that Nets and Snares are laid for his Faith, to prevent (if possible) his believing that most, or but many Christians of the first Ages, had a sound Faith concerning the Trinity. Tho Petavius has indeed, elsewhere, well enough vindicated the Catholick Church it felf of those Times, from any finister Imputation, of that kind. But if Peravius have truly reported the Fathers, as tis granted he has; one may wonder that, the Roman Catholics were obliged by the Council of Trent, to swear that they will understand and interpret Holy Scripture, according to the unanimous Consent of the Fathers.

I omit what he faith of Philo, Trismegistus, and

(the late) Eugubinus.

The words of Justin also must be corrected.

Nor does Athenagoras speak cautiously enough of the WORD. But when he saith, in his Apology; MIND and the WORD of God, is the Son of God. And again, "He is the first Of spring of the Father, not created; for God who is Eternal MIND, had within himself from the beginning the Logos, WORD or WISDOM, for he was al-" ways wife. I fay, herein he speaks as divers others of the Fathers did. DOMESTIC THE

Talianus, otherwise unfound, yet speaks agreably to the other Fathers; " A Power was the Principle or " Cause of the Logos - And with him, (with that power of the Logos that was in him made all things. When he faith here, a Power was the Principle of the Logos or WISDOM, he is not alone in this way of fpeaking.

Theophilins Antiochenius, ad Aureol. L. 2. says almest the same things. "Which WORD (or Wis-

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"DOM) he took as his Minister and Instrument, and by him made all things. This same is called the Beginning, because he hath the Sovereignty and "Dominion over all things that were made by him: this is the Spirit of God, the Beginning, the Wis-"dom and Power of the most High. The Word by " which were all things made, taking on him the " Person (Hpoowwov) of the Father and Lord of " all, came into Paradise.—Before any thing existed, the Father had for Counfellor him, who is his Mind and Wisdom. But when God would " make whatsoever he had decreed to make, he be-" gat this prolatitions WISDOM, or WORD. In the " beginning was God only, and the Word or Wildom in him; - the Wisdom therefore being God, and " originated from God, is sent to what snever place, whensoever the Father of all willeth. Because he callech this Wisdom or Word, inward; and the Mind and Wisdom of the Father: Petavius overhastily concludes that, he believed he was not yet a Son, but the fame with the Father: or that he imagined a twofold WISDOM, one Internal or Inward, even the Understanding or Intellect of God; the other temporary, prolatitions and outward, the Minister and Instrument of the Creation. But Theophilis is hereby wronged; for clearly he intends only, as the other Antients, to consider the only Word and Wisdom of God in a double State. viz. 1. In the State of Eternal In-Existence and Co-Existence. 2. Of temporal Operation. He doth not deny the Eternal Generation, or Filiation, tho he expresses only his In-Existence; he teaches a double Production of the same Son, not two Sons.

Ireneus unfoundly maketh the WORD and WIS-DOM to be the Son and Holy Spirit; and of both, faith very improper and inept things. But as others

also do, he saith Principles for Persons.

I leave Clemens Romanus to the Judgment of the Reader; but as divers more he speaketh unsoundly.

Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. 1.7. says; "The Son is Wisdom, Knowledg, and Truth; and more easi-'' ly known than the Father: he is all Mind, all Light, all Eye;—one God with the Father.

Origen speaks very badly sometimes; not always, unless in those places it is his Translator Ruffinus. And we must say the same of Dionysius Alexandrinus, Indeed some of the Fathers of those Ages seem to have held a twofold Nature in Christ, before his Incarnation; the first a Divine, whereby he was the Eternal Logos or WISDOM of God; a second, created, Super-angelical, the first-born of the Creatures, the Minister and Instrument of God in the Creation: and this last only was acknowledged by Arius. Gregory Thaumaturgus, whose words are recited by St. Basil, seems to have believed the twofold Nature. But other Fathers of these Ages (the three first) a double Procession; even the Eternal Generation, and the temporary Progression to the Work of Creation. In the way we want to the control of the

Petavius blames also Methodius the Martyr, because he calleth the Father and Son two Powers; when indeed both of them are but one Power. But the Power that is indeed but one radically and effentially, may be triple or threefold respectively and pro-

cessionally.

I leave Lucian the Martyr also, to his proper Judg. Tertullian believed the Son and Logos is the Eternal Divine Wisdom; but he seems to have thought that, he then became a Person, when he proceeded to the Work of Creation. In Truth, many of these Fathers held a certain Secondary Personality in the Deity; (a Personality in respect and reference to the Creatures;) in the threefold Manifestation of God, by the Creation, Incarnation; Regeneration

or Sanctification. But as to Tertullian, I really think with Pamelius; he acknowledged our Saviour to be Co Eternal to the Father, in one Essence, in one Power; and in one immanent Act, as the Self-Know-

ledg or Wisdom of God.

Nor can I otherways free Athenagoras, Tatianus, Origen, Theophilus Antiochenus, Tertullian, Last antius, or even Zeno Veronensis, or Constantine the Great; accused by Petavius, p. 30, 31. I fay, I cannot otherways clear them of the Imputation of Arianism, but by supposing that; they held the Son or WORD is the Divine Intellect and WISDOM, in Power and immanent Att co-eternal and co-equal with the Father, and proceeding from him by an Eternal Generation; and that, they mistook his Procession to the transient Act of Creation, to be also a fort of Generation: and lastly that, they spoke almost only of this last, because known to the World. The Logos as a Power, and as an immanent Act, is the same: for every Divine Power or Virtue is always in Att. at least immanently; and every Act is Almighty, and the same with the Virtue or Power; these are but inadequate (or partial) Conceptions of the same thing. And the Divine Action as external, as it is the Act of the Agent, and not of the Patient or Effect, is God himself under a partial Conception: but because the External transient Act is spoken of, with Connotation of the Effect, (or is denominated from the Effect, as when we fay Creation, Sanctification, or the like;) and is often faid to be in the Patient; therefore these Fathers improperly and ineptly said, the Logos was then generated, and the Father then breathed the WORD, when he was about to create Angels and the World. It is better thus to interpret these Fathers, especially there being some ground for it; than to grant to the Arians that, the true Faith was believed but by very few Writers

Writers of the first Ages, when Baptism was administred in the Name of the Holy Trinity. The Testimony of all Ages witnesses that, Christ was always celebrated in the Catholick Church, with unanimous Consent, as the Logos or WISDOM of God. William I was also be a single of the s

Considering the inept Sayings of (some of) the Fathers, the obscurity of the thing, the divertity of Expression among the most Orthodox, the unpolish'd Wit of the most; I would be of the Number of. those, who hope better of the Salvation of many, in those days called Heretics, than some others do: there are but too many that scarce give any other Sign of their Orthodoxy, or even of their Christianity, and future Salvation; but their censuring others as Heretics, or at least as Heterodox. Philastrius; whom they call St Philastrius, has hastily, and as it were in the dark, huddled together a great number of Heresies; in his Book on that Subject: but in the same Book he has heaped also so many weak Falfities of his own, some of them contrary to common Sense; that I scarce think, he would have escaped the Imputation of Herefy, if he had not thus fet up for an Accuser of others. In the season bak

Cyprian, de Idol. Van. Edit. Goulart. p. 336. says; The WORD and Son of God was sent to be the Teacher and Administrator of this Indulgence, Grace, and Polity; the Gospel. The Prophets speak " of him, as the Doctor and Light of Mankind; he is the Power, Reason, Wisdom, and Glory of God. St. Cyprian too much conceals the Eternal Generation; but confesses Christ is the REASON and WIS. DOM of God.

The Error of Marcellus Ancyranus, whom Athanasim defended, seems to have been this; that he denied the Eternal Wisdom of God is an Hypostasis or of the true was being die of the Person. 290000

The Passages out of Hermis, Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Polycarp, and others; cited and repeated by Peravius, Præf. c. 2, 3 are such as the other Fathers, censured by Petavius, would have said.

St. Athanasius acknowledged but one Hypostasis in the Deity; but their Controversy was only Verbal. He saith, Lib. cont. Gentil the Logos is the WIS-DOM of God; and as others, he describes him by the transient outward Act of Creation. The WORD and WISDOM, Saith he, obeying the Father created all things. He calls him, WISDOM, LIGHT, TRUTH; all synonymous Names. He adds, "For as he is the Word and Wisdom of the Father, he condescends also to the Creatures; he becomes their Sanctifier, Life, Shepherd, Door, and "Way, that they may know and understand God. And, de Incarn. Verbi, he calls our Saviour God, the WORD of the true God, the WISDOM of the

Father. I he Fathers long used the Terms Hypollases and The as common to all the Divine Persons; and it was a good while before the Greeks would admit of Person: and seeing neither Hypostasis nor Person was a discrenot altogether as the Moderns do. See Petavius, de Trinitate, Lib.4. c.1. p.312. and of the Sense of the Terms Person, Substance, Existence, Nature, Nature of the Thing, Genus, Supposition, at cap. 3,4. as also concerning the Contentions and Stirs about the Terms Hypostasis and Person. We must observe, and ought to lament it; what this fesuit has largely proved, cap. 9. that Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, Theodorus Abucara, Theorianus, and even J. Damascen, seem sometimes to teach only a specific Unity of Nature between the Divine Persons; such as between Peter James and John, whom they would

not have to be called three Men, but one, because they are of the same Species; lest otherways they should be obliged also, on their Principles, to confess three Gods. It was on this Foundation, that Philoponus grounded his Error. If they really held this, the specific Unity; I don't see, how they can avoid the just Imputation of Tritheists. When they departed from the Trinity of Principles, very many fell into the extreme of Tritheism: and at this time the State of the Church was very unhappy; there were but few Writers who, in describing the Trinity or the Person of Christ, were free from the Accu-sation of Heresy by one another. And truly we ought to pity the Sabellians, Eurychians, Nestorians, Monothelites; if these Fathers, reputed Orthodox, were indeed Tritheists: which without doubt we must say of those of them who have taught that, the Divine Essence is not singularly and individually, but only specifically one; for tis plain that such assert one Deity in three Gods, as they would one Humanity in (three Men) Peter James and John. It may be, it has pleased God to permit that, so few should speak soundly and rightly of these Mysteries; partly that we may learn to pity Human Infirmity, in our Brethren: and again partly to admonish us, to content our selves with a shorter Creed, (a Creed according to Scripture, and our Baptismal Covenant) and a more practical Faith; rather than affect controverted Doctrines, and over-curious Determinations.

St. Austin was the first, or of the first, I think, that denied that the Essential Attributes of WIS-DOM and LOVE, by which God loveth and is Wife, are appropriate to the Persons; he was followed herein by P. Lombard, and Lombard by many of the Scholafties. Anselm also follows St. Austin, but doubtingly; he calls the Father Memory and Supreme Wisdom,

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the Son Wisdom of Wisdom. Monolog. c. 43, 6, 46. At c. 33, & 45. he speaks variously; "When the Spirit saith himself, he thereby saith all things that are made;—perhaps because he is the highest Wisdom, and highest Reason, in which are all things that have been made. Cap. 45. "It is certain, the Son is the true WORD; that is, the perfect Knowledg, or the perfect Cognition Intellection and Science of the whole paternal Substance, the Wisdom that understands and knows the Es-"fence of the Father. Therefore it is no Error, if it be said, the Son is (in this sense) Understanding Knowledg and Wisdom; because he knoweth and understandeth the Father.

The Argument, alledged by St. Austin and his Followers, is; "Because WISDOM is the Essence, and a Divine Persection, it must be common to each Divine Person. We must not say, the Father is not wise in himself; but by the Son: or Father and Son are not Love, &c. Thus they hold a double Wisdom in God; the first Unbegotten, the other Begotten. But the other Side answer; The Father is wise, as he hath the Logos, or Son; which is the same as to be wise: and the Son is the Father's Wisdom. The Father is not without the Son, because not without Wisdom; as the Antients spoke in this Matter. And the same is to be ce faid of Love, or Will. They say, again; both the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, are most perfect God; and the same is to be said of the Divine LIFE, INTELLECT, and WILL: but the
Term Father alone, or Son or Spirit alone, doth " not speak the whole Perfection of the Deity, nor " is an adequate Conception of God. And they think St. Austin says the same, even when he seems to oppose it; Because, i. he saith, the begotten WISDOM is God's Knowledg of HIMSELF, and the SPI-

SPIRIT God's Love of HIMSELF; and they deny that, God's Knowledg or Love of Creatures are Son or Spirit. 2. God's Knowledg and Love of HIMSELF. is always in Att: but if so, I pray, what Intellect or Will, what Knowledg or Love, can be ascribed to God, but the Knowledg and Love of HIMSELF? for the Knowledg and Love of Creatures is here excluded. And if the Son is God's whole Knowledg of himself, it is no Impersection that the Father as distinct from the Son is not the Knowledg of himself; or that again, the Father as distinct from the Spirit is not the Love of himself.

Elias Cretensis, in Nazianzen, p. 846. " In the Divine and incomprehensible Trinity, there is an unity in the thing, because of the Identity or sameness of the Essence, Power, and Will; the Division is only in our Conception: For the Perfonsare in one another, according to that of our Saviour, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; we must conceive the difference, or distinction, only in the Personal Properties, Unbegotten Begotten

cs Proceeding.

But let us again look back to the Sayings of the Antients. St. Cyprian, Test. 1. 2. adv. Judaos, c.2,3. proves from Scripture, our Sayiour is the WISDOM

and WORD of God.
St. Aihanasius, as was noted before, teaches; God is not without the Logos, because not without WIS-

DOM.

Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 1. p. 16. denies three Principles, aplas; and the same at Orat. 23. p. 425. but he means only, in the Trinity the Father is the fole Principle of the Son and Spirit. He faith, the Son was not without a Principle (that is, was not unoriginated) and he (the Son) is the Principle or Cause of all other things, Orat. 29. p. 490. In the same place, he calls the Father the Cause of the Son: And

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And at p. 492. By Principle, faith he, I mean Caufe. He often, and earnestly, says; the Unity of the Es-sence, and Trinity of the Properties, is to be held without enquiring into the manner of this Secret; Christians ought to be sollicitous, rather about a good Life, than Curioficies. Orat. 59. p. 493. And both he, and his Interpreter Ruffinus, say; Christ is the WISDOM of the Father immanently, and with respect to the Creation, or externally. He withe WISDOM of the Father, according to the Apostle; and therefore called the WISDOM of God, to fignify that the Father was never without Wildom, that is, never without the Son.

The Exposition of the Faith, ascribed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, saith, p. 98. "No Man can know the "Father, except he know the Son; for the Son is that Wisdom by which all things were made. He " is not such a Wisdom of God, as Man hath, but Perfect; proceeding from God, and yet ever abiding; not like to the Knowledg of Man which passeth away, or to the Word of Man, which is extinct as soon as spoken: And therefore he is not only the WORD, but the Son; not only WISDOM, but God. Whether we would know God by the Creatures, or by the Holy Scrip-tures; we cannot know him but by his WIS-"DOM.

Macarius, Homil.46. saith, The WORD of God. is GOD; and Homil. 11. the Holy. Spirit is like to Fire. This Father, by faying nothing of the Controversies about the Trinity, and by teaching piously and practically, made shift to escape the imputation of Herefy.

We may say the same of Basil of Seleucia; but he ventures to say, There is in Manithe Image of the Trinity. Orat. 1. p. 5, 6. . termin grade hora me !

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And such also was Ephram the Syrian; who yet, in his Testament, swears in an odd Form; "By the threefold Fire of the Holy Trinity; by that one,

and only Wisdom of God; by the three Subsisten-

"ces of the Intellectual Fire, which are thy Subli"mity and Will, and one and the same.

Cyril (or John) of Jerusalem, often says; Men ought not to be wife beyond Scripture, concerning the Divine Mysteries. Catech. 16. p. 176. What the Holy Spirit hath not said (in Scripture) let us not hear. Cat. 11. p. 101. What thou art commanded, that only be careful to learn. Yet he saith, Christ is the WISDOM and POWER of the Father: and again, the Son is God the WISDOM and God the WORD. Cat.4. p. 26.

Synesius hath said but too little of the Trinity, and of Christ; he saith however, Hymn 1. n. 60. p. 314. The Unity dissussed in an inestable manner, bath a triple Power. He saith not, only a triple Relation. Hymn 3. n. 210 p. 323. Thou hast begot the Son, thy excellent Wisdom, and maker of all things. And Hymn 4. p. 336. The pregnant Counsel, the mediating Principle,

the Holy Spirit.

Sr. Basil of Casaria, Lib. 4. c. Eunom. says; "If "Christ is the WISDOM and POWER of " of God, and this Wisdom and Power is uncreate and coeternal with God; as tis certain God was never unwife or impotent: it will follow that, " Christ is uncreate and coeternal with God. But he doth not interpret what is said of Wisdom, in the first Chapter of the Proverbs, as meant of Christ. In the Book concerning the Holy Spirit, against Sabellius; he grants that Christ is the WORD and WIS-DOM of God; and shows at the same time that he is a Person; which Sabellius denied. He often dis-suades from overcurious Enquiries. I omitted that, Clemens Alexandrinus, ad Gent.

fays; "The Image of God is the Son and Logos,

"and

and Man is the Image of the Logos: There is a Mind in Man, who is therefore faid to be made in " the Image of God: Man, on the account of the "Wisdom in him, is likened to the Divine Logos."

St. Gregory Nyssen, Lib. de Imag. & Simil. Dei, sets himself to prove that, the Soul of Man is the Image of God, in respect of Substance, and Trinity. 4 If "thou wilt know God, first know thy self; thou may'st know him by thy own Structure and Make, and by the Things within thee. There are three " personal Properties, in the one Substance of the "Soul; namely that state of the Soul that is unbee gotten, the Word that is begotten, and the Proces-" fion of the Spirit or Mind. And I will confident-" ly affirm, it was with respect to this Trinity in the Soul that the Apostle says, Man was made in the Likeness and Image of God. After he had said, the Soul, Word and Mind are the Image of the Trinity; he especially notes that, only our WORD (the inward and that which is spoken) is the Image of the Son of God. And from the Writings of the Philosophers he discovers another Image of the Trinity, even the Irascible Concupiscible and Rational Faculties in Man. How boldly would the good Man have talk'd, if he had known the true Trinity of Principles in the Human Nature? Perhaps by the Soul, the Image of the Father, he meant VITALITY; by Reason, the Image of the Son, he meant the Thoughts, or the Faculty of THINKING; by Mind, the Image of the Spirit, our FORMAL CONCEPTIONS.

But more clearly, Catechet. Orat. c. 1, & 2. " He that confesses, God is not Ir-rational, must ne-

" cessarily confess that he hath REASON; the Hu-

" man Reason is but equivocally so called: if there-

" fore any one saith, that he understandeth the "REASON and WISDOM after the likeness of

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'the same in w, he will be led thereby to a more sublime Knowledge. After this he shows, like the other Anticots, that, the WISDOM and WORD passes not saway, as ours does, but is permanent. [N. B. They mean, Human Reason or Wisdom; (whether inward, or as a Conception; or outward, or as it becomes a Word;) ceases and is extinguished with the Acti of Thinking or Speaking: but the WISDOM of God not so, for it is an Eternal Act; and as it is the same with the Essence, a Person. For in God, the Act and Essence are really the same, their Distinction is only Modal; the Act is the Essence asting. In the same with the Act is the Essence asting.

Christis the WORD and WISDOM of the Father. And, p. 48. There is one that is the Lover, another the Beloved; and another who is the Love of both,

even the Holy Spirit: but all the same God.

St. ferom, the accused by his Enemies as a Heretic concerning the Trinity, yet has written very little of these Matters. But he writes very earnestly to Pope Damasus, against three Hypostases; which, he saith, in all good Authors signifys three Substances.

All Philologers, says he, understand nothing by Hy-

dares to say three Substances? If you please, let us hold one Hypostasis, without mentioning three Hy-

And intanother Epistle, ad Marcum Presbyterum, 315.

Because I believe and teach a Trinity of Persons that

have all the same Substance, I am called Heretic, and

Sabellian.—Dam an Heretic; What doth it hurt thee? Be content, I have confessed it Every day

they demand, What is my Belief? As if I had been

Stabaptized, without confessing the Creed. I make

his flicha Confession as they would have me, it doth to 'chan latinfy 'em: "I subscribe, they won't believe

me. See the restein the Author.

I omit Eusebins the Church-Historian, because he too much favours the Arians? as Petavius has fully

proved, the Socrates would not have it so. What St. Hilary, of Poiltiers, thought; one may guels by what he has delivered Lib. 12. de Trin. p. 282. "Neither will I be so foolish and impious, as to determine that, the Father hath been at any time without his WORD, WISDOM, and POWER; that is, without the only-begotten God, even my Lord and Saviour Jefus Christ. For as in ws, WORD, WISDOM, and POWER is our own inward Motion and Work : So with the Father, his inward WISDOM and POWER is generated by him, and inseparable from him; " and it appears that he is indeed born of the Father, in that he hath these Names (which are the Names of God's Eternal Properties) given rohim. Again, de Synod. p. 324. "None is the Image of " himself, but represents him whose Image he is; an Image is the undifferenced Likeness of one thing as compared with another: There is therefore a Father, and a Son the Likenels of the Father; but that he may really be the Image and Likeness of his Father, we must suppose that he bath the Nature and Essence of the Begetter. And de Trin. 1. 12. p. 267. We say, Christ is the WISDOM and POWER of God. Lib. 2. p. 11. "There is one God the Father, of whom are all things; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things; one Holy Spirit, the Gift in all. One Power, of which are all things; one Of-spring, by whom are all things; one Gift, the ground of perfect Hope. You may see also his Comment on Matth. Chap. 11. p. 519. and de Synod. p. 326.

We must not expect that, Epiphanius should tell us what, or where, is the Image of the Trinity; for he denies that the Image of God is in the Soul of K 3

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Man, or in his Body, or in his Power, or in his Regeneration by Baptism; or that (in short) we can find where it is. Tho he uses many words concerning the Trinity, he explains the Mystery but little; it amounts to thus much, "There is one God, and a "real Trinity of Hypostases, but it is inscrutable. But, Tom. 1. Hares. 70. & Har. 69. contr. Arianos, and often elsewhere, he says; "The Son is the "WISDOM of God; the supreme WISDOM of God, not in any sigurative speaking, but in rea"lity. And, p. 751. "The Father begat, neither willingly nor unwillingly; as the Arians would " have us to fay; but by Nature, which is superior to Will and Counsel.

Isidorus Pelusiota commends Philo's Consession; and fays, Christ is the WISDOM and POWER of God, and an Hypostasis; and that he is called the

WORD, because Impassible. Lib. 2. Epist. 143.

St. John Chrysostom, as his Adversary Epiphanius, maketh the Image of God in Man to consist only in the Dominion over the other Creatures; on Gen. 1. Hom. 8. and on Gen. 6. Hom. 21. He speaks of the Holy Trinity, only in general, and in Scripture-terms; he fays, The Unity of the Deity, and the Trinity of Hypoft ases.

Andreas Cesariensis, in Apoc. Serm. 20. says; The Hypostasis of the Son is called the WISDOM,

" either to signify his impassible Generation from the "Father; or because he containeth the Ideas and Reasons of all things, or (and chiefly) because "he is the Interpreter and Minister of the Father's

WISDOM and Power.

Leo Romanus saith many things against Nestorius and Eutyches, for the true Deity and Humanity of Christ; for the Unity of Person and Duality of Nature in him: but he has no Scholastic Subtleties concerning the Mystery of the Trinity; but as some other

other Fathers, of the fourth and fifth Centuries, faith only, "There is one Essence, and a Trinity of Properties or Persons. In Tract. adv. error. Emych. p. 189. he saith; "The Holy Trinity divided (as it were) the Work of our Redemption and In"stauration; for the Father was reconciled, the Son

Nor has Maximus Taurinensis much concerning these Questions: he says only, with Holy Scripture; The Son is called the WISDOM and POWER of God, that we may know that the Father begat not after a carnal manner, but in a manner ineffable and incomprehensible. Homil. in Natal. Euseb. Vercel.

did reconcile, and the Holy Spirit sanctified.

Peter Chrysologus, Serm. 119. says; Christ is the true WISDOM of God. But I think, he faith this, only in regard that our Saviour was the Teacher of that Wisdom which is from above, or the Gospel.

Fulgentius hath many things of the Trinity, but plain and scriptural; as ad Monim. ad Thrasimund. ad Petrum, &c. But, cont. Serm. Fastidiosi, c. 16,6 17. he saith after St. Austin; Christ is that WORD or WISDOM which is (as it were) the THOUGHT that springs from MEMORY. Because St. Austin sometimes explains the Trinity by Memory, Knowledg, and Love. And, ad Thrasim. 1.2. c, 4. If the WISDOM were not coeternal to the Father, then bath God been mutable. He means, of Unwise became Wise.

Agnellus Ravennatensis, ad Armen. de rat. Fid. Epist. Bibl. Patr. T. 3. 147. says; When the Father "would beget the Son, Had he a Power to beget

this Virtue, or to will this Wisdom? If you say,

"he had not; you blaspheme. If you say he had "not POWER, or had not WISDOM; you blaspheme.——Add to the WORD, POWER, and

" you have the third Person.

There is a Fragment said to be St. Austin's, concerning the Trinity, in Bibl. Pair. Greco-Latin. KA

Vol. 1. p. 540. where it is said; "Reason teaches that, the Essence of God is Eternal LIFE. But "if this true LIFE was without beginning, it is certain that it KNEW also this Life from all "Eternity; for if it did not, it would not be wise, Eternal LIFE always knew its. Life, or always knew it Self; it had not this KNOWLEDG from another, but the Knowledg is co-essential to the Life, altho the Life begat the Knowledg as its lilue. Therefore the Father never was without "the Son. And, p. 545. 'I said, the Essence of God is Life; but true Life KNOWETH that " it liveth: And if it KNOWETHits Life, it also LOVETH it. But in God-to live, to know, to love, are no other thing but to be: The Love of God therefore is Life, the Life is Spirit: And because by Love God gave Being to all things, therefore the Love is called SPIRIT; and HOLY, because it sanctifier hall things.——By the Spirit of God we are to understand nothing else but the LOVE of God; and from hence God is called Love by the Apostle Jibn. The Father loveth the Son as himself, and the Son loveth the Father as himself; for the Life loveth to be wise, and the Wisdom loveth to live; and we proved before that, the Life and Knowledg (or Wildom) have the same Estence: therefore Love which is the Holy Spirit is co-essential to the Father and Son, and proceeds equally from both. This perfectly agrees with the Triple Principle, or Trinity, that we described in some of the soregoing Sheets; and shall more amply and clearly discourse hereaster. [But this cannot be St. Austin Bishop of Hippo; but some other Austin, who being also antient, his Work hath been mistaken to be that Eather's. For according to St. Austin, the Father is not LIFE, but Mind or JoV.

or INTELLECT; and tho he teaches that, the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, yet he expresly denys (as we noted before) that he proceeds equally from both, as this Writer saith. Nor would St. Austin have said, the Father is Eternal LIFE, and then that the LIFE is the ESSENCE, for so the Father is the Essence; which is Heresy.]

Casarius, in Dial. 1. Ibid. p. 549. says; The Trinity may be explained in a fort, by the Sun, viz. his Fire, Rays, and Light. He hath there more to the

same purpose.

Zacharias Mitylenensis, Disp. Ibid. p. 357. says; ". The WORD or WISDOM presided in the Pro-

creation and Constitution of Things; and the Divine SPIRIT inspires into Essences the Prin-

ciples of Reason and Understanding, and thus

perfect the their Substance. We call the Father of the word or Wisdom, and from whom also pro-

" ceedeth the Spirit, the sirst Cause and Principle of

" the Deity.

We mention'd him before; but again, Cyril of Alexandria, on John I. I. contra Eunom. fays; "The "Son is the Word, Wisdom, Eternal Light of God; and the Son is not one thing, and the Internal Word another. Then he explicates his Generation by the Likeness of Fire and Light; with a great

deal more to the same purpose.

The Reader may usefully see the Creed or Confession of Peregrinus Laureacensis, Patr. Orthod. Vol. 2. p. 1625. and Eugenius Carth. de Cath. Fide, Ibid. p. 1617. and Thalassius, Hecatontad.4. Because I am afraid of tiring my Reader, I am constrained to o-mit many others: I almost repent that I began so long a Work; but it will be necessary that we do not wholly overpass some few very clear Passages of the following Ages. agrandamine in a part

Guitmundus, Archiepiscopus Aversanus, Bibl. Patr. Tom. 6. p. 226, 227. Speaks copiously; the short is. God begot his WISDOM, by whom are all things of himself. This WISDOM is the Son of God, God of God.—But what should God make by " this WISDOM, if he did not first love it? therefore it is evident that, Love proceedeth from the Fa-" ther to the Son, and from the Son to the Father: " This LOVE is the Spirit; which so proceedeth " from both, as to remain in both. The Fa-" ther KNOWETH his whole felf, and LOVETH " his whole self; therefore the WISDOM and LOVE " are each as great as himself, that is, the Son and "Spirit each equal to the Father. The LIFE liveth, the WISDOM liveth, the LOVE liveth; the " WISDOM is Wise, the LIFE wife, the LOVE wise; the LOVE loveth, the LIFE with, the WISDOM loveth. The Father is LIFE, the Son WISDOM, the Holy Spirit LOVE. And these three are but one Substance, which is God. The "Father is Living, the Son Wife, the Holy Spirit Loving; and the Father Living, Wife, Loving; yet but one Nature, which so Liveth as to be LIFE, is so Wise as to be WISDOM, so Loveth as to be LOVE. [N. B. This comes fully up with the triple Principle, or Trinity of Principles, Life, Wisdom, Love; which our Author approves above all other Explications. But in answering the Question here following, this Father wholly adheres to St. Austin.] "It is asked; Is the Son that "Wisdom, by which the Father is Wise; or what is "the same, is the Father Wise by that Wisdom which is the Son? Answ. The Father is Wise as he " hath the Divine Essence: Therefore if the Father were Wife by the Son, he must have Wisdom from "the Son, and consequently Essence from the Son; that is, he should not be the Father, but the Son.

- As Man died and was lost by Insipience, so by WISDOM only he could be restored; the Wisdom of God was incarnate, that the Insipience of

Man might be taken away.

Potho Prumensis, Bibl. Patr. Tom.9. p. 567. Lib. I. de

fratu domus Dei, says; "There are three Invisible "Things of God, POWER, WISDOM, GOOD-"NESS; from which all things proceed, in which

they subsist, and by which they are governed: the " Father is Power, the Son Wisdom, the Holy Spirit

"Goodness or Love; the Power Creates, the Wisdom

Governs, the Love Preserves. The Power by Love wifely Creates, the Wisdom by Power kind-

" ly Governs, the Love by Wisdom powerfully Pre-

ce serves. Edmundus, Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis, in speculo Eccl. c. 28. faith; "By such a way as this, Man cometh to the Knowledg of God, that he is one in Substance, three in Persons; for every Man seeth it in himself. Every Man hath always in himself " Power, Wisdom, and Love proceeding from both: and when he sees it thus in himself, he will inser it is also so in God, who is above him. Namely " that, in God is POWER, from whence proceedeth WISDOM, and from both LOVE. And because from the first Person proceeds the second, and from the first and second the third; therefore the first is called the Father, the second the Son, the third the Holy Spirit. By this Method, Man attaineth to the Knowledg of his Maker; how he is without beginning, and why it is said he is one in Substance and three in Persons: as also, why the first Person is called the Father, the second Son, the third Holy Spirit; why Power is appropriated to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, Love or Goodness to the Spirit? —— And this manner of knowing God, is the Foundation of Holy Contemplation. Ris

Richardus de S. Victore, in opuscul, ad S. Bernardum, de appropriatis Personis, saith; "Power Wisdom Goodness are things most known to us, in that we see and under stand the invisible things of God, by the things that are made. In the Elements, Plants, and Brutes, there is a certain Power, without Wis-dom; in Men and Angels a Power, not without Wisdom: in Lucifer a Power and Wisdom, without Goodness; in Angels and good Men there is not Goodness; or a good Will, without the Power and Knowledg. Therefore we must say, these three are distinct: the Power is Principal, and of

it self; the Wisdom is from the Power, the Goodness or good Will is of both. Gulielmus, Episcopus Parisiensis, de Universo, parte 1. pag. 580. c. 20, 21. saith; "Almighty God created all things by the WORD, that is the Son; and by his WILL, that is the Spirit. The Word is his THOUGT; in God to THINK and WILL are two Divine Productions; but God doth not think, by forming Conclusions, or by parts; but by one most perfect Act. Again, parte 2, pag. 917. he largely shows that; "The Human Soul is the Image of the Father, who is Vital Activity or LIFE; and of the Son who is WISDOM, and of the Spirit which is LOVE. The Holy Spirit is se seen in the Good, by their Goodness; the Son in the Wise, by Wisdom; the Father in the Powerful, by Power. LOVE is the proper Character of the Spirit, WISDOM of the Son, POWER of the

Father.

And we often meet such like Passages in the famous J. Gerson; as at par. 3. fol. 397. col. 3. and elsewhere.

But see the Sense of the Antients concerning the Trinity, more largely, in Petaviue; Dogm. Theol. Tom. 2. lib. 1. cap. 3 west con the VII. The

er in declaring their street, en VII. The Doctrine of the Schools and
the Schools explain the Distinctions

or Differences of the Divine Persons, by the Differences of the Auributes and Primalities; and call the Renfons by the Name of Primalities; that is, Mind or

INTELLECIE, WISDOM, and LOVE.

We have spoke before concerning St. Austin, the Father in this Matter of the School Doctors But take also his Words, cited by Petavius, de Trin. L. 5. c. 4. p. 503.x God is the Cause of all things; and as of all things, so also of his WISDOM; " neither was God at any time without his WIS-"DOM: he is the Eternal Cause of his own Eternal WISDOM, he is not præ-existent in time to his 's own WISDOM, wilds ows sie ales would be

1. P. Lombard, Bishop of Paris, disp. 3. F. p. 8. fays; "The Son is the TRUTH of the Father, the "Holy Spirit GOODNESS. And G. he faith;

"MIND remembers it self, understands it self, loves it

" felf; if we understand this, we understand the

"Trinity: not indeed that Trinity which is God,

but which is the Image of God. For he speaketh here of the HUMAN Mind.] -M.p.11. "Those

three are natural Properties and Powers of the Mind,

and diftinguished from one another; for Memory

is not Intellect or Will, nor Intellect Will or Memo-

but these three are referred to (or suppose) one another; for Mind cannot re-

member it self, or love it self, unless it know it

felf; and so of the rest. They are also one

Substance; for they are substantially, and not as Accidents, in the Soul or Mind. From whence St. Austin, de Trin. lib. 9. says; "Memory Intellect and

Love

Love exist not as Accidents in their Subject; as Colour (for Example) in a Body; but substantially in ally: because the they are predicated relatively, yet each of them is substantially in his Substance, which is the Soul. He says moreover, de Trin. lib. 15. "He that considers the Human Mind, sees there the Image of the Divine Trinity. It appears by this that, neither St. Austin nor P. Lombard thought the Faculties of the Soul are Accidents; as the Thomists have since taught. And it may be doubted, whether St. Austin intended here to describe the mere Relations, or three Relative Faculties.

But Lombard not well satisfied with St. Austin's MEMORY, substitutes another Explication of the Trinity, out of St. Austin also; S. T. "MIND, its "KNOWLEDG, and LOVE of it self, are three; "for Mind knoweth, and loveth it self, nor could it love it self without knowing it self. Mind and its Knowledg are two things, so are Mind and its "Love; therefore when Mind knows and loves it self, here is a Trinity, even Mind Knowledg and "Love. But he distinguishes afterwards the Begotten and Unbegotten Wisdom, and so also between Between and Unbegotten Wisdom, and so also between Between Between Mind Wisdom, and so also between Between Between Wisdom, and so also between Between Between Wisdom, and so also between Between Between Between Wisdom, and so also between Between

gotten and Unbegotten Love; following St. Austin:

but there is no ground for fuch Distinction.

Aquinas also, tho he confesses the Philosophers did not explicitly know the Mystery of the Trinity, yet they knew the Essential Attributes that are appropriated to the Persons; Power to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, Goodness to the Spirit. Here note, 1. These Attributes are Essential. 2. Known and certain to the Philosophers by the Light of Nature. 3. They are appropriate to the Persons; or distinguish the Persons, as their proper Characters. 1. Qu. 32. ar. 1. ad 1mam.

2. Divers Scholastics, following St. Austin, lest they should be constrained to say, the Father is not Wife

Wife and Loving, of himfelf. And lest it should seem, the Father is of the Son; if he be wife by the Son, because to be and to be wife are the same in God. Therefore they say that, Wisdom and Love as they are the Divine Essence are common to each Divine Person; but the Begotten Wisdom is the Son, and the Begotten Love the Holy Spirit, and the Unbegotten Wildom is the Father, or Wildom as Unbegotien is the Father's. They say however, there are not two Wisdoms, or two Loves, but one only; one Essential Wisdom, Begotten and Unbegotten, and one Love. Of which the Master of the Sentences says, it is above my Understanding; but it is safe to speak as the Doctors do. But the Reason why the several Attributes are appropriated to the Persons; and why Wisdom to the Son, Love to the Spirit, Power to the Father; rather than Love to the Son, and Wisdom to the Spirit: I say, I do not see that any of them have given a probable Reason of this, when (according to them) Power Wisdom and Love are nothing else but the Essence. Of the Relations of these Attributes much indeed may be said; but for the Reason of the Appropriation of these Relative Attributes, there can scarce any thing be said satisfactorily, on the Hypothesis of St. Austin.

propriation of these Relative Attributes, there can scarce any thing be said satisfactorily, on the Hypothesis of St. Austin.

Estima, a Man indeed that affected not Subtleties, speaks the clearest, 1. d. 34. s. 3. p. 113. Of the Appropriations of the Divine Persons, the most common, both in Holy Scripture and Writers of the Church, are POWER WISDOM and GOODNESS; Power proper to the Father, Wistom to the Son, Goodness to the Holy Spirit. To which three Attributions, do correspond CREATION REDEMPTION SANCTIFICA-

"TION or GLORIFICATION, as the Acts of the other.—The Reason why Power (or Omni-

" potence) is appropriated to the Father, seems to

" be, because he is the Origin or Principle not only of the Creatures, but of the other two Divine Perfons. By how much any one is able to effect or produce more things, by fo much he is wonted to be accounted by Men most Powerful; therefore Power being most accommodate to the Property of "Father, it is appropriated to him. And again, because the Divine Power is the most remarkable and conspicuous of the Attributes in the work of Creation, therefore is Creation ascribed to the Father. "But of this, another Reason may be also given; " the Father is the first of the Divine Persons, and "the Original of the other two; and the work of " Creation is the first of the Works of God, and the " Foundation both of Redemption and Sanctification: therefore Creation is reckned to the Father. f. 4. p. 114. After this, he proves from Scripture that, WISDOM is appropriate to the Son. " Because, according to his Divine Nature, the Son " proceedeth from the Father after the manner of a "WORD; and a WORD, faith St. Thomas, is no-"thing else but a Conception of Wisdom. [i.e. A " mental Conception, which is Knowledg or Wis-"dom.] But as the Son; as he is God; is a middle ec Person between the Father and the Spirit; as the WORD is a middle between MIND and LOVE: fo it was congruous that the Son, after taking on him our Nature, should be between God and Men. 2. The Attribute of Wisdom has been given to "the Son, because he is to us the Teacher of the true and heavenly Wisdom. 3. Goodness Love Beor nignity is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, be-" cause the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the "Son after the manner of Love. He rejects the Reasons given by Hugo, in Tract. 1. c. 10; and these given by himself, is some higher be not added, afford but little Satisfaction. 3. · All

3. All of them confess, that the Image of the Trinity in us (our Mind or Life, our Intellect and Love) is not such an Image of the Divine Trinity as is perfect, and exactly corresponding. "It is enough (say Scotts and Lychetus, 1. d. 3. q. 9. p. p.142.)
that it represents the Trinity and Unity, which " require Consubstantiality, Distinction, and Origina-" tion: tho it doth not represent in every respect the "Divine Trinity. And St. Austin, Scotus, and Lychetus, say there, 1. "There is an Image of the "Holy Trinity in the Soul, tho an unperfect one; when it understands and loves the Creatures. 2. It " is a more perfect Image, as Understanding and "Loving it self. 3. It is most persect, when it actually understands and loves the Divine Trinity; " because by such Acts it is assimilated to the Object;
the Act of Intellection being the Likeness of the Obu jest.

4. Scotus and the Scotists, and some others, say; "The Image of the Trinity in the Human Soul,

consists both in the first and second Acts. That is, it comprehendeth Intellect and Will, and also

"the Acts of Understanding and Willing. See Ly-

cheius, ibid. p. 141.

5. What hath occasioned much Obscurity in the Minds and Doctrine of the School-Divines, when they dispute concerning the Image of the Trinity in the Human Soul, is that; they knew only of two Principles or Faculties in the Soul, Intellect and Will: They were not aware of the first, even Active. Vitals Power, or Vitality, or LIFE; that this also is a Principle. St. Austin, to make Three, added Memory. When out of the same St. Austin, they substituted MIND for Memory; Matters went better and more easily. Scotts and Lychetus have noted all this, in the places last cited. But neither the Learned Author, nor those Schoolmen, had read St. St. Austin carefully and heedfully enough. St. Austin did not make Intellect the second Principle, but the first; the Order and Names according to St. Austin are, MIND, which he explains by Intellect, SELF-KNOWLEDG, and SELF-LOVE.]

6. It is controverted by the Schoolmen, Whether the Image is only the second Act, or whether it includes the first also? And Scotus denies that, "The Act of Willing (or produced Love) is the third part of the Image; because it doth not imply any Consubstantiality with the Soul, being really distinguished from it: But the Will it self, as informed by the Act of Willing, or by Love, is (according to him) the third part of the Image; because, in respect of the Will, it supposes (or rather it implies) Consubstantiality. As Lychetus reports

him, Ibid. p. 141.

I ask, Whether the same may not be said of the three Eaculties? Concerning the Image you may see more in Alex. Alensis, 1.q. 60. Memb. 3. a. 3. Bonaventura, 1.d. 3.q. 3. Richardus, 1.d. 3.q. 1.a. 2. Scotus, 1.d. 3.q. 9. St. Thomas, 1.q. 93. a. 5, & 6. Durandus, d. 3.q. 3. J. Bacconus, 1.d. 3.q. 3. We must note the words of St. Thomas, 1.q. 39. a. 7.c. The Essential Attributes are more known to us by Reason, than those that are proper to the Persons; because the former are certainly learned from the Work of Creation, the Personal Properties not. In the same place, and again a. 8. he proves the Appropriation of the Attributes.

7. They almost all agree that, the three Persons

are three Relations.

8. Also that, these Relations are not Accidents; for which reason the Thomists deny any Relations of God to the Creatures, lest thereby they should be obliged to admit Accidents in God. But one that understands

derstands the true Nature of a Relation, as before

explained, will not fear that Consequence.

9. Most of the Schoolmen hold that, the Trinity is by no means constituted by any Relation to the Creatures, but only of God to Himself. But some of 'em grant, there is a twofold Cause or Reason of the Denominations of the Persons; one Internal, the other with respect to the Creatures. That God is really related to the Creatures, predicamentally, and even de novo (or in all their Changes, whether Natural or Moral) is indeed denied by St. Thomas, Ca-jetan, Ferrariensis; but defended by Ockham, 1. Disp. 30. Gabriel, ibid. 4,5. Durandus, 9 3. Gr. Ariminensis, Disp. 28. q. 3. a. 1. Marsilius, 32. a. 1. Palacios, 1. d. 5. And saith Hurtadus, by Anselm Monolog. c. 24. (Hurtadus himself defends it, Metaph. Disp. 15. Sect. 2. p. 901.) "God, Gaith Hurtadus, is formally distinct from Pe-"ter; more perfect than He, and (besides) his Lord: But these are formally predicamental Relations, therefore God hath predicamental Relations; I know well what Capreolus and others have alledged and argued to the contrary; but cannot easily force my self to believe or say that, God is not related to the Holy, really and truly, as their Redeemer, San-diffier, Lord, Governour, Father; and also as their Efficient, Dirigent, and Final Cause. Whether these are to be called Predicamental, or rather Transcendental Relations, let Aristotle see to it; for I care not. Hurtadus however observes that, even of the Thomists, Soncinus and Hervaus do assert the Relation of Dominion in God is real. Molina, 1. p. q. 13. a. 7. fays; These Relations are affirmed to be in God, by Durandus, Gabriel, Gregory, and others. Whom he doth not oppose, except in the distinction of these Relations from their Foundation; but the they are not distinguished from their Foundation, we may affirm L 2

Thinks

them in God, without absurdity. Of this mind also is Fonseca, Metaph. lib. 5. c. 15. q. 1. sect. 7. and Palacius, disp. 5. Suarez thinks, this Doctrine is not to be censured, Metaph. 47. disp. seet. 15, 16, 17. Notwithstanding, this School-Doctor, out of respect to the Society of the Jesuits of which he was, for takes here the Nominals; and joins himself to the Scoufts and Thomists. viz. Aquinas, 1. p. q. 13. a. 7. & 2. contra Gent. c. 12. Cajetan; Fer-rariensis; Capreolus, 1. d. 30. q. 1. a. 1. c. 3. and a. 2. C. 2, & 3. Bonaventura, a. I. q. 3. Richardus, a. 1. q. 4. Scotus, q. 1. Ægidius, q. 2. Henricus, quodl. 9. q. 1. Alensis, 1. p. q. 25. Albertinus would prove the contrary, by some trisling unconcluding Arguments, de Relat. prim. Corol. p. 417, 418. But if there be a true Foundation of this Proposition, God created the World, there is a true Foundation of the Relation of Creator.

10. " A Person, Saith St. Thomas, being a sub-" fisting Relation in the Divine Nature, is really the same with the Divine Essence. —— As Relations in " created Things are but Accidents, so in God they are the very Divine Essence.—A Person in the Divine Nature is a Relation as subsisting: a Relation compared with the Essence, can differ from it but only by mental Conception; compared with the opposite Relation, it hath a real distinction from it, by its opposition. 1. q. 39. a. 1. c. It seems then, Opposition and real Distinction, may be in a thing really and altogether the same. By this it appears that, Relation is a term wholly equivocal, when applied to Divine and Human Things: for in Divine Things, they say, it is a Substance not an Accident; but in human and created Things there is no Relation but what is an Accident, and not formally a Substance. They that say, the Foundation and Relation, the Term being supposed, are the same,

same, may say, Relation is a Substance when the Foundation and Term are Substances. But this is not the Doctrine of these Schoolmen: and hitherto Relation, as Relation, has been distinguish'd almost by all from the Foundation, tho not really; and therefore 'tis really only an Ens Rationis, a Creature of Reason, tho its Foundation is not. But a Relation which formally, or as such, is a Substance; and a Substance perfectly the same, and yet divers ways related to it self; and a distinct Relation, where the Subject, Foundation, and Term, are altogether the same; are things unknown to Men: and therefore a Divine Personality is no more understood by the term Relation, than by any unknown or barbarous Word that one might devise; because it doth not signify what Relation is used to signify by Men.

11. Yes, saith St. Thomas, 1. q. 28. a. 2. c. "A Relation really existing in God, is the same (as to " the thing) with the Essence; and doth not differ, but only in our way of Conceiving. -- What-" ever in created Things has an accidental Existence, "in God hath a substantial; — Whatsoever is in God, is his Essence. And thus it is manifest that, a Relation really existing in God, is the same re-" ally with the Essence; its Distinction is only an

Act of Reason. In short, the Being of a Relation, "and the Being of Essence in God, are the same. The sum then is; the Essence is One, the Relations Three: the Relations are real, and really different from one another; and yet really they do not differ from the one Essence. Nay, they are opposite to one another; in an Essence not really different or diverse, there is a real opposition. The Reader may consider of these Maxims of the Thomists, and other School-Doctors. [But this was an affected darkning of Things: The Opposition is not of the Essence, as such, but only of the Relations; which should not be Re-

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lations, if they were not opposed as Relation and Correlate. And tho there are three Relations in God, that really exist, and are the same with the one Essence; they exist only as they are the Essence related, and they are three and opposite only as they are Asts, and respects of the Essence. The Essence acting after three Modes or Manners, Vitally, Intellectively, and Volitively, is as really distinguished; as those three immanent Asts, or the respects arising from them, can distinguish it. They become Relations, as the first Generates, the second is Generated, and the third Proceeds: Which is more easily understood in St. Austin's Hypothesis, as also is all the rest; than in the (Learned) Authors. To generate, and be generated, do inser Relation; and yet every one sees, they are opposite, tho in the same Essence and Substance.]

these things; he opposes them largely, de Trin. lib. 4.
c. 11. p. 405. He says, contrary to St. Austin and the Thomists; "A Person properly and directly signifies something Relative; it doth not denote the Fssence in God, but a Relative Property, and that too but obscurely. n. g. p.411. He rejects those that say; "Relation as spoken of it self, or as including the Essence, doth constitute the Person, and distinguishes as it is opposed to another Relation, or as he speaks quatenus ad alter am dicitur. N. 10. p. 412. he saith, as the Schools more commonly do, Athing is distinguished, by the same that is constituted. But he confesses; "The Notion of Relation and Person in God, is not the same as in Man, or other created Beings: For in God, Relation as distinguished by the Mind from Essence, is a Residential saith saith

sence, not really; and yet subsisteth of it selfs and the Essence by it, tho they differ not; n. 11. p. 413. He saith farther, c. 16. n. 5. p. 456. What is simply one, is neither in it self, nor is numbred. Agreeing herein with Richardus de S. Vict. de Trin. lib. 6. c. 12. "Nothing is rightly said to be equal " with it self. Where there is Unity, we ought " not to say Equality, but Identity. --- What com-" parison can there be in Unity? there is neither Similitude nor Dissimilitude, where there is sim-" ple and perfect Unity.

13. St. Thomas, 1. q. 28. a. 4. reckons four Relations, two Processions, three Persons: Therefore they do not think, every Relation is a Person; tho they say, a Relation that is a Person, differs from a Relation which is not a Person. [Only opposite Relations, which in the Deity are but three, are

Persons.]

14. The Scorists conclude they clear these Matters, better and more easily, by their formal Distinctions. The 24th Controversy in Rada, is; "Whether a Person as sublisting is constituted by Relation, as Relation notionally and conceptively differs from "Essence; or whether as identified with the Essence? In answer, he saith, (1.) According to Capreolius, Ferrariensis, and St. Thomas; there is in God but one essential Subsistence, common to the three Persons; not three relative personal Subsistences. (2.) On the contrary, according to Cajetan, 1.q. 40. a. 4, Relation, not as the same with Essence, but as conceptively distinguish'd from it, constitutes a subsisting Person, or a Person as subsisting. This last is the Opinion also of the Jesuit Petavius. Note, a thing is said by these Writers to be distinguished in Reason, that is distinguished only Notionally or Conceptively. a give a contract of the

The same Rada opens the Opinion of Scotus in these Conclusions, (i.) We must believe three Subsistences in God, if Subsistence be taken in the Conalso, meaning thereby three Modes, or Manners, or Ways of Subsisting. (3.) Essence as differenced only notionally from Relation, doth not make a Person. (4.) Essence as distinguished from personal Relation; either formally in the nature of the thing according to Scotus, or notionally according to St. Thomas; doth not make a subsisting Person. (5.) Relation as identified with the Essence, doth not give subfishence to a Person. (6.) A Divine Relation as only notionally differing from the Essence, doth not make a subsisting Person. And here they object to the Thomasts, that their way of constituting a Person is mere Fiction; theirs are not really Divine Persons, but only Conceptions. (7.) Relation, according to its proper formal Entity, according to which it is not formally in the nature of the thing the same with the Divine Escace, doth constitute a Person. After this, he proves that formal Non-Identity, is not con-

Because this Author has treated of all that con-cerneth the Persons more clearly, than the other Mafers in Subtiley; therefore omitting what they have said, I will only set down here his Conclusions upon some of the Questions.

The Refolutions and Conclusions of Rada.

Contr. 23. p. 340. Qu. Doth this term Person sig-nisy a Relation? In answer; First he approve th the definition of Person given by Richardus, A Person is an incommunicable Existence, in the rational Nature. Then he asks; Doth Person imply the sirst, or second

cond Intention; that is, the real or notional? He answers, contrary to some others, the term Person doth not signify the second Intention.

Quest. Doth Person primarily signify Relation, or an absolute Entity? Answ. 1. Person taken universally, doth not signify Relation. sally, doth not signify Relation. 2. The term Perfon is common to the three Divine Persons. 3. And not by an equivocal Community, which consisteth in the Name only; but an Univocal. 4. The term Person doth not formally signify the second Substance, or Quiddity. 5. Nor formally a Relation, expressly. 6. If the term Person sormally importeth Negation, it signifieth neither Substance nor Relation; because Negation is neither Substance nor Relation: yet it connoteth something positive. 7. If Person signifieth something positive; it is hard to determine whether that Positive in God, be Absolute or Relative. 8. The term Person doth not primarily formally signify a relative Subsistence, or a relative Subsistent. 9. Nor an absolute Subsistent. 10. But a Subsistent or Subsistence that is indifferent to Absolute and Relative. 11. All this is to be applied to a Divine Person. 12 and 13. The term a Divine "Person; according to the current Opinion, which maketh it to be somewhat positive; primarily and formally, signifies a Subsistent in the rational Nature; Materially the particular Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: Secondarily, the distinctive Formalities in the Persons: and lastly, the Essence

"common to them all.

Contr. 23. Qu. Are the Divine Persons in their personal Entity constituted by the Relations? Answ. The Persons are not distinguished by themselves, as the ultimate Differences, but by Personal Properties; nor are they constituted by themselves. Are they consti-tuted then by Absolutes? We must deny it; not be-cause it is without probable Reasons, or Authorities:

but because it is denied by the Fathers, and Councils.

2. It is a rash Opinion, because contrary to the Current of the School-Doctors. 3. We must say, it is near to Error, because it seems contrary to the Councils, and Fathers, and the Schools. 4. It is not plainly and manifestly Heretical. This he proves largely.

Quest. Are the Divine Persons constituted by Relations; and in what manner? Answ. 1. Relation under the express Form of Relation doth constitute a Divine Person, in its real Being; without any Act of the Mind. 2. The first Person hath only two Relations of Origination: The first by which he is related to the second Person, belongeth only to the first Person, and is called Paternity or Generation; the second by which he is related to the third Person, is common to the first and second Persons, and is called Active-Spiration; it is numerically the same Spiration in the Father and Son. 3. The Relation of Origination of the first Person to the second, hath really but one formal Reason, even Paternity or Generation. 4. The first Person is not constituted by Relation to the Third. 5. The first Personal Entity is constituted by the Paternity or Generation.

In the following Conclusions he shows, in what Manner Relation doth constitute a Person; in our way of conceiving. Concl. 1. If we conceive the first Person in God by a compleat Conception, we must needs conceive him Relatively; namely the Father, as a Father. 2. By an incompleat Conception we conceive the first Person, first under the Notion of an Hypostasis or Person, then of Begetter; and of Begetter, before Father. For so in created Beings, we conceive first a Suppositum, then Begetter, then Father; this is the natural Order of these Conceptions. 3. In a compleat Conception the constitutive Entity of the Person of the Father is conceived under the Notion of an Hypostatical Form, because 'tis conceived under the Notion

Notion of Generation, and as Generation, before as Paternity. 4. The Divine Persons, in the Order of our unperfect Conception, are not constituted by Relations under the express Form of Relations; but of Hypostatical Forms, as an Hypostatical (or Personal) Form abstracts both from Relation and Absolute, and is indifferent to both. [Hitherto clear and edifying Rada; now again our Author himself.]

I omit other thorny Questions and Subtleties of the Scholastics, as also the Opinions (and Reasons of them) that are contrary to these here mentioned; but these I have reported, because I have not elsewhere found the Matter so clearly and briefly

opened.

Scotus confesses that, he makes Relation to be the Material of Person, because it is the least of Disserences; and in the most persect Unity the least Disserence is the only true. [But our Author likes not these things; he opposes them, and answers to the Reasons (alledged for them) in some Sections; but the whole is so obscured, by Scholastic Terms, and by Metaphysical Subtleties, that I shall not trouble the English Reader with it: but the short of his Opinion, in plain English, is. "The Divine Personality is not to be placed in one or some of these things, but in all of them. Radically, in the Trinity of Essentialities, Life Intellect Will; then, in the threefold immanent Act, even Self-living Self-knowing Self-loving, and the Relations thence arising: and lastly, Processionally in Creation Redemption and Santtification, and (thereupon) God's triple Relation (of Creator, Redeemer, Sancti-" sier) to us Men. He concludes these Riddles with commending to the Reader the Soliloquium of Henrieus de Hassia, as an excellent Work; and which treateth briefly and soundly of the Trinity.] TO THE WILL BE THE THE PROPERTY OF THE EN

VIII. The Explications by the Reformed Di-

The Reformed have no difference with the Romamore modest, as well in their Determinations as Enquiries, than the School-Doctors. For the most part they contain themselves, within the Bounds of Scripture; and when they do not, they disent from one another, tho not so much as the Romanists.

Luther in his Common-places, p.8. contents himself in a manner with a bare Proposal and Assertion of the Unity and Trinity. Zuinglius indeed objects to him some Heterodoxes, in these Articles; but they seem rather Obreption, than formed Errors. See Zuing-

lius, Tom. 2. p. 475.

Zuinglius himself well explains the Mystery of the Frinity; Tom.2. p. 523, & 525. He illustrates it by the Trinity of Faculties in the Human Soul; and shows, why OMNIPOTENCE is appropriated to the Father, WISDOM to the Son, LOVE to the

Spirit.

Mr. Calvin is prost Orthodox, in these Matters; Genebrard in vain quarrels with him, for his calling our Saviour Auto See God of himself, when the Nicene Creed faith God of God, i. e. God the Son of God the Father. Mr. Calvin has been well defended, as to this, by the Divines of Leiden; and by Cardinal Bellarmine. Mr. Calvin seems to doubt of the Explications and Illustrations of the Trinity, by Human Comparisons. He confesses however that, the Holy Scriptures distinguish, by attributing to the Father the first Causality or beginning of Action; to the Son WISDOM, Counsel, and the Government of the Things; to the Spirit POWER, and Efficacy of Beza Action.

Beza is altogether found; he notes and blames those (inept) Expressions of divers Fathers, that explain the Divine Unity as only a specific Unity. See Beza de Trinitate, in Tract. Theol. Vol. 1. p. 176.

P. Martyr says very little of the Trinity, in his Common-places; and as well there, as in his other

Works, he agrees with the rest.

. Antonius Fayus treats of these Articles more largely and accurately. He faith, "The Persons differ from the Essence, not really, but conceptively; but "they are really distinguish'd from one another. disp. "2. thes. 8, & 30. and disp. 3. "Christ is the "WISDOM, and WORD of the Father; in respect " both of his Essence, and Office of Mediator. disp.

2. thes. 23.

Musculus, a Divine of great Judgment and Sincerity, speaks only known and certain things; the manner of the Eternal Generation he dismisses as inscrutable. But that the Trinity is not incredible in Reason, he proves by the Trinity of Faculties in the Human Soul; and by the Substance Light and Heat of the Solar Body. Loci comm. p. 12, 13, 14.

I say the same of Bullinger, who hath this Passage, Decad. 4. Serm. 3. p. 272. " It is enough that, the

" Faithful believe and confess (according to Scripture and the Creed of the Apostles) one Divine Es-

" sence or Nature, in which are Father Son and Holy

Spirit. Nor need we to be very solicitous, whether " they are called Substances, Subsistences, or Persons;

if we but express their Distinction, and Properties:

" so confessing the Unity, as not to confound the

"Trinity, or deprive the Persons of their Proper-

" ties. And, c. 2. p. 275. " The Creed of the Apof-" thes was published, that none might controvert the

"Faith; or perplex it with needless Disputations,

and Curiofities.

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Illyricus recites several Senses of the Word Logos, given by others; and thinks them uncertain: he believes this to be the most probable, take it in his own words. "Because the Chaldee Paraphrase often uses " the Term Meimar or WORD, for Jehovah; and "that the Chaldee was the vulgar Language of the fews in the Age of our Saviour and the Apostles: therefore St. John, to signify the Messias is true cc Jehovah, calls him (in Greek) Logos; because Logos as well as Meimar is WORD. Clav. Scrip. p. " 1247. And, Clav. part 2. p. 615. he endeavours to prove that, the Name of Jehovah, first revealed to Moses, doth signify that God shall become Man: it ought not (faith he) to be interpreted I am that I am; but I will be, or he will be; that is, he will be the (Incarnate) Redeemer. He saith also, "The Chal-dee Paraphrast renders the Words of the Psalmist, " The LORD Said to his WORD, sit on my right Hand, " Psal. 110. 1. And that St. John; chap. 1. vers. " 1. having regard to the Words of Moses (Gen. "1.) God SAID, Let there be Light, and so of the " rest; therefore calls the Son the WORD. The "Word Jehovab is still a Mystery to the Jews, be-" cause Christ is hid to them. There are three Perfons, Father Son and Holy Spirit; what they are, no words can express. Clavif. part. 2. p. 208.

Wigandus maketh Persons to be a part of the Desinition of God; and largely proves from Scripture the common Faith, not medling with Niceties and Sub-

tleties. Syntag. p. 48.

Zanchim is copious, and accurate. He saith, de tribus Elohim lib. 8. c. 1. p. 337. "A Divine Person is nothing else but the Essence as distinguished (and as it were individuated) by a Personal Property. And p. 340. "The FATHER is an Eternal, Simple, umost Persect, Living, Intellectual, Volitive, and Uncommunicated Essence; and thereby is a Person,

"Person, simply Unbegotten; and generating the Son, by a Communication of himself, that is, of his own Essence. The SON is an Eternal, most " Simple, most Perfect, Living, Intelligent, Volitive " Essence; but which was communicated to him by an immanent and incomprehensible Act of the Father, which the Scriptures have called Generation; " and therefore he is a Person Begotten, by God the " Father, from all Eternity. The Holy SPIRIT is the same Eternal Essence; an Essence most Simple, "most Perfect, Living, Intelligent, Volitive; com"municated to him by an ineffable immanent Action of the Father and Son; and therefore a Person, or proceeding (through all Eternity) from the Father " and the Son. He feems here to distinguish a double immanent Action of God; but whether these Actions are really distinct, from the Essence or from one another, or only notionally and conceptively, he has not determined. He notes, Lib. 1. p. 4. "The Fathers have confessed that, one can dispute " of no Subject that is so difficult, or dangerous, as " this of the Trinity.

Junius, Vol. 1. p. 2012, 2013. saith; "The Di"vine Persons are distinguished from the Essence,

only conceptively; but from one another, by real

"Distinction, which is the Ground of the Properties and Relations. Farther, he distinguishes the

inward Personal Acts; (Begetting, Breathing, Proceeding;) and saith the Father begat the Per-

" son, not the Essence. p. 2016.

Polanus has performed well; but he did not throughly understand the meaning of the School-Doctors, whom he endeavours to follow. He saith, Syntag. 1. 3. c. 8. p. 224. "The Relations of the Persons really differ from one another; so that the Father is one thing, the Son another thing, the Ho"Iy Spirit a third thing: but from the Essence they

" differ

"differ Modally, and Formally, not Really. And, p. 226. "Relation only makes the Distinction; the Re"lation of the Persons is a Mode of existing. He asserts,
"with Gabriel, a formal Distinction; and with St.
"Thomas that, not every (real) Relation maketh a
"Distinction (or Personality) but only an opposite
"Relation. But, t. Either he means Relations, as including their Foundations, or as abstracted from the Foundations: if the former, Relations are the very Divine Essence or Substance; if the latter, Relation is nothing else but Comparability or Reference, a mere Child of Reason, not a Thing or Mode of a Thing. 2. A real Distinction, or as of one thing from another thing, is not the same as either Modal or Formal Distinction; which are indeed in the Nature of the thing, but not real. Therefore when he afterwards distinguishes the Essence, as a thing from its Modes, he speaks Contraries.

Bucanus, Loc. 1. p. 10. says; The difference (of the Persons) is not, 1. Essential. 2. Nor Rational, that is Conceptive Notional or Verbal only. Nor, 3. Respective; as the same Man may be both Father and Son. 4. It is real, but Incomprehensible. He explains it however, by a Mode of Existence; and therefore, probably, he thought it Mo-

dal.

Orsinus and Paraus, in Catechesi, say nothing out of the common Road; but intimate that, the distin-

ction of the Persons is Modal.

Matth. Martinius, a Divine of the first Note, de Symb. p. 60. says; the Persons are distinguished really. In Onomastico, in the word Person, he saith; It is enough to Salvation to know that, Father Son and Spirit are three; and yet are but one God. If this was sufficient to so great a Man; why do we require more of the Unlearned? Do we expect, they should understand the nice Subtleties of the Schools;

Schools; five Notions, four real Relations, three real opposite Relations, two Processions in God. And that, in all this there is however but one indistinct Essence. That, all Distinctions in God, but only that of Persons, are not real, but only conceptive and fastitious. That, tho the distinction of Persons is real, yet they are one undistinguish'd Essence; because there is nothing in God but God. All this, sure, is not necessary to Salvation.

Snevanus, Method. de Deo, p. 70, & 120. lays down many most useful Rules concerning the Trinity; and but few Subtleties. But when he denies, the Father is a Principle with respect to the Son; he

must mean it of a temporary Principle.

G. Sohnius, tho a Divine of great acuteness, has faid only common things; either in his Method; Common-places, Theses, or Exegess. But in this last, p. 87. he says with some Schoolmen, against some of ours; "The Father by communicating his "whole Essence begat the Son, that is, another Per"son from himself; and the Son, by receiving the "whole Essence of the Father, exists, as Light of Light. And the same of the Holy Spirit, p. 88.

Ph. Melanchton, after Luther, finds many Traces of the Trinity, in the Sun, and the Human Soul; and Similitudes of it, in the Arts, as in Astronomy, in Music, in Geometry, Arithmetic, Grammar. Loc. com. p.3,4.

Ludovicus Crocius, a Divine of great Reputation, has many things (in Syntagm.) concerning the Attributes; especially the LIFE, INTELLECT, WILL, and EXECUTIVE POWER. But in truth, they are but three, Astive-Vital-Power, Intellect, and Will. He faith not much of the Trinity; yet he saith, Generation is an immanent Act, p. 696. and that the Persons are distinguished from one another really and astually, but from the Essence only by an Act of Reason. He concludes, the Trinity

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is an inscrutable Mystery; to be adored, not search-

Bishop Davenant, as cited by Crocius; "It hath been well and necessarily determined that, God is

one in Essence, trine in Persons that are distinct.

" But a Man should deserve but little, either of the

Church or of our Saviour, who would define or determine on either side in the Disputes of the

Schools; concerning the manner of the Generation

"or Procession. And, Determ. 24. p. 112, 113. he saith; "A Relation signifys only this or that Mode

" (or manner), of having the Divine Nature.

Reckerman, Syst. Theol. Lib. 1. c. 3. follows the Scholastics, and is of their number, who say; The Persons are Relations and Modes; and that the Acts of Speaking, and of Breathing or Loving, are the Foundations of the Relations. He rejects the real, and formal, and merely conceptive Distinctions, of the Persons; preferring the Modal: and therefore explains what a Mode is, tho by Instances not very congruous.

Beumlersu, a Divine that understood the usefulness of well-chose Method, Theol. Lib. 3. p. 50, 51. prefers the Definition of a Person by Anastasius and Cyril, before all others; The Persons differ, or are dissinguished from one another truly, but not really, each by his Mode of subsisting. And, p. 52. they are dissinguished by Relation, and a certain manner of subsisting. He affirms, 'tis improperly said that; the Essence begets or communicates the Essence, or the Essence

sence emanes from the Essence.

Trelcatius, Instit. Lib. 1. p. 38. says; "The di"stinction of Persons (in the Unity of the Es"sence) is real. And, p. 39. "The Essence is di-

stinguished from the Persons, not as a thing from

other things, but as a thing from the Modes of a thing: for the Persons are Medes of the Divine

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Essence; from which they are differenced, not by a real Distinction, or by mere Conception, but as the Degree or Mode of a thing. But when he saith, the Distinction of the Persons from one another is real; and afterwards, tis in Degree and Mode: Either he thinks, Degree and Mode is an Entity or thing, or he does not use the term real Distinction in a Scholastic sense, or he contradicts himself. But he well describes the Trinity of Attributes.

Dudl. Fennerus concerns himself with no Controversies; and Wendelinus affirms that, a Mode of sub-

fisting doth not constitute a Person.

Maccovins, Colleg. Theol. speaks properly;
"Tis asked, May Person in the Abstract be called
"a Mode? I would not affirm it directly; because
"a Mode is always posterior to the thing or being,
of which it is the Mode: Which must not be said
of God. And yet there is nothing else by which
"we can better express, or conceive, a Personality
in God. For if Personality is really in God, it is
Essence, or Accident, or Mode; there is no sourth.

But it is not Essence, for then there should be
three Essences; nor Accident, for that would take
away the Simplicity of God: It is therefore a
Mode; but Mode analogically, not properly,
taken; and it is, as saith Damascan, an Eternal
Mode.

Gomarus saith, a Person is a Being, that hath its proper Mode of Existence; and not only a Mode of Existing. But he speaketh this of Person in the Concrete, or as it include th the Essence; not of Personality. He engages in no Difficulties. Loc. 3.

Scharpius, Curs. Theol. p. 211. hath the same No-

scharpius, Curl. Theol. p. 211. hath the lame Notion; A Person, saith he, is a Being that hath its proper Mode of Existing, and is not only a Mode of

Existing.

Fest. Hommius, Disp. 7. n.6. says; "In the Nicene Creed, Christ is called God of God, Light of Light; not in respect of his Essence, but Person.

Cluto, Idea Theol. disp. 5. p. 40. saith; "The Divinity contracted is analogically called a Person;

the Persons are distinguished by Properties, and the Properties arise from the Acts proper to the Persons: The Persons are really distinguished

" from one another, that is, not conceptively on-

"Iy. He hath not ventur'd to fay any thing of Per-

Sonality.

Amesius, Medul. Theol. I. 1. c. 4. n. 26. saith; The Divine Attributes are in God, not only virtually and eminently, but formally. But, n. 28. he says also; "They are distinguish'd from the Essence " and from one another ratione ratiocinata, or so that the Foundation of the Distinction is in God. But, 1. Foundation is an ambiguous word; and signifies, either that there is a certain true Diversity and Difference in the thing: or only that, there is an Occasion, without Difference in the thing; as, when it is distinguished by inadequate (or partial) Conceptions. 2. The Distinction of ratio ratiocinata is of the last sort; but modal, formal, and real Distinction, is of the other sort. Chap. 5. He distinguishes Subsistences from the Essence, as Modes of Subsisting (not as Modes of Being;) and from one another by Relative Properties, or Relative Affections. saith, as do others, the difference between Generation and Procession is inexplicable: But that, it may be in a fort explained by this Similitude; the Father is (as it were) GOD KNOWING, the Son GOD THE INTELLECT, the Holy Spirit GOD LO-VED. Somewhat like the Scholasties.

Polyander, in Synopsi Leidensi, Disp. 7. p. 78. says; "A Mode of Subsisting doth not really distin-" guish Person from Essence, but only notionally or

conceptively. N. 28. But the Persons are distin-"guished from one another, not by a Conception

of our Reason, but really. N.20. But the Man-

" ner is rather to be adored, than searched.

Waleus, Ibid. Disp. 8. recites the Explications of the Fathers, by the Acts of Intellect and Will; and doth not reject them. And, n. 16. he faith, The Father communicated his whole Essence to the Son by this Eternal Generation.

Thysius, Ibid. Disp. 9. n. 10. saith; "Procession is to be understood as an immanent Action in the Essence of God, whereby God so acteth in the " Essence, that being reflected on himself, he maketh a Relation by communication of the Divine " Essence. | But this mystical Flourish is nothing but this; Procession is God's reflex Act of Love, or his SELF-COMPLACENCE.] Upon this of Thysius we may note; Either this Act is the same with the Person, or not the same. If the same, then the Attributes and Essential Acts are the Persons: for God's Love, and to love, and to love himself, are the same in God: and God's Intellect, and to understand, and to understand himself, are also the same. But if they say, the Act is not the same with the Person, then they must first distinguish the Attributes and the Efsential Acts from one another; and after say, the Relations arise from them.

Spankemins, Disp. Th. de Trin. p. 46. n. 6. says; The Persons are distinguish'd from the Essence, " not by a real Distinction: but by a formal, or a " modal, or a conceptive; but he determines not by which of these. But, as Amesius, he mistakes the meaning of the Distinction Ratione ratiocinatà: He thinks, 'tis such Distinction' as hath its Foundation in the Thing, when indeed it doth not fignify any difference in the thing it self. Again, he distin-guishes the Persons, in respect, 1. Of their Order. 2. Of their Properties, and Personal Operations.
3. Of their manner of operating, in the Essential Works.
4. Of the Terms of operating, or the Objects on which they operate.
5. Of their mutual Relation.
n. 13. He saith farther, the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son, is not in respect of Essence, but of Person only: and yet he saith, the Explication of the Generation and Procession, by the Acts of Intellect and Will, do rather perplex than expound those Secrets.
n. 16. And he saith, as St. Anstin, he doth not know how to distinguish them.
n. 19. He saith, contrary to St. Anstin, and the Schools; Relations are not the constitutive Principles of the Persons, but only the notifying. He adds, a Mode is used but improperly in describing the Persons, n. 21. [But he means, 'tis not in all respects the same in God and Creatures; but so neither is Person, or any of the other Terms.]

The Thefes Sedanenses, de Trin. n. 7. p. 90. piously fay; " The Doctrine of the Trinity has for its end, rather the comforting and strengthning the Con-" science, than instructing the Mind. And, p. 9. lt is peculiar to this Controverfy that, not only a Mistake is easily made, and the Truth is hard to " be sound; but even when found, is not proposed " and published without danger: For a true Explication, less accurately or properly exprest, ministers occasion of Calumny and Accusation to the Malicious, and of Mistake to the Unlearned. The fafest way is, to keep close to Scripture, and the measure of Knowledg there revealed; and that too in as few words as may be: lest we feem to speak things that are indeed ineffable, and withal forbidden. N. 18. It is sufficient to prove the Eter-" nity of the Son, that he is called (Prov. 8. and

" John 1.) the WISDOM and WORD of the Fa-

et with-

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without WISDOM; or his inward WORD, which is nothing else but the WISDOM of the Father.

See also N. 20, 21, 22.

Lud. Capellus, in Thes. Salmuriens. Vol. 1. n. 12. p. 179. says; "A Person differs from the Essence, "not really, but only conceptively: as a Mode of a Thing, from the Thing; for example, as a degree of Heat, from Heat. But the Persons are really differenced from one another, as the Mode of a Thing from other Modes of it; as in example, one degree of Heat from another. But this is more than conceptive Distinction. He hath besides, at N. 23, & 181. some notable Exceptions; against the Explication by the immanent Acts of the Intellect and Will: but having been already more prolix than I intended, I shall omit them.

Altingius, Loc. Com. pag. 46. speaks cautiously; "The Persons are not really distinct from the Escence, but eminently by an Act of Reason; but from one another really, but not essentially, or separably. The Essence, he saith farther, is not generated, but

communicated.

P. Voetim, Theol. Natural. has abridged almost the whole Theology of the Schools, concerning the Trinity, and the Divine Attributes. But the Reader may consider; whether what he says c.7. S. 4. n. 2, 3, 4. p. 116, 117. agrees with n. 7, 8. p. 120. [But on the whole, Voetim is both learned and accu-

rate. Note, it is Paul Voetius, not Gilbert.]

D. Chamier, Panstrat. de Trin. 1. 1. vindicates Mr. Calvin; who had wished, on certain Conditions, that the terms Trinity and Persons were buried. c. 2. He proves that, the Substance or Deity is not a Relation. c. 3. n. 35. And he proves largely that, the terms WORD, and IMAGE, are figurative, against Suarez, Gontier, and others. c. 8, 9. He saith, The Divines of the Schools have proved that, there is not

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one word (but Ens, or a Being) used univocally, or in the same sense, concerning God and the Creatures: And yet some please themselves, be saith, in barking madly against the Sober, who cannot agree to their Folly and Ignorance, in asserting that WORD and IMAGE are spoke of God and the Gentier are like other vain Subtleties of the Schools; they say, in short; "We must distinguish between the Knowledg of God taken simply, and his knowing by way of the Internal WORD; the first is common to the whole Trinity, the other is terminated on the Internal Word. And God's spraking (say they) antecedeth his WORD, that is, his Know-" ledg; as Scotus and the Scotists (besides others) teach. God's speaking is his thinking, as the School-Doctors teach; his WORD is, as it were, an intelligible Species received. As if God, like us, properly thought; or knows, by receiving a Species, and not by one most perfect Intuition. And as if in God, speaking were one thing, and understanding another; or his simple Self-knowledg different from his Self-knowledg by way of WORD; and that in proper speaking. Saith Chamier again, c. 8. n. 6. " if I should grant that, the inward SPEAKING is terminated on the inward WORD; which yet is an extravagant Battology, because the Terms are the fame; yet the Internal Speaking, and the Internal "Word, is a mere crackle of Words, differing in found, not in signification. A bold insult on the whole fineness of the Schools! But see also what he says c. 10. where he proves that; as to external Works the Father is the first Principle of Action, the Son the Second, the Spirit the Third; yet not three Principles really distinct, but one.

Maresius, yet more boldly and remarkably, Colleg. Loc. com. Theol. 3. n. 22. says; "Altho the

three

three Personal Properties may be expressed by the Relative Terms, of Father, Son, and Spirit: Yet the Relations, Paternity, Filiation, active and pas-" sive Spiration, are untruly by some Scholastics called Real Entities, and by others, Substances subsisting of themselves; from which Mistake of theirs, have come all their Disputes about the Divine Relations. For a Relation, consider'd precisely and abstractly, is a mere respect of one thing to another: which respect tho it hath a real Foundation in the thing, and the habitude of things towards one another; yet (in actu exercito) it always depends on the Operation of the Understanding, as referring, or else opposing one to the other ac-"cording to their natural Disposition and Habitude. N. 23. And seeing according to the Metaphysicians, the Absolute Properties of a Being are not real Beings; How should the Relative Properties of Persons be Real Entities or Beings? The Per-" fons indeed in God are constituted by Relations, as considered in their Foundation; which some call the Manner of Founding: and not as confidered in their External, Denominative, and Respective " (Esse, or) Being. Paternity, as it is the Relati-" on of the Father to the Son, doth not make the " (Person of the) Father, but only denotes that he is Father by his Generation of the Son. I perceive by this, Friend Maresius has read the School-Doctors; and that in Metaphysics and Logics, he does not take Names for Things: But the Romanists will call thee Heretic. They will take it uncivilly that thou wilt not know, or not observe, that the Divines of the Schools do not by Rel ttion understand Relation properly so called; but something that can neither be expressed, nor understood; and yet that, they may write numerous Volumes of what is not to be understood.

Arminius, Disp. 4. p. 187. speaks as the rest do. I say nothing of the Tritheism of Curcellaus; nor of the Minority of the Son in respect of the Father, asserted by Episcopius. But it is remarkable what this last advises, concerning rejecting all the Scholastic Questions and Disputations about these Matters, and of the Trouble and Vexation they gave to him and others. See of this, his Institut. c. 33. p. 337. Cc. 32. p. 333. See also what he saith, c. 24. & 35. of the Indifference of believing the manner of the Divine Filiation of Christ. And in truth, if the many Dissensions of the School-Doctors, are damning to one of the Parties; these samous Disputers are in a bad Condition. Wo to the World, if every one shall be damned, who is not more subtle than the Scotists, Ockamists, and the rest. These Damners and Heretic makers represent our Lord Christ, as a monstrous Tyrant, rather than a Saviour; and as a teacher of Subtleties, not of practical Truths.

See the 27 Differences, observed by Voetius, between a Divine and Human Person. Theol. Natural:

c. 5. S. 2. p. 52, &c.

Not farther to trespass on the Patience of the Reader, I advise him to read the Corpus Confessionum of the Protestant Churches; that he may see how much (according to them) is necessary to be believed in these Questions.

I will conclude with the words of Graius, in Ca-

techesi.

Quest. What reason have you to believe Three in One?

Answ. Finite cannot comprehend Infinite.

2. But is there no likeness any where, of the

Great 7 bree one ?

A. The Sun, his Light, and Heat, are Three and but One.

Q. Is there not the Image of the Maker in Man also?

A. To Live, Understand, and Will, are Three in

One.

Quest. VIII. In this diversity of Opinions; What is your own Judgment of the Trinity of Primalities and Persons compared?

Answ. We have said wherein they agree; the rest may be expressed in these Theses.

1. Nothing should be proposed, as necessary to be

believed, but what is certain.

2. Nothing is necessary to be believed in these Matters, but what is comprehended in the meaning of the Baptismal Covenant, and may be understood by all sincere Christians.

3. It is certain that, the moral Image of God, is the Holiness of the natural Image: Which moral Image is a Trinity of spiritual LIFE, KNOWLEDG, and LOVE, in the Unity of the Spirit or Soul.

4. It is certain that, there is a Trinity of Principles or Faculties in the Unity of the Essence, in Man;

the Image of God.

and Calefactive POWER of the Sun, and the Vital Intellective and Volitive Virtue or POWER of the Human Soul, are the Essential and Formal Differences of the Sun and Soul: Yet they make no Composition in the Essence, nor are Parts of it; but the whole Essence is Life or Vital, and so of the rest, tho not wholly. And yet these Faculties are necessarily to be distinguish'd from one another; for who doth not distinguish the Motive Illuminative and Calefactive Virtues, or the Vital Intellective and Volitive Powers?

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6. No body questions that, the Processional or External Asts of the Soul are distinguished by (or according to) their Objects; and therefore also the Powers or Faculties (from whence those Acts proceed) are distinguished, connotatively, by (or according to) the Objects: So that Intellect, Will, and Vital-Active-Power, which is executive, are undoubtedly distinguished.

7. Not only the External, but the immanent Acts are to be distinguished; so that to act vitally, to understand and love himself, are not altogether the same. To live, to know that I live, and to will to live, one clearly and certainly perceives that they are not the same. And in like manner, to understand, to will to understand (and so of the rest) are not one

another.

- 8. Tho we are certain that, here is a difference; yet what it is, or how to express it, we cannot find: one may say with Ockam, it is better perceived by mental Intuition, or some Internal Sense, than by Organical and Verbal Explication; but the Difference is not to be denied, because it cannot be defined.
- g. It is certain that, as was before said; the Soul both in Naturals and Morals is the Image of God: and therefore the Image by which Man is like to God, confists in this Trinity in Unity; in the Active-Vitality, Intellect, and Will, in the one Essence of the Soul. As by that, he is the Natural Image of God, as is said, Gen. 9. 6. and is distinguished by it from Brutes: so Holy Men are distinguished from Wicked, by God's Moral Image in them; even the Spiritual Life, Light, and Love, that is begot in them by Grace.
- thing can be spoke of God and Creatures Univocally, or in the same Sense; and that no Mortal can have a proper

proper and formal Conception of God, and yet less can express it: we must necessarily conceive of God by equivocal and improper Conceptions; all our Terms and Words concerning God are Metaphorical. For the thing expressed is primarily and eminently in God; yet the Notion of ours that expresses it, is primarily in the Creature, the most famous Signification (as Grammarians speak) is in the created thing.

11. Because we must speak of God metaphorically and improperly, we can borrow our improper and metaphorical Expressions and Conceptions from no other thing so well as the Human Soul. We have no other Natural Glass, as saith the Apostle, in the present Life, in which we can see God more clearly; and certainly it was not for nothing that the Soul of Man is called, in Scripture, and by God himself, the

Likeness and Image of God.

12. It is certain that, the Lord Christ (I speak here of him as Man) is the most perfect Image of God, known to w; who had therefore natural and fanctified Faculties, as a Trinity in Unity.

13. Neither is it to be flighted that, we see the Traces of the Maker in all created Nature: every Active-Nature is formally constituted, of one Substance; and of one formal Power in the Substance or Essence, which yet processionally is threefold; as was noted

before, in my Answer to the fourth Question.

14. Therefore, either we must say nothing at all of God; or we must speak of him, from the Glass before described: that he is one in substantial Escence, and one in formal Power or Virtue; which Power processionally or objectively is triple. This Trinity in Unity is certain; but the Notion or Manner of it, is not clearly and formally known: but a certain thing is not to be denied, because the manner of it may be above us.

15. And therefore again 'tis no wonder there is here so great Diversity of Opinion. Whether these Attributes differ from the Essence and from one another really: or only in the Nature of the thing, namely Formally, or Modally: or only Virtually, by inadequate Conception, called Ratione ratiocinata; or connotatively, by extrinsecal Denomination, called Ratione ratiocinance. But almost all agree that, a good account of the Difference of Conceptions, is given from the thing it self.

16. What are the same with a third, are also the same among themselves; but no farther than they are the same with the said Third: so the Attributes and Persons, so far as they are the same with the Essence,

are the same with one another.

God, from the Will, must not discourse of God. Would he preach, as the Scriptures speak, to Ediscation; or deserve well of God, and the Church; who should teach, that God, in himself, and with respect to his own Act, equally loves Himself and the Creature, Holiness and Impiety, Peter and Judas; or that his Will to save and to damn, is the same; or that his Knowledg of Sin, is the same with Willing of Sin; because in Truth Intellect and Will in God are altogether the same?

18. Altho the Esse, the Verum, and Bonum of God; as Metaphysicians speak; are the same: yet after the Manner and Glass of the Creature, we must say that, to live, to understand himself, to love himself, are not the same in God; that is, are not the same necessary Human Conception of

God.

19. Relation, meant univocally and intelligibly, as distinguish'd from its Foundation, has no greater Entity (or Reality) besides what it has in mental Conception, than Faculties or Powers as distinct from their

their Substances; no nor any greater real Difference

from other Relation.

20. If the Relations in God have a greater Difference or Distinction from one another; than the Attributes; it will become more hard to answer to their Objection, who say, it doth not agree with the Divine Simplicity. The Trinity of Primalities is not more contrary to the Divine Simplicity, than the Trinity of Real Relations which are the same with the Essence.

21. They that fay, the Personal Relations or Perfons really differ from one another; while they differ from the Essence, only by an Act of Reason; can by no means deny the same of the Primalities. He means, the Life Intellect and Love in God, or the Vital Intellective and Volitive Powers, are not less really distinguished from one another; tho they differ from the Essence only by an Act of Reason; than the

Vital Intellective and Volitive ACTS are.]

22. They that say, the Foundations of the Personal Relations really differ from one another; either make the Foundations (them only, or them with the Relations,) to be Persons; or suppose some o-ther real Distinctions in God besides the Relations. And because they hold the Foundations are the immanent Acts, [the Acts of Self-living, Self-knowing, Self-loving.] and every immanent Act of God is the Essence; they teach a real Difference in Absolutes. But the learned Author did not consider there, that; the immanent Acts are not the Essence simply, but are said to be the Essence, only because they are the Essence acting: and therefore tho those Acts are really distinct, this doth not make a real Distinction in Absolutes.

23. But if there be no Difference in the Foundations of the Relations, neither real nor in the Nature of the thing; it cannot be understood, how real Relations should arise without any Difference in the Fun-

damentals,

damentals, Subject, or Term; and a thing altogether the same would be really Relatively distinguished; without Connotation of Externals.

Modes of Existence, while they deny Accidents, say no more than we plainer Men; namely, that there is a Difference, but of what sort they know not. For by distinguishing the Mode of a Thing from the Thing, both Substantial and Accidental, they say nothing distinct, but consused. They that make a Mode somewhat between something and nothing, tell of four such Sorts of Modes: but Gassendus and others the best Philosophers say now, all Accidents are either the Modes or Qualities of Substances. Therefore they consess that they know not what a Mode is, in that they are not able to explicate it to others.

25. It is certain that, there is neither Composi-

tion, nor Impersection in God.

26. And the School-Divines confess that, a Plurality of real Relations and Hypostases in God, is no way contrary to the Divine Simplicity. Nor is it discernable by Reason, how a mere Relation, tho predicamental, should infer Composition or Imperfection. If among the Antipodes there are a thoufand People like or unlike to me, there arises hereby to me no Imperfection or Composition. Some say, the Creatures, are Related (or referred) to God, not he to the Creatures; others that, Relations are attributed to God secundum dici, or Verbally and Notionally; others that, the Relations are real, but Transcendental; others, they are Predicamental, even with respect to the Creatures: but none of these think that, there is hereby any Composition in God. And sure, if it made God to be imperfect or compounded, that we say he is relatively a Creator; then to create must also make him imperfect and compounded: for to be a Creator is nothing else but to be He who doth create. 27. The 27. The dim Human Mind hath Ideas of Perfection, by which too many judg rashly of the Divine Perfection, without knowing whether these Notions do quadrate to the Divine Perfection. Thus the Arians think, a Trinity of Persons is contrary to the Divine Simplicity: when it is God only that knows his own Perfection; and no Difference of Attributes, Acts, Properties, Relations, Persons, that is clearly affirmed of God, in the Word of God, can imply any Imperfection or Composition.

28. Altho the Notions and Terms of Active-Life Intellect and Will, spoken or conceived of God and Creatures, are not Univocal; but Analogical or Metaphorical: yet because in the present Life we have none more proper, it is necessarily to be held that, God liveth, understandeth, and willeth. And because from Eternity there was no other Object but himself, we must say that; as he is Self-living, so he understandeth himself, and willeth (or loveth) himself: but herein is no Composition, or real Diversity of the Agent, Act, or Object.

29. As Life is the first Act, the same with the Li-

ver; so in the Image it hath some Influence on the Intellect and Will: and as the Notion of Life, precedes the Notion of Intellect; so it must be said, I understand and will, because I live; not I live, because I understand and will. Intellect also is prior (in the Order of conceiving) to Will: and the Vital-Act produceth the Act of Intellection, the Vital and In-

tellective Act produceth the Volitive.

30. An Act, conceived without a Vital-Active-Power, is either of an impersect Agent, or is an imperfect Conception; for a Stone may act. I wonder therefore that, some Metaphysicians are afraid they should impute Imperfection to God, if with the Astributed to him an Active Power: for in very Deed we can have no higher or more perfect Conception of God than that, he is an Infinite Virtue and Power, always and most perfectly in Act; it is the true Conception of a most perfect Spirit.

3 t. He that shall well consider the ways of distinguishing of the School-Doctors, will perceive that those Divines plainly declare that; they own a certain Difference between the Attributes, and again between the Relations and Persons: but that withal, they do not know the true Notion or Nature of the Difference; seeing they dispute (with so much Subtlety, and so great Dissent from one another) whether it be a real Distinction, such as of one thing from another thing, or Modal, or Formal, or Virtual, or by External Connotation? Nay one may see, they understand not perfectly their own Distinctions, viz.

The Formal, Modal, Virtual, Rationis ratiocinate, Rationis ratiocinantis: for what one calls a Formal, another names it a Virtual Distinction. As lately Posewitz, Theol. Schol. p. 142,143. calls the Formal Distinction of Scotus, Virtual; and yet real, tho not actual: while yet the Nominals make Virtual Distinction to be only connotative or denominative of the same Virtue, by a Diversity of Acts and Essects. But whether there be some Inexplicable Difference of the Powers or Virtues between one another, which with Posewitz we must call Virtual: or whether (as I rather think) the Power that is altogether one in itself, is triple with respect to its Acts and Effects; this Difference may well enough be called Virtual. [Whereas the Learned Author fays here, the Scholastics do not understand their own Distinctions; and gives for Instance that, what one calls Formal, another calls Virtual, and might have instanced after the same manner in the other Distinctions: as his Observation is untrue, so his Argument or Instance is nothing to the purpose. His Instance doth not prove that, they understand not their own Distinctions; but only that, de 3 - 192 1

that, they do not always apply them alike: nor is it to be expected that they should, till all Mens Observations and Knowledg of the true Natures of things, is of like Extent and Perfection. The Truth is, these Metaphysical Precisions are the very Perfection of Knowledg; without them we can discourse accurately of nothing. But our Author's aim in perplexing thus (all along) the Scholastic Learning, and more particularly their Distinctions that are applied to Essence and Relations, was this; to establish thereby his own Notions of Persons and Trinity, both which in his Hypothesis (or Explication) comprehend a great deal more, than they do in St. Austin's, or the Scholastic Conception or Account of them; as

he will make us presently to see.]

32. If St. Austin and the Schoolmen, who observed the Triple Faculty in the Soul, had not put Memory instead of Active Vitality; without doubt they had otherways ordered their Notions of the Divine Trinity, of which the other (in the Soul) is the Image, than now they have done. And those that are forced, either to prove or illustrate the Trinity, by only the Acts of Understanding and Loving, have drawn on themselves such Difficulties, as discourage others from conceiving of, or explaining the Trivity by the Image of it in Man. St. Thomas for instance, and Alex. Gill, have laboured very much 3 1 am afraid, without the defired Success; to prove that, if we follow the Explication of the Trinity by the Triple Faculty of the Soul, there will be only three Divine Persons Posewitz has many things against this way of establishing the number of the Divine Persons; he endeavours to prove that, by this way of proving and explaining, there will either be more Divine Persons, or none. And Becanus, against Keckerman, and against his own Scholastics, endeavours by many Arguments to subvert this way of N 2 proving

proving the Trinity; namely, by the Image. But if they had understood that, Active-Vitality or LIFE is in the Order of Nature the first Essential Power, and that it produces its own proper Act, and the Act also of INTELLECT; and that Life and Intellect produce the VOLITIVE ACT; lastly that, these three Powers do concur to all External Acts: they would have thought, the Image is the most proper both Proof and Explication of the Divine Tri-

nity.

33. And I truly don't see that St. Austin and the School-Doctors, while they deny that, the Essential Attributes are the Trinity of Persons; avoid the Assertion and Inconvenience, that they designed hereby to escape: I fear, they affirm and deny almost the same thing. For the Acts of Speaking, Under-standing, Loving, are nothing else but the Essential Astributes, as always in Act. And saith P. Aquila Scotellus, 1.d. 2.q. p. 42. The Notional Acts are " founded on the essential Immanent Alts; and with him are divers others. And hence, J. de Ripa and some more, endeavour to prove that, Personality includeth something that is absolute; tho many contradict it, and Peravius thinks it an intolerable Absurdity. And Posewitz, q. 21. p. 125. repeating the Arguments on both sides, seems to incline to them that say; Personality is something absolute: and he answers there the Objections. And if Intellect and Will, to Understand and Will, to Speak and Breath, differ not in God; it is unintelligible that, the self-same thing should be related to it self by a different real Relation. But they that make the Essential Attributes both the Foundation and Terms of the Personal Relations; I leave it to be considered, how and how much they distinguish the Attributes from the Relations? And I have observed that, ordinarily Divines do not hear it very approvingly, when it

it is said the three Divine Persons are only three Relati-0715.

The Determination of the Author, upon the whole that hath been said in this Dissertation.

We must now declare, what we our selves think.

(1.) As to the Thing; the Doctrine of the Trinity.

(2.) As to the Term; Persons.

(1.) As to the Thing. I think it both safe, and necessary, to hold and affirm all those Truths, about which the contending Parties are agreed; so if we err, it will be only in Words and Terms, not in the

Thing it felf. Therefore, and the state of t

1. I think it certain that, from the Unity and Trinity of Principles, or formal active Powers in every active Nature, chiefly in the Soul of Man, which is the Image of God; we must fay, Analogically, and according to the Human Capacity; God is one in substantial formal Essence, or, as they speaks in the Quidditative Conception: And in this one Essence is 2 Trinune Power, a Power that is Three and One; One, as Essence; trine or three, Virtually, Connotatively, most certainly; but whether also Formally, and Modally, I must profess not to know.

2. It is certain that, this Triple Power or Virtue is Vital-Act, or Active Vitality, Intellect and Will: And that, it is to be consider'd, both as a Virtue (or Active Power;) and as an Act, that is Virtue

and Power in the fecond Act. of the land said in

3. Certain it is that, God hath self-Life, Under-

standeth himself, Willeth himself.

ndeth himself, Willeth himself.
4. Therefore these Relations are found in God. First, The Fundamental Relation, viz. by self-Life and self-Action to beget Intellection, and to produce

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Volition or self-Love. Secondly, By Intellection (or self-Knowledg) together with Life, to produce Volition. Thirdly, To Will or Love himself, proceeds from the other two, as in the order of Nature Consequents from Antecedent Principles.

5. These Relations are distinguished by Properties,

as the School-Doctors have shown.

6. Tho what are the same in a third, are the same with one another; whereby these Properties, Relations, and immanent Fundamental Acts, are the same with the Essence, and with one another in the Unity of the Essence; that is, with respect to the Oneness of the Essence; yet they are distinguished and differ from one another, in the Nature of the Thing, and antecedently to any Act of the Understanding; but in a manner unknown to us.

7. I never said, or thought that, the Trinity of Essentialities (viz. the Vital Intellective Volitive Powers.) are the same with the Trinity of Persons, or Father, Son, and Spirit. What I say, is only that; the Trinity of Essentialities or Primalities, showing its Traces or Impressions on all Nature, in every part of active Nature, as I proved in the Answer to the fourth general Question; if it is not the Trinity of Persons, yet makes that Trinity intelligible and credible. For no reason can be given, why one Trinity in the Unity of Essence, should be discoverable in God, by the mere Light of Nature and Reason; and the other be in a manner incredible. I fay not therefore, they are the same; but I prove the revealed Trinity to be credible, by the natural, as by a Demonstration: The Notions and Opinions of others, which I do not understand, I do not however deny.

Tonceived by us, in a triple manner. Finst, As an Alive-Kital, Intellective, Volitive Power. Secondly,

In

In the triple Immanent Act, on himself; or as self-Living, self-Knowing, self-Loving. Thirdly, In a triple, external, or processional Act, as it is the Act of the Agent; or as Creating, Redeeming, Santtifying

or Glorifying.

9. It is certain that, in Holy Scripture the Works of Power are most commonly attributed to the Father, those of Wisdom to the Son, of Love to the Spirit; effecting to the Father, directing to the Son, perfecting to the Spirit; Creation to the Father, Redemption to the Son, Sanctification to the Spirit. The Father is the Author of Nature, the Son of the Remedy, the Spirit of Salvation; all of them conjunctly of Glory.

10. I hold as most certain that, the fæderal Doctrine of the Trinity necessary to Salvation, is practical: He that will be faved, must so believe Father, Son, and Spirit, to be three Persons in one Essence, as to give and dedicate himself to God, and to place his Faith and Hope in him; as his Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier; his Lord, his King, and Friend. This is the saving Faith of the Trinity. And hitherto of

the Thing; Now,

(2.) As to the Name or Term; and here,

1. The Terms Person, Hypostasis, Subsistence, are not inept, or to be avoided: but neither are they simply necessary, as not being found in Scripture in this sense. The Posewitz has said much of the Inconvenience of these Terms: And Peravius has cited much more out of St. Ferom and other Fathers against them. condition of the second constitution

2. I willingly give the Name or Appellation Perfons to the Properties and Relations; but know not,

whether they are to be given to the Primalities.

3. For it is not certain to me that, Properties, or the name Persons, should be so separated from the Esfential Primalities, that the Primalities neither are the Persons, nor the Foundations of the Persons : It N 4 feems.

seems rather that, the name Persons should be given to the Relations, Properties, and elsential Primalities, conjunctly. [He means, the Trinity of Divine Persons is, the Vital Intellective and Volitive Power of the Divine Essence, or God; then the immanent Acts of Self-living, Self-knowing, and Self loving; then the internal Relations hereupon, of Paternity, Filiation, Spiration, as is more particularly explained at Numb. 4. in the first part of this Determination; Lastly, The External Relations of God to his Creatures, or Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. And to fay, and confirm this, was the whole Aim of the Learned Author in this Dissertation.] But if any one lists to contradict these; I, who am ignorant in the Matter, will not gainfay him.

4. That there is something here inexplicable and unconceivable, and that shall hereaster be revealed

and opened, I have no manner of doubt.

5. I doubt not that, besides the consideration of these Eternal Properties, God is often called in Holy Scripture the Father, on the account that he is the Creator; and Son, because he was Incarnate, and for that reason also is said to be generated or begotten; and Holy Spirit, because given by an Inspiration to Men. These are the Personalities best known to us; and on these accounts, as well as higher, are the Son and Spirit said to proceed from the Father.

6. But neither can I doubt that, Father, Son, and Spirit, have been three Persons, from all Eternity: I hold the Eternal Generation, and Processions; according to the manner so often already declared.

7. Tho I hold, with most of the Scholastics, that; the immanent Acts of God on himself, are the primary Foundations of the Properties: Yet I dare not to affirm that even from Eternity the Divine Vitality, Intellect and Will, and Father, Son and Spirit, had no Secondary denominating respect to the things that were to be created. [The meaning here is: Tho - 3

Father.

Father, Son, and Spirit, are primarily so called from the immanent Acts of God on himself, his Self-living, Self-knowing, Self-loving; yet it may be they are secondarily so named, even from Eternity, with respect to (or on the account of) the decreed Creation, Incarnation, and Sanctification.

8. I judg the Reasons of Rada to be most sound, those I mean by which he proves that, 'tis neither Heresy, nor savouring of Heresy, to place the Persons in the absolute Attributes: And he himself seems of the same mind, in that he has alledged and proposed them; but he durst not declare it, it being against the most. [The absolute Attributes are Power, Wisdom, Goodness: If the Divine Personality be placed in these; then God is three Persons as he is God

Almighty, infinitely Wise, and most Good.]

9. As no one shall be damned for the Name or Term, that believeth the whole Thing; viz. The trin-une Virtue or Power, the immanent Acts, the Properties, internal Relations, processional Acts, and external Relations; all which I firmly hold. So none shall be saved, because perhaps he afferts three Persons, but only in the Name; and uses indeed the Terms of the Schools, but never heeds, it may be knows not, that one by Persons means three Absolutes, another three Relations, a third three Modes, a fourth three Formalities, but Himself hath no Idea of his term Persons. The Unity of a Term, that is differently understood, doth not make an Unity in Faith; nor is an Unity of Faith that consisteth in things, destroyed by a diversity in the Terms.

If the Reader would see more, and what is accurate, on the Trinity; let him read Alcuinus (or Albinus) Praceptor sometime to the Emperor Charlemain, de Trinitate: You have him Patr. Orthod. Vol. 2. p. 1730. Also Meurisse the Scotist, de Trinitate. And Henricus de Hassia, Soliloq. de Anima;

you meet him Patr. Orthod. Vol. 2. p. 1607. Authors are brief, clear, and found.

The Conclusion; with a Summary, and Elucidation, of the Whole.

Thus far the Learned Author; who has led us to the Determination he at last makes, through a long and disficult way: And therefore, Reader, let us now refresh, with something that may be more plea-

fant, and more easy.

And in the first place, here is a prety company of Authors, for one Man to have read, on one Subject. Especially considering that, they are not Pamphleteers, or your slender Octavo, or even Quarto Writers; they are all Folio-men, the least of 'em in two, or three Volumes in Folio, divers in fix or feven, some in ten or twelve; and Suarez in twenty four. It is truth, some Men may read all their Lives long, and be never the wiser, but rather the more foolish: But we should wrong our Author, if we did not say; his own Determination upon the whole, is worthy of so great previous Pains and Study; it is Learned, Judicious, Modest. As he had read more Authors, than any Man before him, on these Questions; not excepting D. Petavius: So he understood them best; and allowing that he writes in the Scholastic way, expresses himself clearest.

Well, this Bee has been upon every Flower, growing (or that hath grown) in the Churches Garden; let us examine what he hath brought away, and stor-

ed up, for common use.

SOF

I. In some things all his Authors are agreed; the Fathers with the Scholastics, both with the Moderns, and all of them with one another. As that, there is one Deity, Divine Essence, or God; an individual Divine

Divine Nature, which is numerally one; distinct from all others, indistinct in it self. Some Greek Fathers indeed are accused, as having spoke unaccurately, and incautelously, concerning the Divine Hypostases, or Persons. For in explaining, how three Divine Hypostases can be but one God; they use such Comparisons as seem to intimate that the Hypostases or Persons are Specifically one Nature, but physically and numerally three: which would be three Gods in one (Specific) Divine Nature, as Peter, James, and John, are three Men in one (Specific) Human Nature. But withal these Fathers fay fome other things, that are inconfistent with such an Error. As particularly that, the second Hypo-stass is the WISDOM of God, not metaphorically, Say They, but properly speaking. And again, God was never without the Son or second Hypostalis, because never without WISDOM, or never unwise. They say indeed, the Divine WISDOM and WORD is not like ours, but is a Person: But they explain it, by saying; it is permanent, and always in Act, and thus (considered with the Essence) a Person; while ours is transient, passes away as soon as conceived

or spoken.
II. They agree also, except perhaps two or three. (who in so great a Number, are to be reckoned none,) that; we can know God but only (as faith the Apostle) as in a Glass, which Glass is first the Divine Word or Holy Scripture, and then the Works of God. The former of these, in many Texts, refers us to his Works; as where he may be best seen and known by us, while we are in Via: by these we know that, he is; by these we discover his Essential Attributes, his Omnipotence Omniscience and Goodness. But of these Works, the Human Soul is (by the Scripture-Writers, and by God himself) called the LIKENESS and the IMAGE of God: and there-

fore here it is that, we may inform our selves of him; what he is, as well as that he is; with more clearness, and particularity, than elsewhere. The Human Soul should not, in distinction from the rest of this Sublunary Creation, be called God's Image, if it were not like to him in Trinity, as well as Unity: in the Unity every thing may be said to be like to him; for, it is the first Property of every thing that is, as Metaphysicians observe and agree, to be Unum, One.

The Soul resembles the Unity of God, in its Essies, or (if you will) triple Power.

III. But because the formal Nature of the Soul,

hath not been equally understood by all: therefore in assigning or naming, and describing the Powers, Properties, or Faculties of the Soul, there is some Difference among the Church-Writers; and consequently in their Conceptions of the Divine Trinity, or in alligning the Characters of the Divine Persons, by which they are distinguished from one another.

Concerning the second Property or Person, it is unanimously agreed that, it is the WISDOM of God: and so much is implied in the Name or Appellation, Logos; which signisses WISDOM, or KNOW-LEDG. They mean not however, the Knowledg of the Creature; but only God's SELF-KNOW-LEDG, which is Eternal and Immanent, and the same with himself. And as the Logos is the second Person, or discretive Property, in God; so is Reason (or Wisdom) in the Human Soul. But for the other Faculties of the Soul, how they are to be named; and the two other Divine Personalities, what are their Characters; there hath been (as I said) a great Variety among the Doctors of the Church, from the very first.

Some distinguish the Powers of the Soul, into Memory Intellect and Will; and the same in God: and

this was St. Austin's first Opinion.

Afterwards he said, Mind or INTELLECT, SELF-KNOWLEDG, SELF-COMPLACENCE. Which is commonly followed by the Schools, and Councils of the middle Ages; and not only by the Latin, but Greek Churches, as appears by the Confession

of Faith drawn up by the Patriarch Gennadius.

But divers of the later Fathers said, active Life or VITALITY, INTELLECT, and WILL, are the formal effentiating Powers of the Human Soul. And therefore these said, the triple Distinction in God is by LIFE, INTELLECT, and LOVE or Will; for Love in God, is not a Passion, but his Essential WILL. So, God is three Persons as he is SELF-LIVING, SELF-KNOWING, SELF-LOVING. These say, Life, Intellect, Will are most certainly three distinct Powers, Properties, or Faculties of the Soul; and together are its Essential Form: therefore here we must abide, and by these explain the Divine Trinity. But a Difficulty arises; for some fuspect that, Life is not a distinct Power or Faculty, but as it were the Genus and Foundation of the other Faculties. But the Exception is not valuable; for Intellect also is as it were the Foundation of Will; there can be no Will where there is not Intellect, and the Choices of the Will are (at least generally speaking) grounded on the Judgment that the Intellect makes. What deceived the Objectors was, that Life is not a Faculty of the Human Soul, as it is a Rational Soul; but 'tis a Faculty or Power, and the first Power of the Soul as a Soul.

Some of the Antients, and Moderns also, distinguished yet otherways; some saying, the Character of the first Person is Power: therefore their Trinity is God, as Almighty, Self-Knowing, Self-Loving. Which seems however coincident with the Former;

for by Active-Life they meant, or however intended to include in it, the Vital-Activity or POWER.

But others make Power to be the Character of the third Person; according to those words of the Angel to the Virgin Mary, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, the POWER of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore they explain the Holy Trinity to be God, as the first Cause of all things, as Self-Knowing, and All-Powerful. This last was the Thought of Mr. Calvin; and is followed by the Churches that follow his Model of Doctrine and Discipline, as is seen in the Corpus or Harmony of Confessions of the Protestant Churches, published at Geneva 1581.

But some Fathers of the middle Ages, and some Scholastics that immediately followed them, insist only on Power Wisdom and Goodness; as that Distinction by which God is denominated three Persons.

The Divines of the middle Ages did not wrangle in that bitter Manner, concerning their Opinions; as before and after was done: they usually content themselves with a videtur quod sic, or videtur quod non, in their Oppositions and Answers to one another. They did not hereticate one another, for Differences in the very highest Controversies and Articles; provided the Churches former express Decisions were not opposed, or denied. The Opponent whether in speaking or writing, having first proposed his Doctrine, in a Proposition or Propositions, and explain'd the Terms, said thereupon, & probatur: the Anfwerer, having heard or read the Argument of the Opponent, said, at contra; and thereupon either denied, or distinguished, what had been offered. In short they argued, or conferred, without wrangling: and hence it is that, tho their Explications of the Trinity, or what is meant by three Divine Perfons, are so very different; yet there was no dividing from one another, much less condemning or hereticating one another. They are the only Authors

thors, fince the Foundation of the Christian Name, that have been content to argue disputable Matters in the Schools of the Learned; without bringing; them to the Magistrate, or People, to be determined by Power or Numbers without Knowledg.

IV. Of so many Writers, not one has so much as once thought that, the Divine Persons are so many several or distinct Spirits, or Minds; they all agree in explaining the Trinity by Properties, or Powers, or Modes, or some such Affection of Being; in the

Unity of one Mind, Spirit, Substance, Being.

.V. This Agreement should content us; the difagreement being in a Matter fo unconfiderable. One God, one Eternal Infinite Spirit; most Powerful, infinitely Wife, and infinitely Good, which last implies infinitely Just; our Creator, Instaurator, and Perfetter in Holiness and Happiness; that hath Eternal Self-Life, Self-Knowledg, Self Complacence in this all agree. The Disagreement is only that, whereas there is a triple Distinction in God, known in the Catholic Church by the Name of Persons, and Father Son and Spiration of Spirit proceeding from both; whether these be the triple Power, of LIFE KNOWLEDG and WILL? Or the immanent Acts; of SELF-LIFE, SELFK-NOWLEDG, SELF-COM-PLACENCE; or some such like? Or lastly, all these; so as to comprehend also the triple External Relation of God to his Creatures; that is, their CREATOR, INSTAURATOR, and PERFEC-TER? I say, this Disagreement, or Question rather, is little. Because the Appellation three Persons is applicable (and perhaps equally) to any of these Expositions of the triple Distinction; if we conceive with them (as all agree we should) the Divine Efsence, Deity, or God. And as to the Relative Terms, Father Son and Spirit proceeding from both; fince they are not used, by Confession of all, in the Physical or Vulgar, but in the Hyper-physical and TheolaTheological Sense: it is as plain that, a Reason of those Names may be given also from any of the Expositions, and indeed is actually given; as naturally and adequately, as is requisite to such Terms as are confessed not to be Univocal to God and Creatures,

but Analogical Reductive and Figurative only.

VI. Therefore, for obtaining an Uniformity of speaking, in the Article of the Trinity; it seems best that, all would agree to speak of the Matter, as St. Austin does. I mean not that, those that speak otherways, have not probable Reasons for it; but I say, they are not so much better (after all Objections and Exceptions are satisfied) than that Father's, as will countervail the Inconvenience of so many different ways of speaking. Without resolving to adhere to St. Austin, there will be an endless Variety and Dissonance, in particularizing and adjusting the Characters of the Divine Persons: to the hazarding of the Churches Peace; and to no manner of Advantage, in respect either of necessary Piety, or saving Knowledg.

The Differences of Divines in adjusting the Characters of the Divine Persons, or in explaining the triple Distinction in God, seems somewhat like to the Controversy among Geographers about placing their first Meridian. Ptolemy drew it a Degree Westward of the Fortunate (or Canary) Islands. The Dutch commonly draw it over the Pike of Tenariss, which is one of the Canaries. Mr. Sanson (the French Geographer) over the Isle Fer, another of the Canaries. It is drawn by many over the Azore Islands; by others, among those of Cape Verd. The Spaniards draw it, sometimes over Cape Finisterre, sometimes over the City of Toledo. Some Geographers have withdrawn it Eastward, to the Cape of Good Hope in Africa. Our English Maps begin to draw it over London. It may be, we shall see that, other Nations will also honour their Capitals with the first Meridian.

Meridian. This Schism of the Geographers, from their Father Ptolemy and from one another, is as needless; as it will be endless: for at what Point soever one makes the first Meridian to intersect the Equator in the Maps; all Geographical Questions or Difficulties are answer'd and satisfied, with equal Truth and Certainty. I say hereupon, as the Geographers may make all their Maps uniform, as to the Longitudes of Places; by returning to Ptolemy, the first of them that throughly understood the Celestial and Terrestrial Systems: so may the Divines, and perhaps ought to, conform to the Hypothesis and Explication of St. Austin; and thereby abolish that Confusion of Language, in the Article of the Trinity, that has been (dangerously as well as rashly) introduced by Mens over-valuing their own Authority and Discoveries.

VII. Till this is obtained, all ought to be warned in the mean time that, the Catholic Church has always allowed a Latitude, in adjusting the Characters of the Divine Persons; or what is the same, in expounding what is meant by three Divine Persons, in one Divine Essence. She approves what St. Austin says, de Trin. lib. 9. Let us endeavour to understand the Mystery of the Trinity;

begging help of him, concerning whom we enquire; and as He shall enable us, explicating it to others. So explicating it, that if by milhap we fay that of one Di-

vine Person, which belongeth to another, or to the Tri-' nity; we say not however what is unworthy, either of fuch Divine Person, or of the Trinity. This Moderation and Caution of the Holy Father, hath been always observed in the Catholic Church; all the Writers cited in the foregoing Differtation concerning the Trinity, tho (divers of them) so widely differing in their Expositions, yet are allowed by the Church to be Catholic Writers, for so much as respects these Questions. The Church rejects or censures none but those, that advance a specific Unity; so making the Divine Persons to be so many distinct Sub-

stances, Minds, or Spirits.

VIII. An especial care is to be used, in the Proofs (or Arguments) that we alledg, for establishing the Article of the Trinity. He that by speaking or writing would prove the Holy Trinity, should begin with explaining the Terms; God; Essence, Persons, Unity, Trinity: So he

will

will see, what fort of Scripture-Proofs, or Arguments from the Works of God, on which the Divine Nature and Properties are in some measure impressed; may be properly and consistently alledged: and the like in proving the Divinity of our Saviour. The safest, and most home Proofs of the Trinity, from Holy Scripture, are without doubt those that direct us to know God by his Image; the Human Soul. The Soul is one, in Essence or Substance; triple, in Properties, immanent Acts, and Modes of existing: What we fay beyond or besides this Image, is arbitrarily said; or very imperfectly. For God is not known, immediately; but in the Glass of the Creature, and in his (declared) Likeness, the Soul of Man: He is an Object too great and disproportioned, to be known by us, immediately; He is knowable by us, only inadequately and partially, and by these Similitudes of him.

IX. If we first explain the Terms; and then prove the Contents of them, by their proper Proofs; there will be no more Disputes concerning this Article, or the depending Articles and Questions: the Article will be so clear and

certain, that none will litigate about it.

· The Socinian Controversy arose, merely from a neglect of the Church-Writers, to explain the Terms; Trinity, Persons, Essence, Unity, Father, Son, Spirit, Generation, Procession: and will be quieted, so soon as the Litigants know the meaning of the Terms, that is, know the

true Meaning of the Catholic Church.

The same may be said of the other controverted Articles and Doctrines of the Catholic Church; the Strife was begot by a Misrepresenting by one side, and Misunderstanding by the other side: and this, not only in the Controversies about the Faith, but in those also about the Discipline of the Church. There needs no more to a Coalition among Christians, more especially among Protestants, but only, 1. A true Representation, and dextrous Proposal, of the Catholick Faith and Discipline. 2. That, the (supposed) contrary Parties excuse in one another but as much, as they all tolerate in the Members of their respective Parties. Which thing, if I have opportunity; by retreat and leisure: I shall clear to the unprejudiced of all Perswasions. I have had this Design, not only in my Mind, but on my Hands, these many Years. It looks indeed indeed very much like to the Projects of some Mathematicians; to square the Circle, double the Cube, give the perpetual Motion; or if there be any thing else that more bears the Countenance of Impossible. But things of this nature seem not more impossible, before they are done; than facile, after Men, are shown the manner of doing them. But these Designs are in the hand of Providence: and I owe nothing to the Publick, if that owes nothing to Me.

X. I will conclude with it, that; when we speak (or write) to the People, and not as they speak, we ought to explain our selves, otherways we missead 'em; and the Errors, whether in their Faith or Practice, to which we fo give occasion, shall be imputed to us by God. The Terms Persons, Father, Son, Spirit, Eternal Generation, and the rest, in the Language of the People, imply so many difinet actual Beings; and are always so understood by them: But it is certain, if we leave them in this Error, by neglecting to explain to 'em those Terms, and the Faith intended in 'em; they cannot avoid to be Tritheists and Idolaters. When we go before 'em every Lords day, and every Wednesday and Friday, in these words; O God, the Father, have mercy upon us miserable Sinners; O God, the Son, have mercy upon us miserable Sinners; O God, the Holy Ghost, have mercy upon us miserable Sinners. When we say so often, to the Father, concerning the Son and Holy Spirit; Who liveth, and reigneth, with thee and the Holy Ghost, World without end. And at other times, To whom, with Thee and the Holy Ghost, be all Honour and Glory, now and for ever. When we say, in the A-thanasian Creed, There is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost; and, the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. And in the same Creed, concerning the Son, he is God, of the Substance of the Father, before all Worlds. And in the Nicene Creed, 'I believe in one God the Father, Almighty, ' maker of Heaven and Earth: And in one Lord Je-" sus Christ, begotten of the Father before all Worlds; God of God, very God of very God; who came down from Heaven, and was Incarnate. I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and giver of Life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, and is worshipped together

gether with the Father and Son. I say, when our Words are such, is it not necessary that, we inform our People with great care and explicitness, that since the compiling the Liturgy, and those Creeds, the word Person hath received a new fignification in common and ordinary Speech, from what it then had : and that, the other Phrases and Expressions were intended, and are to be understood Θεοπρεπώς? That, we no more intend by any of those expressions to impute to God a Physical Generation or Procession, or to represent the Divinity as three Beings, or three distinct Objects of Worship; than when we speak of God's Anger or Love, his Eyes or Bowels, we mean he hath real Passions or organical Parts; or than when we fay in the same Creeds, He came down from Heaven, and was Incarnate, we mean to deny his Infinity and Immobility? In short that, we interpret to them, with great exactness, and often, the true Doctrine of the Church in these Articles, and the true meaning of the Terms and Forms we use? The unwillingness of so many, to explain (as they speak) these Mysteries, I hope, is from some better Cause than a secret Tritheism, or culpable ignorance of the Churches Faith: But if they had that clear and certain Knowledg of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church concerning the Holy Trinity, or that abhorrence of Tritheism and Paganism, that they ought to have; it is matter of wonder to me that, their Caution and Zeal is not (almost) wholly on the other side. That is, that they are not as mindful and as forward, to explain the Article of the Trinity, and the manner of our Saviour's Divinity; as now they are reserved in both.

By explaining, in this whole Treatife, I mean, expounding, or (rather) declaring our own (and the Churches) meaning; not, explaining the Mysteries, either of the Unity or Trinity. For God is more perfectly One than we can comprehend: And the immanent Asts that make the Persons, and by which God is denominated Three, are as much above our apprehension; as to their Nature,

and (especially) their Manner.

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